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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis explores the significance of national identity in shaping the 
trajectory of Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. It explains why 
and how Romania’s Euro-Atlantic national identity was subject to re-
definitions and discursive dialogue prior to the European Union accession on 
1 January 2007, as well as how and why these identity re-definitions 
influenced the state’s foreign policy decisions. The research employs a multi-
dimensional framework of national identity, which draws from four academic 
literatures related to: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory 
and self-esteem and international recognition. National identity formation 
represents a two-way socio-psychological process that depends on both 
domestic and international factors. To identify the themes or self-images of 
national identity, the project has examined the discourses of elites as the 
primary actors of Romanian foreign policy. The three main self-images of 
Romania’s Euro-Atlantic national identity – ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and 
‘security provider’ – configured an ideational foundation that impacted on the 
state’s foreign policy throughout 1990 and 2007. 
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Introduction: The General Foundations  
of the Thesis 
 
 
 
The key purpose of my thesis is to explore the importance of national 
identity in shaping the story of Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 
2007. The project analyses an empirical puzzle that has preoccupied 
academics and practitioners alike - how does a state’s national identity 
influence its international relations? In this respect, the thesis explains why 
and how Romania’s Euro-Atlantic national identity was subject to re-
definitions and discursive negotiation prior to the EU accession on 1 January 
2007, as well as how and why these identity re-definitions impacted on the 
state’s foreign policy decisions. My project is only concerned with highlighting 
and elucidating the role of national identity in the configuration of Romania’s 
foreign policy, in order to balance the great attention given to pragmatic or 
material calculations. While I acknowledge the significance of Romanian 
economic interests in the state’s pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration, they are 
included in the category of rational or material factors, together with realist 
interests such as physical security and gaining power. Romania’s post-
communist foreign policy had two major goals that marked the evolution of 
national identity – membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and in the European Union (EU). Romania became an official NATO 
member in March 2004 and an EU one in January 2007. The state’s post-
1990 foreign policy has widely been examined through realist lenses and 
there is an ample scope for accounts that are not focused on material 
interests like power or economic and political benefits. The aim of this 
introductory chapter is to show the general foundation of my thesis, which 
will include the following: underlining the original contribution of my work, 
locating my arguments in the Romanian foreign policy literature and laying 
out the methodological underpinnings of the project. These individual 
components will be divided into three sections – literature review, 
methodology and thesis structure. 
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The original contribution of my research to the Romanian foreign policy 
field derives from conceptual and empirical aspects. This thesis features a 
multi-dimensional framework of national identity which draws from four 
academic literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory 
and self-esteem and international recognition. It is not intended to be a 
constructivist project, because the empirical material on Romanian identity 
and foreign policy during 1990-2007 brought to the surface some problematic 
issues that could not be entirely solved by using constructivist notions and 
instruments. The insights and lacunae of constructivism have been 
supplemented by the other literatures, which together help to understand the 
intricacies of a state’s national identity. The inter-disciplinary nature of my 
ideational framework offers a complex view of national identity that captures 
its internal and external dynamic. National identity formation represents a 
two-way socio-psychological process that depends on both domestic and 
international factors. The internal sources of national identity are the nation 
and collective memories about the historical past. The external dimension of 
national identity requires international recognition, which is intertwined with 
a state’s sense of self-esteem.  
 
Another original contribution of my thesis to the Romanian foreign 
policy literature is the application of national identity to a quite large time 
frame of the state’s post-communist international politics. The period 1990-
2007 was very significant for the re-articulation of Romanian identity and 
provides a series of interesting case studies or ‘formative moments’.1 These 
‘formative moments’ are favourable times that allow new meanings to 
(re)appear and new identities to be (re)established.2 To identify the themes of 
Romania’s national identity, my project has examined the discourses of elites 
as the main actors of foreign policy. The seventeen years following the 1989 
Romanian popular revolution against the communist dictatorship were 
particularly meaningful for Romania as a democratic state and its foreign 
                                       
1 A notion taken from Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of 
Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 77. 
2 Ibid, p. 83. 
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affairs, since they constituted the opportunity for a new beginning. This time 
frame contains several key case studies that show the re-definitions of 
national identity and how the latter have influenced foreign policy actions: the 
1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’; the complicated Hungarian-
Romanian relations that obstructed the signing of a bilateral cooperation 
treaty until mid-1996; Romania’s reactions to the escalating Kosovo crisis 
and eventual NATO intervention of 1999; the state’s support and military 
involvement in the 2003 Iraq war, as well as the domestic debates in 2006 
about maintaining Romanian military presence in Iraq and the post-2005 
intensified Atlanticism of national identity and foreign policy. All these cases 
have been discussed individually or as smaller groups in the literature, but 
not as a sequence of inter-related episodes that have shaped Romanian 
identity and international stances from 1990 to 2007. In order to clarify my 
position in the Romanian foreign policy field, an overview of the literatures 
that both touch upon and deal at length with Romania’s international 
relations is useful at this point. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
The subject of Romanian post-communist foreign policy has been 
explored to some extent in the academic literatures, though not as extensively 
as the foreign policies of other states in Central-Eastern Europe. This section 
aims to map out the various IR disciplines that have a connection with 
Romanian international relations, moving from a wider to a narrower scope as 
the survey focuses on the literature that specifically analyses Romania’s 
foreign policy. The literature review is not meant to be exhaustive and 
contains a few key examples that reflect the arguments circulating in each 
field. The case of Romania has attracted substantial attention from scholars 
preoccupied with democratisation processes. They have studied the political 
and economic aspects of the Romanian transition from a communist 
dictatorship to a democratic regime. A few noteworthy representatives are 
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Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan3, Tom Gallagher’s4 numerous contributions on 
the general politics and abuse of nationalism in newly democratic Romania, 
Florin Abraham’s5 book concerning the impact of external elements on 
Romanian politics, as well as edited volumes by Daniel Nelson6, Lavinia 
Stan7, Duncan Light and David Phinnemore8 and Henry Carey9. Romanian 
external affairs have been discussed as part of broader historical enquiries 
about the country’s evolution. Some relevant examples are the work of Lucian 
Boia on history and myth in the Romanian consciousness10, Steven Roper’s 
book on Romanian political and economic development from the nineteenth 
century until 199911, Nicolae Toboşaru’s monograph on the history of the 
Romanian-US strategic partnership12, Armand Goşu’s article on the 
highlights of Romania’s Eastern policy between 1990 and 200513, along with 
Andrei Miroiu and Simona Soare’s historical overview with a realist outlook 
on Romanian security policy.14 The exclusive topic of Romanian post-1990 
                                       
3 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996). 
4 Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceauşescu: The Politics of Intolerance (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1995); Tom Gallagher, ‘A Feeble Embrace: Romania’s Engagement with 
democracy, 1989-94’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, volume 12, 1996, 
pp. 145-172; Tom Gallagher, ‘Romania’s Desire to be Normal’, Contemporary Politics, volume 
4(2), 1998, pp. 111-125. 
5 Florin Abraham, Transformarea României: 1989-2006. Rolul factorilor externi/ The 
Transformation of Romania: 1989-2006. The Role of External Factors (Bucharest: Institutul 
Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006). 
6 Daniel Nelson (ed.), Romania after Tyranny (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 
7 Lavinia Stan (ed.), Romania in Transition (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). 
8 Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with 
Transition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 
9 Henry F. Carey (ed.), Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society (Oxford: 
Lexington, 2004). 
10 Lucian Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2001). 
11 Steven D. Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005). 
12 Nicolae Toboşaru, Parteneriatul strategic dintre România şi SUA: Istorie şi semnificaţii 
geopolitice/ The Strategic Partnership between Romania and the USA: History and Geopolitical 
Implications (Cluj: Presa Universitară, 2010). 
13 Armand Goşu, ‘Politica răsăriteană a României: 1990-2005’/ ‘Romania’s Eastern Policy: 
1990-2005’, Contrafort, number 1(135), January 2006; available at 
http://www.contrafort.md/old/2006/135/958.html (April 2014). 
14 Andrei Miroiu and Simona Soare, ‘Politica de securitate a României 1878-2006: O 
perspectivă istorică’/ ‘Romania’s Security Policy 1878-2006: A Historical Perspective’ in 
Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Marian Zulean (eds.), Politica de securitate naţională. Concepte, 
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foreign policy has been analysed by three categories of IR literatures: 
explanations driven by material interests, EU and Europeanisation literature 
and accounts based on ideational factors. 
 
Firstly, the literature on Romanian foreign policy driven by material 
interests has been well developed and includes prominent realist 
contributions like that of Ruxandra Ivan. Her research is discussed in more 
detail because it is extensive and emblematic for the type of arguments put 
forth by this kind of material explanation. Ivan has identified three stages of 
Romania’s post-communist foreign policy.15 The first one (1990-1996) was a 
phase of relative confusion, when Romanian leaders hesitated about staying 
within Russia’s sphere or drawing nearer to Western Europe and the US. The 
second stage (1996-2004) clearly set NATO and EU accession as national 
foreign policy objectives and saw the organisation of sustained actions to 
accomplish these goals. The third period (2004-2006) started a stage of re-
definition, when the state’s external initiatives were more intense and 
sometimes even aggressive.16 Ivan argues that Romanian behaviour in 
international politics has been characterised by ‘bandwagoning’. In the early 
1990s, the Soviet Union’s weakened state was not obvious and Romanian 
elites oscillated between two forms of bandwagoning – an alliance with the 
East or one with the West.17 They firmly opted for Western integration only 
when the USSR disintegrated and the new Russian Federation lost its 
superpower status. The same bandwagoning phenomenon occurred in the 
case of US-European divergences on an Iraqi invasion in 2003. Romania was 
involved in the Iraq war and aligned with the US, since the latter was the 
most powerful actor.18  
 
                                                                                                                         
instituţii, procese/ National Security Policy. Concepts, Institutions, Processes (Iaşi: Polirom, 
2007), pp. 149-170. 
15 Ruxandra Ivan, La Politique Etrangère Roumaine (1990-2006)/ Romanian Foreign Policy 
(1990-2006) (Brussels: Editions L’Université de Bruxelles, 2009). 
16 Ibid, pp. 111-148. 
17 Ibid, p. 13; also see Ruxandra Ivan, ‘L’ombre de l’Empire. Les rapports de la Roumanie à la 
Russie, 1991-2006’/ ‘The Shadow of Empire. Relations between Romania and Russia, 1991-
2006’, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 8(3), 2008, pp. 513-538.  
18 Ruxandra Ivan, La Politique Etrangère Roumaine (1990-2006)/ Romanian Foreign Policy 
(1990-2006), p. 167. 
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Ivan also explains that certain internal and external factors inevitably 
shaped Romanian international relations. The domestic source with the 
greatest impact on Romanian foreign policy was the institutional triangle, 
which had been formed by the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs 
Minister. Compared to it, other internal factors like political parties and 
public opinion did not have a decisive contribution to foreign policy 
decisions.19 As for the external elements, the first phase of Romania’s 
international course was channelled by the post-bipolar configuration of the 
international environment and the Euro-Atlantic (Western) integration trend 
prevalent in Central-Eastern Europe. The strategic choices of the second 
phase, such as signing basic treaties with neighbouring states like Hungary, 
were made due to EU and NATO pressures. The conditionality exercised by 
the two organisations over the candidates seeking NATO and EU membership 
was an omnipresent consideration of Romanian international conduct after 
1996.20 
 
Furthermore, Andrei Miroiu has described Romania’s international 
position as typical of a minor power in an anarchic system, needing to ensure 
its security by joining the most powerful continental blocs – the EU and 
NATO.21 Robert Weiner also thinks that Romania has opted for a realist 
approach to its external affairs, especially with former enemies or problematic 
neighbours like Russia and Hungary.22 He considers national interests to be 
the guiding premise of Romanian foreign policy in the post-1989 era, which 
were driven by material and rational calculations like overcoming the state’s 
                                       
19 Ibid, pp. 89-110 and pp. 149-164; also see Ruxandra Ivan, ‘Qui fait la politique étrangère 
roumaine? La prise des décisions: cadre légal et équilibres informels’/ ‘Who Is Responsible for 
Romanian Foreign Policy? The Process of Decision-Making: Legal Arrangements and Informal 
Balance’, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, volume 6(4), 2006, pp. 923-945.   
20 Ruxandra Ivan, La Politique Etrangère Roumaine (1990-2006)/ Romanian Foreign Policy 
(1990-2006), pp. 165-186 and ‘La conditionnalité de l’UE et de l'OTAN sur la politique 
étrangère roumaine des années 1990’/ ‘The Conditionality of the EU and NATO on Romanian 
Foreign Policy in the 1990s’, Revista Institutului Diplomatic Român, volume 2(1), 2007, pp. 
104-114. 
21 Andrei Miroiu, ‘National and International Security at the Dawn of the XXIst Century: The 
Romanian Case’, Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, volume 2(2), 2002, pp. 88-113.  
22 Robert Weiner, ‘Romanian Bilateral Relations with Russia and Hungary: 1989-2002’ in 
Henry F. Carey (ed.), Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society (Oxford: Lexington, 
2004), pp. 485-502. 
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international isolation and resolving its security dilemma. Romanian efforts to 
normalise exchanges with Russia and Hungary simply intended to serve its 
realist interests or fulfil NATO and EU demands.23 Tom Gallagher agrees that, 
for Romania and Hungary, ‘the prospect of shedding their isolation and 
becoming part of an enlarged European security system is a powerful-enough 
incentive to enable them to bridge important differences between them’.24 
Most of these types of material explanations regarding Romania’s foreign 
policy are problematic because they do not open the ‘black box’ of the state. 
They treat states as unitary and exclusively rational actors, whose foreign 
policies consist of fixed and objective preferences like physical security and 
accumulating power or wealth.  
 
Consequently, the literature based on Romanian material interests 
either excludes the role of national identity or subsumes the latter under the 
material constraints of elites as foreign policy decision-makers. National 
identity actually has a great influence on a state’s international stance. 
Material and rational calculations cannot account for all the complexities of 
Romanian foreign policy. A national identity framework rejects the 
assumption that state elites had a unitary and objectively identifiable opinion 
on Romania’s international direction. Instead, it shows the internal 
contestation among Romanian officials in controversial episodes like the 1991 
Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’. Some national leaders endorsed a 
security relationship with the USSR, which could have prevented Romania 
from seeking NATO and EU membership. Even so, the majority of elites 
wanted a Western or Euro-Atlantic orientation for their state; they made sure 
that the signed Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ would not be legally binding and did 
not ratify it in the Romanian Parliament. National identity also supplements 
the story of Romania’s foreign policy by helping to understand why and how 
certain decisions were taken despite material considerations. For instance, at 
a closer look, EU and NATO conditionality did not work well in the case of 
                                       
23 Ibid, pp. 486-499. 
24 Tom Gallagher, ‘Danube Détente: Romania’s Reconciliation with Hungary after 1996’, 
Balkanologie. Revue d’études pluridisciplinaires, volume 1(2), December 1997; 
http://balkanologie.revues.org/index222.html (April 2014). 
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Romanian-Hungarian relations and the signing of their basic treaty of 
cooperation. Both states had inflexible foreign policy views about what 
European identity meant with respect to minority rights. They did not reach a 
mutually agreeable compromise until mid-1996, when the international 
community and especially ‘Europe’ (EU, Council of Europe and OSCE) 
clarified their perspectives on what were the suitable liberal democratic 
provisions for minority rights.  
 
The second category of approaches to Romanian post-communist 
foreign policy pertains to the EU and Europeanisation literature. David 
Phinnemore has extensively analysed Romania’s difficult road towards EU 
accession.25 His article in 2000 dealt with rising domestic concerns that the 
EU did not plan to expand, which would leave the state in a ‘grey zone’ of 
political, economic and social instability characteristic of South-Eastern 
Europe and close to Russia’s influence.26 Together with Dimitris 
Papadimitriou, Phinnemore has written a comprehensive book on Romania’s 
journey to EU membership. They covered a wide variety of issues such as the 
state’s initial cautious steps towards the organisation, the struggle for a 
credible candidacy, EU negotiations and meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the 
delayed political and economic reforms, along with a distinct in-depth look at 
the implementation of the acquis communautaire for justice and home 
affairs.27 The authors’ overarching argument is that Romanian success in 
attaining EU integration must be attributed to both external and internal 
elements: the EU’s decision to continue enlargement, the dynamics of that 
process and the actions of successive national governments to fulfil accession 
requirements.28 Tom Gallagher has provided a different interpretation of 
Romania’s relationship with the EU and eventual EU membership. His core 
thesis is that ‘the EU’s multi-layered system of decision-making was unequal 
                                       
25 David Phinnemore, ‘And We’d Like to Thank… Romania’s Integration into the European 
Union, 1989-2007’, Journal of European Integration, volume 32(3), 2010, pp. 291-308.  
26 David Phinnemore, ‘Stuck in the “Grey Zone”? Fears and Frustrations in Romania’s Quest 
for EU Membership’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, volume 1(1), 2000, pp. 95-
121. 
27 Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, Romania and the European Union: From 
Marginalisation to Membership (London: Routledge, 2008). 
28 Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
  P a g e  | 9 
to the stark challenges presented by a candidate with as many problems as 
Romania’.29 Gallagher basically argues that the ‘story of Romania and the EU 
helps to illustrate the unhelpful way that Western political concepts can be 
transferred to the South-East European context and how they have been 
diluted and even deformed in the process’.30 
 
In the Romanian foreign policy literature, there is an increasing interest 
in Europeanisation or how EU integration impacts on national structures and 
processes of taking decisions. Sorin Denca has produced a comparative study 
of new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe - Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia. He affirms that even if Europeanisation has generated 
institutional adaptation, the structural domestic changes tend to be linked 
more with national factors like governmental coalitions and bureaucratic 
politics, rather than with European integration pressures.31 Another 
contribution to this field has been made by Liliana Popescu, who has tested a 
few hypotheses about Romanian elite socialisation, bureaucratic 
reorganisation, institutional and policy adjustment to the EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and projection of national interests on the EU 
agenda.32 She concludes that Romania’s external relations have become more 
coherent due to EU membership, especially with regards to advocating the 
Republic of Moldova’s EU candidacy and placing it more firmly onto the 
organisation’s agenda.33 On a related note, Mircea Micu has evaluated the 
methodological utility of the Europeanisation toolkit and given some insights 
about its application in the Romanian case. Micu discusses ‘misfit’ examples 
where the EU and Romania did not have a common view. He identifies the 
domestic elements targeted by EU adaptation pressures, detects the direction 
                                       
29 Tom Gallagher, Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong 
(Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2009), p. 3. 
30 Ibid, p. 11.  
31 Sorin Ş. Denca, ‘Europeanization of Foreign Policy: Empirical Findings from Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, volume 5(3), 2009, pp. 
389-404. 
32 Liliana Popescu, ‘Europeanization of Romanian Foreign Policy’, Romanian Journal of 
European Affairs, volume 10(4), 2010, pp. 50-65.  
33 Ibid, pp. 59-61. 
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and degree of change if they exist and then explains these shifts through 
established logics like that of ‘appropriateness’.34  
 
An interesting ‘misfit’ case happened in August 2002, when Romania 
was the first state to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the US. The 
document granted all American citizens immunity from the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court. Romania’s decision initially favoured the US in 
an inter-state issue that was highly controversial for the EU members. In 
such circumstances, Micu argues that widely used EU models of foreign 
policy cooperation showed their relevance. The EU expected that the 
consultation norm would be internalised by members, as well as candidate 
states.35 The ‘appropriate’ EU perspective emerged after consultations and did 
not endorse the signing of Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the US, except 
within narrow parameters. These bilateral treaties could only exempt 
American diplomats, military personnel and extradited persons from the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Romania refusing to adopt 
the EU view could have affected the state’s chances for EU accession.36 The 
state eventually aligned with the EU and did not make the American Bilateral 
Immunity Agreement legally binding by ratifying it in Parliament. 
 
While certainly interesting, most of the EU and Europeanisation 
approaches to Romanian foreign policy go beyond the scope of my research, 
which has the end point of January 2007 when the state became an official 
EU member. My project examines Romanian foreign policy through a different 
lens too, which is the state’s national identity. EU accession irrevocably 
confirmed Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity, which had already been 
internationally recognised via NATO integration in 2004. EU and NATO 
membership were the major goals of Romania’s post-communist foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, the 2002 American Bilateral Immunity Agreement will be 
discussed in more detail as part of the formative period of 2000-2004. This 
                                       
34 Mircea Micu, ‘The Europeanization of Romanian Foreign Policy: Mitigating European and 
National “Misfits” in the International Criminal Court and Kosovo Cases’, Romanian Journal 
of European Affairs, volume 11(4), 2011, pp. 50-65. 
35 Ibid, p. 54. 
36 Ibid, pp. 55-57. 
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episode of Romanian foreign policy underlined the state’s uncomfortable 
situation between the opposing US and ‘European’ (EU) positions, which 
would be later amplified in the case of the Iraq war (2003). Romania did 
modify its initial support for the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement 
under ‘European’ pressures. Yet the document’s key significance lay in 
prefiguring that Romania could prefer an ‘Atlantic’ rather ‘European’ 
orientation on Iraq, depending on how national identity shaped the state’s 
foreign policy in 2003. 
 
The third category of approaches to Romanian foreign policy refers to 
ideational factors, which are similar to the enquiry of my thesis. Alina Hosu 
has written a very useful book chapter on Romanian identity, where she 
argues that ‘Romania’s security policy in the post-Cold War period is closely 
linked to processes of state-building and political identity formation’.37 Hosu 
thinks that, ‘through the practice of security, the boundaries of identity 
within Romania, and those between Romania and “the West”, have been 
constantly (re)drawn’.38 The author also mentions how Romania was 
frequently articulated after 1990 as ‘Central-European’ and as being a 
‘security provider’.39 The discussion focuses on how securitisation 
mechanisms constructed ‘Romanianness’ and the state’s relationship with 
neighbouring Hungary: ‘[t]he fear that Hungary would act to attain the return 
of Transylvania, the threat of the non-loyalty of the Hungarian minority, and 
the alarm over ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia point to the highly 
complex, and contested, processes of nation building in post-communist 
Romania’.40 The author has concluded that security discourses revealed the 
‘(re)drawing of ethno-cultural boundaries’ between Romanians and 
Hungarians, as well as the construction of a collective subjectivity between 
‘Romania’ and ‘the West’.41 In a similar vein, Irina Angelescu’s article in 2011 
                                       
37 Alina Hosu, ‘Post-Cold War Romania: A Study in the Construction of Security and Identity’ 
in Eiki Berg and Henk van Houtum (eds.), Routing Borders between Territories, Discourses 
and Practices (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 52. 
38 Ibid, p. 53. 
39 Ibid, p. 64 and p. 72. 
40 Ibid, p. 69.  
41 Ibid, p. 71. 
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talks about a ‘foreign policy’ or ‘political’ identity that has affected the 
‘Eastern vocation’ of Romanian international positions.42 She argues that - 
‘Romania expresses a form of solidarity with most of its neighbors on the basis of a 
political identity that it shares with them (...) Romania’s path of accession to Euro-
Atlantic institutions has consolidated this liberal-democratic form of its political 
identity and had beneficial consequences for the country’s relations with its 
neighbors. The exception to this pattern is Moldova, as historical identity lies at the 
basis of the Moldovan-Romanian relations’.43 
Angelescu has analysed three case studies as part of Romania’s Eastern 
foreign policy: relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea area.  
 
Relating each of the two ideational accounts to my research, Hosu’s 
book chapter and Angelescu’s article were a good move away from the usual 
material interest explanations of Romania’s international affairs. They are 
interesting contributions that examine specific segments of Romanian 
external policies. Both include identity as a key element in influencing the 
state’s foreign affairs, yet without going into details about how identity 
operates or compares to rationalism and material calculations. The two 
contributions on post-1990 Romanian identity require expansion and a 
systematic study of Romanian foreign policy over a longer period and across 
multiple cases. These latter aspects are among the aims of my thesis, which 
has not employed a critical approach to discourse analysis and foreign policy 
like Hosu’s. The focal point of my framework is the internal articulation of 
national identity, along with its external discursive negotiation between the 
self and salient others and how all the identity re-definitions have shaped 
Romanian international responses. My perspective does not compete with 
rational and material interests, but rather elaborates on why and how 
national identity supplements the analysis of Romanian foreign policy and 
explains issues unaccounted for by rationalism. For instance, in 2005-2007, 
the intensified Atlanticism of national identity and foreign policy impacted on 
Romania’s international purpose, by depicting the state as a bridge to the 
‘East’ or towards the non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity. Even after obtaining the 
                                       
42 Irina Angelescu, ‘New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania’s Relations with 
Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region’, Perspectives, volume 19(2), 2011, pp. 123-124. 
43 Ibid, p. 124. 
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alleged material goal of NATO accession in 2004, Romania maintained its 
military presence abroad in missions coordinated by NATO or not 
(Afghanistan and Iraq), while also attempting to configure a more active role 
in democratising and stabilising the Black Sea region. 
 
Another ambitious ideational project on Romania’s foreign and security 
policy has been completed by Şerban Cioculescu, who talks about the 
strategic culture and motivations of national decision-makers. His book deals 
with psychological-cognitive and constructivist notions (norms, ideas, values 
and perceptions) and their influence on Romanian involvement abroad. These 
numerous factors are linked to the state’s justification of international 
intervention, which has been defined as being involved in the stabilisation 
and reconstruction of weak countries or converting ‘rogue’ states into 
responsible ones.44 Cioculescu has selected examples from Romania’s 
engagement with the Balkans, Black Sea area and the Greater Middle East. 
He explains how the post-1995 security culture, which supported 
intervention alongside the West in order to reform the above regions, shaped 
‘national role conceptions’ of foreign policy. Romania having a ‘national role 
conception’ means that political elites adopted ‘a coherent set of mental 
images concerning the country’s importance in relations with other states’.45 
This national role conception had an associated palette of values and 
objectives that were promoted via discourse. As the author has summarised, 
‘from the first post-communist years, when foreign policy oscillated between the East 
and the West and elites were divided about the chosen direction – neutrality and non-
alignment, or a Balkan bloc, a Central-Eastern European bloc, a closer relationship 
with Russia, [or] NATO and EU integration – until 2000 the role of security anchor 
and provider was gradually configured [under the impact of] an alliance of ‘values’ 
(NATO) or a supranational organisation (EU), or of a US-led coalition of the willing’.46 
While Cioculescu’s study has a special interest in Romania’s policies of 
international intervention and its ‘security provider’ role, my thesis examines 
                                       
44 Şerban F. Cioculescu, România postcomunistă în „ecuația” strategică a vecinătăților: 
Balcanii, Marea Neagră şi Orientul Mijlociu Extins/ Postcommunist Romania in the 
Neighbouring Strategic ‘Equation’: The Balkans, Black Sea and Greater Middle East 
(Bucharest: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2009), p. 55. 
45 Ibid, p. 262. 
46 Ibid, p. 266.  
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wider trends and themes of Romanian identity and external affairs such as 
how the ‘European’ self-image influenced the state’s relations with Hungary 
(1990-1996) and the foreign policy responses to the Kosovo crisis (1998-
1999). Cioculescu employs a great variety of notions - norms, ideas, values, 
perceptions, motivations, strategic culture and national role conceptions – 
and it is not clear how everything fits together in a coherent perspective. My 
ideational framework of national identity is broad enough to capture the 
complexity of Romanian foreign policy, but specific enough to keep the 
analysis focused and meaningful. Having illustrated and located the original 
contributions of my work in the Romanian foreign policy field, the general 
foundation of this dissertation continues with methodological aspects.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis represents a qualitative research project, which relies on 
discourse analysis as a methodological tool to interpret the available primary 
sources. The types of relevant Romanian material include a wide variety of 
texts that pertain to foreign policy discourses. The body of primary sources 
compiled for the thesis consists of the following broad categories: a) the 
official stances of Romanian political leaders - Presidents, Premiers, Ministers 
- on the state’s foreign policy, expressed through public speeches, statements, 
interviews or press conferences, most of them being available in libraries or 
archives and some online; b) the transcripts of parliamentary debates on 
foreign policy issues, which show the contestation among the views of 
different political parties and the kinds of arguments used to support them; c) 
legal documents such as the Romanian Constitution, the laws regulating the 
organisation and activity of the state’s external affairs, as well as treaties 
between Romania and other states; d) other official documents belonging to 
state institutions – national security strategies, governmental programmes, 
white papers, press releases - or to political parties and international 
organisations; e) news articles that help to fill in information blanks and 
underline how the media reflects discursively the subjects present on the 
Romanian foreign policy agenda. In order to ensure the triangulation of 
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research findings, my project has also used memoirs, biographies, books with 
interviews and other useful collections of texts from actors who have occupied 
state positions significant for Romania’s post-communist foreign policy. The 
Romanian material is examined by applying a certain methodology of 
discourse analysis, which will be discussed at this point. 
 
‘Discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis’ are profoundly contested terms, 
whose definitions range from communication in a particular context to a 
theoretical framework on the study of language. Michel Foucault, who 
founded the concept of ‘discourse’, employed various understandings of it. His 
broadening of the term ‘discourse’ was intentional and quite clearly 
rationalised - ‘instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of 
the word “discourse”, I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it 
sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an 
individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice 
that accounts for a number of statements’.47 Foucault’s work is not a 
component of the ideational perspective of my thesis. But his different 
meanings of ‘discourse’ are useful to identify a comprehensive working 
definition for the term. Throughout my examination of the Romanian 
empirical material, discourse alternatively illustrated each of Foucault’s three 
notions: ‘the general domain of all statements’, a specific ‘group of statements’ 
(e.g. Romanian discourse on the Kosovo crisis) and ‘a regulated practice that 
accounts for a number of statements’ (the main discursive themes of 
Romania’s national identity – ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security 
provider’). This brings some conceptual ambiguity, yet that is inevitable 
because discourse has become so deeply ingrained in academic language that 
finding a suitable replacement to convey its complexity would be an almost 
impossible task. Discourse and ideas have a strong link, which is relevant for 
the formation of national identity. Roger Fowler has defined their relationship 
as follows: 
‘“[d]iscourse” is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and 
categories which it embodies; these beliefs constitute a way of looking at the world, an 
organization or representation of experience – “ideology” in the neutral non-pejorative 
                                       
47 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 90. 
  P a g e  | 16 
sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; 
and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which 
the discourse is embedded’.48 
 
Depending on how one understands the term ‘discourse’, discourse 
analysis might also mean different things. First, it is a methodological 
instrument by which texts and speech acts are examined. Second, discourse 
analysis may refer to certain conceptual assumptions, which treat language 
as more than a transparent vehicle of communication; discourse not only 
constitutes social reality, but is also constructed by it. At the same time, 
discourse analysis stands for more than a single methodology or a 
homogeneous theory; it is rather a multi-faceted approach dealing with ‘the 
study of language in use’, as well as ‘the study of human meaning-making’ or 
‘the production of meaning in social life’.49 In other words, ‘social reality is 
produced and made real through discourses, and social interactions cannot 
be fully understood without reference to the discourses that give them 
meaning’.50 Here it seems appropriate to say that my project applies discourse 
analysis as a research tool. The methodology of discourse analysis has the 
following objectives and features - 
‘ascertaining the constructive effects of discourse through the structured and 
systematic study of texts (...) Discursive activity does not occur in a vacuum, however, 
and discourses do not “possess” meaning. Instead, discourses are shared and social, 
emanating out of interactions between social groups and the complex societal 
structures in which the discourse is embedded’.51 
Discourses about a state’s national identity and foreign policy are contextual 
and depend on international events and narratives. These discourses are not 
‘produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context 
into consideration’; they are ‘always connected to other discourses which are 
                                       
48 Roger Fowler cited in Sara Mills, Discourse (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 6. 
49 Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, Simeon J. Yates, Discourse Theory and Practice: A 
Reader (London: SAGE in association with the Open University, 2001), p. 3. 
50 Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social 
Construction (London: SAGE, 2002), p. 3. 
51 Ibid, p. 4. 
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produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and 
subsequently’.52 
 
A great advantage of discourse analysis as a methodological instrument 
derives from its flexibility. Instead of applying a fixed mechanism to every 
empirical example, some discourse scholars use the approach in less 
constricting ways and ‘articulate their concepts in each particular enactment 
of concrete research’.53 Sometimes a set procedure of doing discourse analysis 
limits to an extent the kind of knowledge provided by a case study. The 
absence of an established step-by-step scheme could be seen as a weak point, 
yet the interpretive nature of discourse research offers valuable advantages. 
For instance, content analysis focuses on pre-determined categories that need 
to explicitly appear in the available material. Compared to content analysis, 
the more flexible nature of discourse analysis enables the researcher to find 
both explicit manifestations and implicit meanings or assumptions that may 
otherwise be overlooked. The enquiry of my project has been guided by two 
principles put forward by Jutta Weldes, who explains how elites shape self-
images, foreign policy representations and identities out of the circulating 
ideational structures. The first dimension of this process – articulation - has 
been described as follows:  
‘[t]he term “articulation” refers to the process through which meaning is produced out 
of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources. Meaning is created and 
temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic 
elements. In this way, different terms and ideas come to connote or to ‘summon’ one 
another, to be welded into associative chains that make up an identifiable, if not a 
logically consistent, whole (…) With their successful repeated articulation, these 
linguistic elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily 
connected, and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, come to seem an 
accurate description of reality’.54  
To configure stable images, articulation needs to be combined with a second 
dimension - interpellation - ‘a dual process whereby identities or subject-
                                       
52 Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak cited in ibid. 
53 David R. Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis, Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000), p. 5. 
54 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 98-99. 
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positions are created and concrete individuals are “hailed” into or 
interpellated by them’.55 The period 1990-1996 showed an abundance of 
(re)emerging understandings in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, which 
formed the patterns and themes of an ideational foundation for the state’s 
post-communist foreign policy. 
 
Moreover, the central research question investigated by my thesis is the 
following - what are the re-definitions of Romania’s national identity during 
1990-2007 and how and why have they influenced the state’s foreign policy? 
By asking both ‘how’ and ‘why-questions’, my project departs from the 
dominant approaches to Romanian foreign policy analysis, which usually deal 
with answering only why certain decisions resulting in concrete actions were 
taken. Ontologically, ‘why-questions’ already presuppose a background of 
meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships.56 So ‘how’ and ‘what’ types 
of research questions take things a step further by uncovering the way in 
which Romanian understandings, objects and subjects have been 
constituted, as well as their impact on foreign policy. With regards to 
epistemology, Jennifer Milliken has opinionated that discourse researchers 
have a common rejection of ‘epistemic realism’; they employ ‘a logic of 
interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating 
and specifying “real causes”, concerning itself instead with considering the 
manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over 
another’.57 In more conventional IR terminology, the epistemological position 
of my thesis is ‘understanding’ foreign policy behaviour by looking at it 
through national identity lenses. As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have 
noted, the approaches of ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ should be 
distinguished because they embody divergent purposes. On the one hand, 
‘explaining’ is about identifying what caused a particular event or state of 
                                       
55 Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing National Interests’, European Journal of International Relations, 
vol. 2(3), 1996, p. 287. 
56 Roxanne L. Doty, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Construction’, International Studies Quarterly, 
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affairs.58 In order to rigorously establish or dismiss a causal relationship 
between two variables, a number of cases are examined by generating and 
testing hypotheses. On the other hand, ‘understanding’ reflects the search for 
a meaning, not necessarily the cause. Such a method involves treating history 
not as a source of information that might falsify a theory, but as a narrative 
which allows a greater appreciation of the origins, evolution and 
consequences of an event or state of affairs.59 After having laid out the 
methodological underpinnings of my research, the discussion moves on to the 
last introductory segment – the analytical plan of my arguments.  
 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
This dissertation has a primary empirical concern, which has been 
translated into its overarching structure. Following the introduction, the 
thesis has been divided into six chapters – one conceptual and five empirical 
in nature. Chapter I offers background knowledge about Romanian history 
and politics, which will be necessary to better understand the main analysis 
of post-communist national identity and foreign policy. It features a historical 
survey of important ‘formative moments’ in Romania’s pre-1990 evolution and 
an overview of the Romanian post-1990 political context. Chapter I presents 
how Romanian identity and international relations developed, particularly 
after the Great Unification of 1918, when the provinces of Transilvania, 
Basarabia and Bucovina decided to join the Romanian Kingdom. The chapter 
also deals with the turbulent events of post-revolutionary Romania, which 
occurred in the early 1990s. 
 
Chapter II configures the ideational framework of national identity that 
will be applied to Romanian foreign policy. The conceptualisation of national 
identity draws from four literatures that relate to constructivism, nationalism 
studies, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. The 
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constructivist school of thought advances useful insights on how to define 
identity, but the case of Romania brought up some lacunae that needed to be 
addressed by the other intellectual fields. The four literatures create a multi-
dimensional view on national identity, which stresses its internal and external 
dimensions. National identity formation is a two-way socio-psychological 
process that encompasses both domestic and international elements. The 
internal sources of national identity refer to the nation and collective 
memories or interpretations of the nation’s past. The external dimension of 
national identity is about a state’s self-images being internationally 
recognised, which links to an increased or reduced sense of self-esteem 
depending on whether or not those self-images are accepted in the global 
arena. 
 
Chapter III focuses on the period 1990-1996 with its three ‘formative 
moments’ that were essential for Romania’s national identity and foreign 
policy. The first one defined the state’s international orientation towards 
‘Europe’ after an episode of domestic contestation among elites – the 1991 
Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’. Political leaders had to answer an 
existential question for post-communist Romania – to be or not to be 
‘European’? The Romanian President signed the Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, 
which implied a security relationship with the USSR that could have 
prevented Romania from seeking NATO and EU membership. This ‘Eastern’ 
international direction was not shared by the majority of Romanian officials, 
who envisioned a European identity and future for their state. Having 
definitively opted for ‘Europe’, the second ‘formative moment’ of 1990-1996 
saw the emergence of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary that featured three 
key discursive themes or self-images: ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security 
provider’. These self-images feeding into national identity constituted an 
ideational foundation that shaped Romanian international politics between 
1990 and 2007. The state’s ‘European’ self-image was particularly meaningful 
in 1990-1996 and influenced its problematic relations with Hungary, which 
engendered the third ‘formative moment’ of national identity. The latter 
highlighted for Romania the dynamic of European identity contestation, 
dialogue and external validation between the self and other. The Romanian-
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Hungarian treaty could not move beyond the inflexible foreign policy stances 
of both states, which operated on different conceptions regarding what 
‘European’ identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights. As the 
authoritative ‘Europe’ was still debating this matter, Romania and Hungary 
did not sign a bilateral cooperation treaty until mid-1996. 
 
Chapter IV explores the years 1996-1999, which were predominantly 
marked by the ‘formative moment’ of the Kosovo inter-ethnic conflict and 
NATO’s military intervention in 1999. The Alliance had refused to include 
Romania in the 1997 wave of enlargement, which could have rendered the 
state even more reluctant to endorse NATO actions in Kosovo. Yet Romania 
exhibited evolving foreign policy reactions to the Kosovo crisis, which began 
with partial support for the Alliance in October 1998 and changed to 
unconditional assistance for NATO’s Operation ‘Allied Force’ in March-April 
1999. The initial Romanian position was a middle ground with a dual 
purpose: first, partial support (airspace access in emergencies) did not 
undermine the state’s Euro-Atlantic identity; second, it accommodated the 
dilemmas inherent in Romania’s national identity - whether to act as a 
‘European’ liberal democracy and ‘security provider’ or choose the traditional 
Balkan affinity. This foreign policy response was re-defined under the 
combined impact of three factors: national identity, rational interest and 
shifting international context. Romania eventually assisted NATO’s campaign 
in Kosovo by providing unrestricted airspace access without armed forces. 
 
Chapter V concentrates on the time frame 2000-2004, which associated 
a series of ‘formative moments’ that culminated in a fundamental re-definition 
of national identity during the 2003 Iraq war. The international discourses of 
early 1999 on an urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo facilitated the 
re-articulation of Romanian identity as a pro-active liberal democracy that 
tried to help the people suffering in totalitarian regimes. Since French-
German and US opinions on how to disarm Iraq differed throughout 2002-
2003, Central-Eastern European states were forced to make a ‘European’ or 
‘Atlantic’ choice. Romania’s national identity underwent a crisis within its 
‘liberal democratic’ self-image and the state had to opt whether to act as a 
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‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. The tensions in national identity 
were settled by invoking certain collective memory-myths that reinforced the 
idea of Romania becoming an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. 
 
Chapter VI looks at the period 2004-2007, when the Atlantic vocation of 
Romania’s national identity and foreign policy was consolidated and 
intensified. Although the state was an official NATO member, the self-images 
of ‘security provider’ and ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ continued to be very 
relevant for its international affairs. The Presidency’s Atlantic views shifted 
Romania’s foreign policy efforts from the ‘West’ to the ‘East’, where the state 
could have a significant role in democratising and stabilising the Euro-
Atlantic community’s neighbourhood, as well as contributing to more distant 
theatres of operations like Iraq. This intensified Atlanticism was not accepted 
by all Romanian elites, especially the Prime Minister who tried to re-balance 
the ‘European’ self-image and Atlantic dimension of national identity and 
international politics. The Premier’s attempt at contestation was unsuccessful 
and Romania maintained its military presence in Iraq, along with pursuing an 
Eastern foreign policy in the Black Sea area. 
 
The arguments of my thesis end with concluding remarks about the 
role of national identity in the overarching trajectory of Romania’s foreign 
policy between 1990 and 2007. 
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Chapter I: The Context of Romanian  
Identity and Politics 
 
 
 
A thorough understanding of Romania’s post-communist national 
identity and foreign policy requires a wider knowledge of the state’s historical 
and political background. After 1990 the articulations of Romanian identity 
and international affairs had historical origins that enabled elites to recover 
the idealised image of a Western and democratic state. This chapter aims to 
configure a dual foundation for the future empirical arguments: the history 
underlying Romanian identity and the political context established after the 
revolution of 1989. The discussion contains a selective survey of ‘formative 
moments’ for Romania’s national identity and foreign policy before 1989, with 
a special focus on the post-1918 time frame which saw the Great Unification 
of the Romanian state. The interwar period was very important in defining an 
aspired Western identity and international orientation for Romania, along 
with long-standing ideas about the state’s relations with salient others like 
France. The interwar French memory-myth shaped the traditional diplomatic 
and cultural rapport between the two states, which would again be 
meaningful after 1990. As the communist dictatorship was officially installed 
in 1948, Romania was mostly separated from the West for more than fifty 
years. During this time, certain memory-myths about the US as symbol of 
freedom and democracy were contoured in the Romanian collective imaginary, 
which would be relevant in the 2003 Iraq war. The chapter also explores the 
‘formative moment’ of Romania’s post-communist politics and the events that 
marked the state’s difficult transition to a democratic system. Thus, the 
chapter has been structured into four main sections: articulating Romanian 
identity between the West and the East, which includes the French memory-
myth; Romania’s interwar domestic politics and international relations; the 
communist dictatorship and American memory-myth; and finally, the 
turbulent internal context following the Romanian popular revolution of 
December 1989. 
 
  P a g e  | 24 
Historical Background – Formative Moments of National Identity 
 
A defining characteristic of Romanian national identity over time is its 
place between the West and East. The ‘dilemma of choice’ between these two 
worlds manifested from the beginning of statehood in the fourteenth century, 
when the Romanian Principalities (Transilvania, Moldova and Valahia) were 
created. The West-East encounter arguably occurred even earlier when the 
Dacians and Thracians (ancestors of Romanians) came into contact with the 
ancient Greek cities founded near the Black Sea, then were conquered by 
Rome in the early second century.60 Romania became connected with the 
West through its ethnic descent, neo-Latin language and historical evolution. 
The East marked Romanian territories via the Orthodox religion and 
Byzantine Empire, whose legacy shifted to relations with the Serbs and 
Bulgarians. The aggressive advance of Ottoman Turks in the later fourteenth 
and fifteenth century forced Valahian and Moldovan princes to make a stand. 
They identified with Western Europe and participated in Christian crusades 
to stop the Turks. Ottoman suzerainty eventually encompassed Moldova and 
Valahia and lasted until the early nineteenth century, which brought the 
Romanian Principalities closer to the East without completely separating 
them from Western influence. As Keith Hitchins has explained,  
‘[t]he Romanians preserved their institutions and social structure and over time 
exercised greater or lesser degrees of administrative autonomy. Although vassal status 
prohibited formal relations with foreign powers, neither principality was isolated from 
the West. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century they carried on trade and 
maintained diplomatic contacts, even if indirectly, with Central Europe. They were 
open to varied cultural and intellectual currents from the West’.61 
Ottoman suzerainty had a reduced impact on Valahia and Moldova, since the 
Turks were satisfied with receiving the agreed tributes from their vassal 
countries and were not overly concerned with Romanian domestic affairs. 
This allowed Romanians in the two Principalities to preserve their Orthodox 
religion, cultural values and identity with limited outside interference. 
Meanwhile, the Romanians in Transilvania were ruled by the Habsburg and 
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later Austro-Hungarian Empire, struggling for political rights with little 
success until 1918.62 Compared to the Ottoman suzerainty in Valahia and 
Moldova, the Austro-Hungarian administration was much more restrictive for 
ethnic Romanians and forced many of them to convert to Catholicism. The 
notion of a Romanian national identity was not fully expressed until all the 
territories united in 1918. 
 
Moldova and Valahia managed a de facto union by electing the same 
Prince - Alexandru Ioan Cuza - in 1859, who after seven years was replaced 
by Prince Carol I of the German Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen dynasty. Domestic 
political elites thought that building a constitutional monarchy under a 
foreign king would help to consolidate the de facto union in the international 
context, hence preventing neighbouring empires from separating Valahia and 
Moldova. The united Principalities attained independence in 1878 and were 
recognised as the Romanian Kingdom in 1881.63 Therefore, Romania 
emerging in the twentieth century was a synthesis of West and East. The 
state was dramatically altered by the outcomes of World War I, whose 
aftermath found the Romanian Kingdom in the winning camp. The post-war 
settlements facilitated the unification of Great Romania in 1918. The mid-
nineteenth century and interwar period were a noteworthy time in the 
historical trajectory of Romanian identity and foreign policy, because it was 
filled with re-definitions of national identity, debates about the state’s future 
development and international direction, as well as long-standing ideas like 
the French memory-myth which would be re-activated after 1990.  
 
Articulating Romanian Identity between the West and the East 
 
 The themes of post-1918 continued the crucial discourses from before 
the unification. As a Romanian scholar has argued, 
‘[f]rom (...) the beginning of modern Romania, systematically every two to four decades 
the drama of alternatives has been unleashed. The problem posed during it was, 
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invariably, what path of development to follow. The dispute would flare up overnight 
and last a good while, then subside in favour of one of the camps (...) But then some 
major socio-political event would unleash the confrontation again in a new phase of 
this unbreakable cycle’.64  
Defining national identity and how that would be embodied in Romania’s 
evolution as a state were the primary concerns of domestic elites. A 
participant in the process succinctly noted - ‘West or East? Europe or the 
Balkans, urban civilization or the rural spirit? [Since 1860] the questions are 
still the same’.65 The great task of the nineteenth century had been the 
modernisation (understood as Westernisation) of Romania. The challenge was 
how to change ‘a patriarchal and authoritarian system, a society 
overwhelmingly rural, dominated by landed property, in which the modern 
stimulating factors of capitalism and democracy were almost completely 
absent’.66 National leaders came up with the solution of emulating the 
Western European political culture. They heavily borrowed institutions like a 
new Constitution, Parliament, responsible Government and legal codes, which 
were subsequently implemented in Romania to a more or less successful 
degree. The literary critic Titu Maiorescu wrote an influential article in 1868, 
in which he criticised this superficial attitude and described it as incarnating 
‘forms without substance’.67 Indeed, a profound transformation of Romanian 
mentalities and political system needed more than an imitation of the West 
promoted at elite level. The debates about identity and the state’s future 
course were bound to become more acute after the unification of Great 
Romania. 
 
The aftermath of World War I gave Romania the opportunity to fulfil a 
long-time national aspiration. As the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed, the 
ethnic Romanians declared their wish to unite with Romania. The Romanian 
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Kingdom was joined by Basarabia (27 March 1918), Bucovina (28 November 
1918) and Transilvania (1 December 1918). The result turned out to be a 
doubling of Romania's population and land.68 This fragile unification did not 
make Romania feel more secure, however, as Hungary was certainly not 
reconciled to the loss of its former territories. The international context was 
further complicated by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Romania feared 
that Bolshevism would spread across the borders, which sharpened anti-
Russian sentiments and reinforced Western identification. Russia was now 
firmly the ‘barbarous East’ and was meant to be opposed by embracing the 
West.69 The intellectual and political discourses of interwar Romania were 
preoccupied with articulating national identity, although not everyone used 
this exact term. The ultimate objective was to form a consolidated national 
state, a strong economy and vibrant culture. There were three main groups 
debating the various representations of Romanian identity – ‘westernisers’, 
‘pro-orientals’ and the ‘third way’ supporters.70 The ‘third way’ camp was not 
homogenous and included slightly more Western or Eastern oriented 
advocates. They all stressed ideas of Romanian exceptionalism that had to be 
protected from ‘the corrupting effects of imported civilizations’, especially the 
Western one.71 The westernisers and ‘third way’ promoters held the most 
intense and extensive debates, which suggests that pro-orientals played a 
marginal part in the discourse. The persuasiveness of pro-oriental arguments 
was certainly limited by the negative associations with Bolshevik Russia. 
 
The discussions focussed on more than national identity and 
Romania’s international stance. There were many other themes entangled in 
the rhetoric of West or East or somewhere in between: whether to opt for 
industrialisation or remain an agrarian society, the type of democratic regime, 
the role of religion. This overview of different positions is not exhaustive and 
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only contains the most prominent contributors. First, the pro-orientals (also 
called at the time the ‘Orthodoxists’) were represented by Nichifor Crainic: 
‘[i]f the mission of the Romanian people is to create a culture after its image and 
likeness, this implies as well how its orientation must be resolved. Whoever 
recommends an orientation toward the West speaks nonsense. Orientation contains 
within itself the notion of Orient and means directing ourselves toward the Orient (...) 
Everywhere it is said that light comes from the East. And for us, who find ourselves 
geographically in the Orient and who, through our Orthodox religion, hold to the 
truths of the Eastern world, there can be no other orientation than toward the Orient, 
toward ourselves (...) Westernisation means the negation of our orientalness; 
Europeanising nihilism means the negation of our creative potential’.72  
Here the prevalent Orthodox religion of Romanians invoked an Eastern 
dimension for national identity. Still, even such a radical pro-oriental voice 
indicated some sort of ‘third way’ that was not really about a complete 
Romanian identification with the East. The reason is that, until the 
nineteenth century, Romania was immersed in the Eastern cultural space 
permeated by Orthodoxism. Once debates about ethno-cultural identity 
dominated the national discourses, Romanians became much more aware of 
their ethnic descent – ‘an island of Latinity in a Slavic sea’.73 Russians 
stopped being ‘Orthodox brothers’ and the ‘shared religious identity seemed to 
pose an additional danger, threatening to facilitate the assimilation of 
Romania’.74 
 
Second, the ‘third way’ group included influential figures like the 
philosopher Lucian Blaga, who advanced the idea of Romanian 
exceptionalism that retained an Eastern facet - 
‘[w]e think ourselves merely Latins... lucid, rational, temperate, lovers of classical form 
but willingly or not we are more than that. A significant percent of Slavic and 
Thracian blood flows in our veins. The Romanian spirit may be dominated by Latinity, 
a peaceful and cultured force, but we have also a rich latent Thraco-Slavic foundation, 
exuberant and vital, which, no matter how much we oppose it, sometimes (...) rises up 
powerfully in our consciousness (...) Why should we violate our true nature, corset 
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ourselves in a formula of Latin clarity, when so many other possibilities for 
development lie within us in that barbarian unconscious?’75  
‘Third way’ thinkers agreed that Romania needed to find its own developing 
path, which was based on ‘ruralizing the national essence’.76 In contrast to 
the ‘third way’ camp, the westerniser group contained moderate promoters 
like the literary critic Garabet Ibrăileanu, who accepted the already existing 
Western impact on Romania and wanted to further pursue it: 
‘[i]n the twentieth century, history has set Romanians the following problem: will 
Romania continue to be a semi-asiatic, oriental country or will it enter the ranks of 
European peoples and European culture? This problem has been answered by 
history. For various reasons, Romania could not exempt itself from the European 
influence [that] penetrated into our country. It penetrated through the very fact of its 
superiority’.77  
 
There were more enthusiastic westernisers too, such as the writer and 
diplomat Eugen Filotti, who wholeheartedly embraced Western influence on 
Romanian identity - 
‘[w]e mean to propagate a sense of culture that is European. Our light comes from the 
West. We see our deliverance in the occidentalisation of this country (...) Balkanism, 
our cherished and idealised orientalness (...) now shelters all the brigands who have 
impeded political purification and opposed uplifting the people from the cultural 
cesspool in which they flounder (...) [We seek] the affirmation of our genius and 
specific character in the forms of European culture, in the harmonious and shining 
framework of the culture of the West’.78 
Westernisers like Filotti sat at the opposite end of the spectrum from Crainic's 
pro-oriental stance and were the most persuasive. They treated ‘contact with 
the West as liberating even while they worked for a “truly Romanian tradition” 
as a result of such contact’.79 In this respect, the rhetoric of another 
westerniser – Eugen Lovinescu - was reminiscent of the kinds of debates 
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about national identity and Romanian foreign policy that post-1990 elites 
would later express: 
‘[i]solated from the rhythm of western civilization by its surroundings and its religion, 
the Romanian people was unable to develop in its own manner and was detoured from 
the potentialities of its race (...) Time is on our side and, after ages of alienation and 
deformation, new prospects have arisen for the creation of a truly Romanian soul. If 
we seem to some historians melancholy stepchildren of a Romanian-Byzantine-Slavic-
Turkish-Phanariot tradition, let us hope that in the eyes of future generations, we will 
seem venerable forefathers of a true Romanian tradition [through Europe]’.80 
The communist dictatorship would be portrayed after 1990 as having 
separated Romania from its aspired Western European identity and 
international course, which had been configured especially during the 
interwar years. Indeed, the interwar period brought forward the definite 
articulation of Romanian identity as Western, while also circulating various 
meanings about the state’s relationship with salient others. 
 
The mid-nineteenth century and interwar years constitute the major 
formative period of the French memory-myth in Romania’s imaginary. Having 
opted for westernisation, Romanian elites were looking for sources of 
inspiration to be emulated and applied in national settings. France - ‘the 
great Latin sister’ - was by far the most attractive prospect since it was a 
strong and successful state with an influential civilisation.81 Belgium also 
exerted a certain appeal because it was a smaller Francophone state that had 
adapted the French model to its own needs. Westernised and modernised 
Romania aimed to adapt the political system of France to its own 
requirements as well. So the Romanian Constitution of 1866 heavily borrowed 
from the Belgian one, which led to the frequently used expression of Romania 
being ‘the Belgium of the Orient’.82 In 1914, a part of national elites showed a 
‘visceral attachment’ to France and wanted to enter the war not necessarily to 
serve Romanian interests, but rather to ‘defend the threatened civilization of 
France’; quoting from the memoirs of a diplomat,  
‘[they] wanted immediate entry into the war (...) and they wanted it only for the love of 
France, which could not be left to perish, as if its fate lay within our power! In their 
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sincerity they hardly mentioned Transilvania, making the people whole (...) 
abandoning all the arguments of a national character which drove almost all of us to 
be against the Central Powers, and calling for entry into the war “pour voler au 
secours de la France” [“to fly to France’s rescue”]!’83 
The fascination for France had gradually infused Romanian society since 
1830. French became the language of culture and any self-respecting 
intellectual needed to have reasonable knowledge of it. Considering that 
young Romanians were studying in Paris, ‘for more than a century France 
would provide or influence the training of the greater part of the country’s 
intellectual elite’.84 Apart from consolidating the French memory-myth, the 
interwar period was a formative time for Romania’s democratic trajectory and 
international relations. 
 
Romania’s Interwar Domestic Politics and International Relations 
 
On a more general note, the interwar period was marked by ‘broad 
trends of political, economic, and social development’ which helped modern 
Romania to reach ‘its fullest expression as a nation-state’.85 During the 
1920s, the prospects for a Romanian democracy were promising because the 
two main parties – the National Peasant Party (PNŢ) and the National Liberal 
Party (PNL) – committed themselves to building stable parliamentary 
administrations. There were nine governments, most of them led by either 
PNŢ or PNL. The driving force behind PNL was a financial oligarchy, which 
had been ‘grouped around large banking and industrial families headed by 
the Brătianu family and its allies’.86 PNL leaders presented their party as a 
promoter of all social classes and their respective interests. Yet the practice of 
PNL policies differed greatly from Western European liberalism. PNL used 
whatever means necessary to increase the benefits of its financial oligarchy, 
which often caused other parts of society to be disadvantaged. The other main 
interwar party was PNŢ, which had been created in 1926 when the Peasant 
Party of the Old Kingdom (Valahia and Moldova) joined with the National 
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Party of Transilvania. In spite of their contrasting ideologies, prominent 
figures from the new PNŢ offered a progressive and distinctive governing 
programme, becoming a credible alternative to PNL: 
‘[PNŢ led by Iuliu Maniu] promised to add explicit guarantees of civil liberties and 
political rights to the constitution, carry out a decentralization of the state 
administration, and expand the responsibilities of local government. They recognized 
the primacy of agriculture and proclaimed their intention to strengthen the 
independent smallholder and promote the cooperative movement. But they also 
agreed to encourage industry by giving equal treatment to foreign and domestic 
capital and by removing burdensome protective tariffs’.87 
 
The stability of the Romanian political system was further reinforced by 
King Ferdinand I, the successor of Carol I. Ferdinand preferred a neutral role 
in internal politics, although the 1923 Constitution granted the King ‘the 
power to appoint and to dismiss cabinet ministers as well as to veto 
legislation and to issue discretionary regulations’.88 The legislative agenda of 
the 1920s contained land reform, industrialisation and cultural policies, as 
well as the unification of administrative apparatuses in the newly joined 
provinces. The task of unifying diverse fiscal, judicial and religious 
arrangements proved to be very difficult. This was also due to Romania’s 
‘sizeable minorities’, 28% compared to the 8% of pre-1918, ‘all making claims 
and looking to outside powers’.89 Ethnic Hungarians, Jews and other groups 
did not feel compatible with the ideologies of parties like PNŢ and PNL and felt 
isolated by the rising Romanian nationalism of the 1920s. They increasingly 
turned towards the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), which was founded in 
1921. Unlike nationalist associations that had many members in the 1920s, 
PCR was quite unpopular because it advocated that Basarabia ‘should be 
relinquished to the Soviet Union’.90 In 1924 PCR was outlawed, a fact which 
was used by party leaders and the USSR as a propaganda weapon to attract 
more supporters; the attempt was unsuccessful and PCR remained at the 
periphery of Romanian politics during the 1920s and 1930s.91 
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The 1930s represented a very challenging decade for Romanian 
democracy. The new King Carol II ascended the throne in 1930 and ‘made no 
secret of his disdain for parliamentary institutions and of his intention to 
become the undisputed source of power in the state’.92 As parliamentary 
democracy was weakening, far right wing nationalism was intensifying to an 
alarming degree: 
‘[t]he world depression exacerbated existing economic problems and sharpened social 
tensions and thus gave impetus to those forces hostile to the prevailing parliamentary 
system. The crisis enhanced the appeal of anti-Semitism among certain elements of 
society, who used it to rally support for their particular brand of nationalism’.93  
One extreme right wing organisation that placed anti-Semitism at the core of 
its ideology was the Iron Guard, founded by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Carol II 
and the mainstream parties opposed the fascism of the Iron Guard that had 
created a party called ‘Everything for the Country’. The Iron Guard retaliated 
by assassinating Prime Minister Ion G. Duca in 1933. Despite the escalating 
violence of Iron Guard members, the far right organisation attained its largest 
popularity in the mid-1930s. In February 1938, things changed dramatically 
when Carol II established a royal dictatorship by annulling the 1923 
Constitution. He decreed the dissolution of all political parties and took 
drastic action against the Iron Guard, which he viewed as his main enemy; 
members of the Iron Guard and PCR were jailed and some killed.94 
 
With respect to Romania’s interwar foreign policy, its primary aim was 
to defend the borders drawn by the World War I settlements and the Great 
Unification of 1918. Apart from the communists, all Romanian political 
parties endorsed the ‘Versailles system, a stance which dictated the choice of 
allies and provided continuity with the foreign policy pursued immediately 
before the war’.95 Romania kept cultivating relations with France and, to a 
lesser extent, with the UK to preserve the territorial status quo from the 
revisionist attitudes of major actors like the Soviet Union and Germany or 
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smaller ones like Hungary and Bulgaria.96 The relationship with France was 
not simply political - ‘it grew out of the Romanians’ perception of a general 
community of interests between the two countries, of mutual comprehension 
and even affection, feelings that were entirely absent in contacts with 
Germany’.97 Yet the lack of French and British military reactions to Adolf 
Hitler’s growing conquest of Central-Eastern Europe forced Romania under 
King Carol II to re-consider its international alliances. The King tried to reach 
an agreement with Germany in mid-1939, as the Nazis cooperated with the 
Iron Guard and other Romanian far right wing organisations too.98 Hitler’s 
Germany did not provoke the same fear as the Soviet Union who had been the 
‘hereditary enemy, always present, always a threat’ to Romania’s existence.99 
Carol II hoped that the Germans would guarantee the state’s territorial 
integrity and not give Basarabia to the USSR. He had no other option since 
France had been defeated by the German armies in June 1940. Nevertheless, 
Romanian elites were not aware that the non-aggression pact signed between 
the Soviet Union and Germany on 23 August 1939 contained a secret 
protocol agreed by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and German Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop. That protocol mentioned that Basarabia and Northern 
Bucovina would be annexed by the USSR, a fact which occurred on 28 June 
1940. Hitler also forced Romania to accept the renouncement of Southern 
Dobrogea to Bulgaria and a large part of Transilvania to Hungary on 30 
August 1940.100  
 
Following the loss of Transilvania, Romanian public opinion turned 
against Carol II, who asked Marshal Ion Antonescu to form a new 
Government. Carol II intended to save his reign through the advantages of 
appointing Antonescu as Prime Minister of Romania. According to Keith 
Hitchins, 
‘[Carol II] wanted to use Antonescu’s connections with the Iron Guard to bring about a 
reconciliation between its leaders and the throne, his good relations with the National 
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Peasants and Liberals to neutralize their opposition to the royal dictatorship, and his 
close contacts with members of the German legation in Bucharest to demonstrate 
Romania’s firm attachment to Hitler’s new order in Europe and ensure German 
support for its king and its political independence’.101 
But Antonescu, together with the PNŢ and PNL leaders, were determined to 
remove Carol II and replace him with his young son, Mihai (Michael). Carol II 
abdicated and King Mihai assumed the throne on 6 September 1940, granting 
Antonescu full powers via decree.102 Marshal Antonescu created a coalition 
cabinet in which the Iron Guard was the dominant political force. Iron Guard 
leaders challenged Antonescu’s authority by trying to gain control over state 
institutions like the police and the army. They formed a separate legionary 
police to be used specifically against political opponents. The atrocities 
committed by the ‘legionary death squads’ of the Iron Guard culminated in 
November 1940.103 Among the victims were many former government 
ministers and other officials, including Nicolae Iorga and Virgil Madgearu. 
Antonescu eventually eliminated the Iron Guard from the Government and 
Romanian politics due to the rising violence it perpetrated internally. By 1941 
Romania moved from a royal to a military authoritarian regime. In June 
1941, the state ‘joined Germany in a declaration of war against the Soviet 
Union’ and Marshal Antonescu maintained his alliance with Germany 
throughout World War II.104 His main foreign policy reason to side with 
Germany was to recover at least Basarabia and Northern Bucovina.105 By the 
spring of 1944, key figures of Romania’s democratic opposition were covertly 
negotiating with Western states – especially the UK and US – to avoid Soviet 
occupation and received disheartening replies. In May 1944, the UK and 
USSR divided South-Eastern Europe into military operational zones, which 
located Romania in the Soviet sphere. On the Romanian front, King Mihai and 
the democratic opposition organised a coup against Marshal Antonescu in 
August 1944 and managed to overthrow him. King Mihai immediately 
announced that Romania had joined the Western Allies against Germany and 
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would mobilise all armed forces to free Transilvania.106 Even so, the Soviet 
Army occupied Bucharest on 31 August 1944 and treated Romania as a 
conquered country. The Romanian communists led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-
Dej were preparing to take over state power. The USSR could not allow new 
free elections to be held in Romania as - 
‘[they] would undoubtedly have prevented the installation of a friendly and docile 
government in Bucharest. The antipathy which the majority of Romanians felt toward 
the Soviet Union and their desire to maintain traditional ties to the West made the 
prospects of a freely elected pro-Soviet regime coming to power extremely remote’.107 
By 1946 Romania was firmly under a communist administration that had 
been approved by the Soviet Union. The post-war settlements returned the 
previously lost part of Transilvania to the Romanian state. King Mihai was 
forced to abdicate and leave the country in December 1947. And Soviet 
military troops stayed in Romania until 1958 to ensure the communist 
control over the state.108 
 
The Communist Dictatorship and American Memory-Myth 
 
The Romanian communists under Gheorghiu-Dej officially rose to 
power in 1948 and engaged in the state’s complete Stalinisation to keep 
receiving support from the USSR. They had ‘no independent source of 
legitimacy’ and their power base was almost exclusively derived from Soviet 
authority.109 Romania’s Stalinisation was described thus: 
‘the first ten years of Communism were marked by a deep, coercive institutional 
isomorphic change. Along with nationalizing policies, the abolition of the multiparty 
system, the imprisonment of a large number of the pre–World War II intellectual and 
political elites, and the beginning of a rapid industrialization, the “history” of Romania 
was also revised to show, for instance, the allegedly positive role that Russia had 
played in Romania’s past’.110 
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Gheorghiu-Dej was gradually able to ‘blend nationalism and Soviet ideology, 
turning issues that challenged his authority to political advantage’.111 He died 
in 1965, after having infused a nationalist character to Romanian 
communism which would be augmented by his successor – Nicolae 
Ceauşescu. Despite criticising Dej’s rule, Ceauşescu continued the former’s 
intention to obtain independence from Moscow. Romania’s independent 
foreign policy stance culminated in 1968 when Ceauşescu refused to join and 
objected to the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia.112 Unfortunately, in 
1971 he travelled to China and North Korea and was fascinated with their 
communist models, where the dictators had nearly total control over the state 
and society. After those official visits, Ceauşescu transformed the Romanian 
communist dictatorship into a ‘sultanistic’ regime, meaning totalitarian with 
an extreme type of patrimonialism where the supreme leader regarded the 
country as his personal domain.113 Romania turned into a distinct example of 
closed-off society dominated by nationalist communism. 
 
Against such a bleak reality, ordinary Romanians tried to find different 
coping mechanisms and reasons to hope. Many found their escape in dreams 
of an idealised West, an imagined perfect world, fundamentally different to 
the society in which they lived. Others were waiting for an external force to 
create profound changes in communist Europe or at least to reform the 
totalitarian system imposed by the USSR. In this collective imaginary, the US 
played a central role as leader of the West, symbol of freedom and prosperity 
and the only possible source from which help could come.114 It was the main 
‘formative moment’ of the American memory-myth, which had been fuelled 
since the late nineteenth century. Romanians, particularly from Transilvania, 
immigrated to the US due to economic and political motivations. In 1917-
1918, there were approximately 180,000 – 200,000 Romanian immigrants in 
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the US; a part of them returned after Transilvania joined the Romanian 
Kingdom in 1918 and had earned enough income for a comfortable existence 
in their home country.115 They told stories about ‘America’ as a land of 
freedom and opportunities, which slowly formed the foundation of the 
American memory-myth. In Cold War Romania, the American symbolic 
presence was best represented by a famous phrase – ‘the Americans are 
coming!’ – influential in the 1940s-1950s and repeated until the present. The 
historian Florin Constantinescu defined it as: 
‘[a] strange phenomenon of collective psychology (...) the strong and enduring belief 
that the West and above all the USA would pull Romania from beneath the Soviet 
boot. “The Americans are coming!” was an expression that summarised a political 
attitude but also a state of mind. These resisted all proof of disinterest in Western 
capitals towards the countries left behind the “Iron Curtain”’.116 
 
In the late 1960s, communist Europe became more convinced that the 
US and the West would only offer encouraging declarations. So the awaited 
US arrival ‘was symbolically replaced with the departure of 
Romanians/Eastern Europeans to “America” or more generally to the “West”, 
in search of the promised individual salvation’.117 Those who could not escape 
communism by immigrating to democratic states listened to a network of 
radio stations like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, which broadcast 
in Central-Eastern European languages including Romanian. Voice of 
America talked in a somewhat propagandistic style about the American way 
of life, though the notion of democratic freedoms was certainly true. This was 
part of ‘the long term ideological fight against communism, which had been 
based on the idea of consolidating the US prestige’ in the Central-Eastern 
European mentality.118 Radio Free Europe also had a front line contribution 
and ‘converted itself from a weapon in the psychological war to liberate 
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[communist] Europe through revolution into a true nationwide station, with 
diverse and good quality programmes that were listened to on a large 
scale’.119 The communist authorities were aware of the widespread pro-
American sentiments and attempted to ruthlessly suppress them.120 Yet they 
could not control absolutely every aspect of Romanians’ lives and the 
American memory-myth continued to offer hope in a better future. 
Ceauşescu’s dictatorship was removed by popular revolution in December 
1989. After more than fifty years of communism, Romania could resume its 
democratic path and re-establish relations with the West, represented by 
NATO and EU states. Unfortunately, Romania underwent a very problematic 
transition to democracy, which partially accounts for why international 
discourses had many negative representations of the post-communist state. 
 
The Turbulent Domestic Context in the Early 1990s 
 
After 1990, Romania had great difficulty in establishing diplomatic 
relations with a quite distrustful Euro-Atlantic community. The main reasons 
derived from the widespread violence associated with the 1989 revolution and 
questionable transition to democracy: the execution of the dictator Nicolae 
Ceauşescu, alongside his wife and co-ruler Elena Ceauşescu (25 December 
1989); the Jiu Valley miners’ extremely violent actions in Bucharest (June 
1990 and September 1991). Such turbulent events contrasted strongly with 
the peaceful transitions occurring in the rest of post-communist Europe. 
Taking each issue in turn, in December 1989, Romania experienced a violent 
revolution and began a difficult transition to democratic rule. Small-scale 
protests, repressed by the regime’s security forces, turned into mass 
demonstrations that eventually removed Ceauşescu’s dictatorship.121 On 23 
December 1989, protestors gathered in various places in Bucharest were shot 
by unidentified ‘terrorists’; thousands of people were killed during those street 
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fights.122 Two days later, the Ceauşescu couple was accused of committing 
genocide against the Romanian people and sentenced to death by an 
extraordinary military tribunal. Their execution on 25 December was seen as 
a ‘purifying act’ for Romanian society, until the promises of the new regime 
did not live up to the population’s expectations.123 There is still no definitive 
conclusion as to whether Romania went through a ‘revolution’ or a ‘coup’ in 
late December 1989. Juliana Geran Pilon argues that a coup orchestrated by 
second rank communists managed to ‘hijack’ the Romanian revolution.124 
Katherine Verdery and Gail Klingman opine that Ceauşescu’s rule could not 
have been abolished without a popular uprising; a coup would simply not 
have been sufficient to overthrow the dictatorship.125 Amidst the 
disagreement about what prompted the removal of communism, the 
revolution clearly had a dual significance - consolidating Romania’s 
exceptionalism within the ‘velvet’ transitions of Central-Eastern Europe and 
shaping the state’s transition to democracy.126 
 
The Romanian transition to a democratic system was steered by the 
National Salvation Front (FSN) led by Ion Iliescu. It emerged in the ambiguous 
context of the 1989 revolution and initially served as a provisional governing 
body, until democratic elections were organised. But FSN converted itself into 
a political party and rhetorically used the revolution to gain popular support 
in the first post-communist elections (May 1990), with Iliescu as a 
presidential candidate. They competed against the two ‘historic’ parties that 
had been outlawed by communists in 1947: the National Peasant and 
Christian Democratic Party (PNŢCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). 
Iliescu and his FSN won the elections in May 1990; FSN received 66% of votes 
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cast and Iliescu 85%.127 The May elections proved to be problematic as well. 
The FSN had exhibited an undemocratic attitude, prompting the European 
Parliament to condemn ‘all intimidation of opposition parties and their 
candidates in Romania, organised or condoned by the ruling National 
Salvation Front’.128 Steven Roper remarked that - 
‘FSN’s electoral success was due primarily to the lack of any real opposition, the 
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the country’s transition. 
Ironically the FSN (...) benefited the most from Ceausescu’s cult of personality (...) 
which undermined any opposition movement or underground media. Because of the 
cult of personality, frustrations were focused more on the individual (or in this case 
the [Ceauşescu] family) than on the institution of the [communist] party’.129 
It is not surprising that FSN did not know how to act in a democratic manner, 
considering the lack of substantial change among Romania’s post-1990 
political elites. Despite being democratically elected, the FSN administration 
was seen as ‘old wine in new bottles’, rather than ‘advocates of a new 
order’.130 Most of its members had been connected in some form or another to 
the communist regime.  
 
Unfortunately, violence did not stop in Romania after the revolution 
and democratic elections, which were further shadowed by the Valea Jiu 
miners’ extremely violent actions in Bucharest (June 1990 and September 
1991). Even though FSN and Iliescu had obtained an ‘overwhelming electoral 
victory’, they continued to ‘treat their opponents in highly undemocratic 
ways’.131 On 13 June 1990, President Iliescu made a highly controversial 
gesture and called for the people’s help to safeguard the new administration 
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from civil opposition groups who had been protesting in Bucharest against 
the election results. Approximately 10,000 miners from the Jiu Valley 
answered the President’s request and came to the capital, where they brutally 
assaulted the demonstrators and vandalised the headquarters of opposition 
parties.132 When the miners left Bucharest, Iliescu publicly declared these 
shocking words - 
‘I thank you for everything you have done these days. I thank you all once again for 
what you have proved these days: that you are a powerful force, having a high civic 
and working-class discipline (...) We know that we can rely on you. We should ask for 
your help whenever it seems necessary!’133 
This was not the only time the miners interfered with Romania’s democratic 
evolution. In early 1991, as Parliament was debating economic legislation, 
FSN members did not agree on ‘the pace and substance of reform’; the faction 
supporting Prime Minister Petre Roman wanted a faster pace of reforms than 
the Iliescu wing did.134 In September 1991, the same Jiu Valley miners 
arrived in Bucharest to protest against their declining living standards and 
the Government in general. Roman proposed a cabinet reshuffle to prevent 
another crisis like the one in June 1990, yet was forced by President Iliescu 
to resign. The miners provided Iliescu once again with the opportunity to get 
rid of those who opposed his approach to Romanian politics.135 Nevertheless, 
FSN remained divided over how to implement economic reforms and several 
factions decided to split. Iliescu’s advocates created a new party – the 
Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) – in March 1992. The second 
post-revolutionary parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled 
for September 1992. The largest number of votes went to FDSN - renamed 
Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) in 1993. Iliescu was also 
reconfirmed as President of Romania and exerted a great influence on the 
FDSN (PDSR) Government. He played a key role in the state’s foreign policy 
between 1990 and 1996, but could not impose a certain external course and 
identity for Romania. This was underlined by the domestic contestation about 
Romania’s ‘European’ choice, which will be analysed in chapter III. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
To conclude, Romanian identity has historically been shaped at the 
intersection between the West and the East. In the evolution of Romanian 
history, the post-1918 and interwar period was very significant because it 
defined the Western identity and international orientation of the unified 
Romania. It was a time of internal debates about whether the state’s future 
development should look towards the West or the East. The interwar years 
also consolidated the traditional friendly relations and cultural affinity 
between France and Romania, the two Latin sisters sitting at opposite sides of 
the continent. Having opted for westernisation, Romania wanted to 
strengthen its Western links and was fascinated by the influential French 
civilisation. As many young Romanians studied in Paris, France exerted a 
substantial impact on Romania’s intellectual and political elites. This 
gradually formed the French memory-myth in the Romanian imaginary, 
which would be relevant after 1990. France would become a major advocate 
of Romania’s NATO accession, particularly at the Madrid summit in 1997. 
Romanian democracy had roots in the interwar period too. The 1920s were a 
favourable time for Romania’s democratic system, which was then heavily 
challenged by King Carol II and the rise of the Iron Guard in the 1930s. The 
complicated context of World War II forced Romania to align with Germany 
against its great enemy from the East – the USSR. Bucharest was occupied by 
the Soviet army in 1944, which would soon lead to the installation of the 
communist dictatorship. A noteworthy ideational aspect of that time was the 
American memory-myth, encapsulating the Romanian aspirations towards an 
idealised West and depicting the US as the symbol of freedom and democracy. 
It was a type of escapism and a source of hope for Romanians, against the 
desolate reality of an extremely oppressive totalitarian regime. Following the 
1989 revolution against Ceauşescu’s dictatorship, Romania underwent a 
series of fundamental changes as part of its transition to democracy. The 
early 1990s provided a turbulent context for the trajectory of Romanian 
national identity and foreign policy, which will be apparent in the subsequent 
empirical chapters. 
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Chapter II: Conceptualising National Identity in  
Romania’s Foreign Policy 
 
 
 
The central problematic of my thesis is the significance of national 
identity in shaping the trajectory of Romanian foreign policy between 1990 
and 2007. The thesis looks at why and how Romania’s national identity was 
subject to re-definitions and contestation prior to the finalising of the EU 
accession process in January 2007. Identity in its various forms has been 
intensely analysed in a range of academic fields, shedding interesting light on 
the way we think about a state’s international relations. As Christopher Hill 
and William Wallace eloquently note, 
‘[e]ffective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-
state’s “place in the world”, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. 
These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing 
slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal 
developments reshape them’.136   
In the overall structure of my arguments, this chapter has the main purpose 
of identifying the conceptual framework which will be applied in the empirical 
part of the project. The conceptual analysis of national identity is followed by 
a brief outline of the three key identity themes or self-images which circulated 
in Romania’s post-communist foreign policy imaginary. These discursive 
themes are a prelude to the core empirical discussion in the subsequent 
chapters. The words of Hill and Wallace resonate with the inter-disciplinary 
view of national identity that I have adopted in my ideational framework.  
 
Talking about identity in IR is usually associated with constructivism. 
This school of thought provides very useful insights on the conceptualisation 
of identity and thus it formed the point of departure for my thesis. However, 
my project was to a large extent empirically driven and the material on 
Romanian identity and foreign policy between 1990 and 2007 brought up 
some puzzles which could not be entirely resolved using constructivist 
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notions and tools. Therefore, I have supplemented and modified 
constructivism by drawing on other literatures related to nationalism, 
collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. Each one 
adds a different element to my conceptual framework, so as to produce a 
multi-dimensional perspective on national identity. With regards to structure, 
this chapter has four sections dealing successively with each intellectual field: 
identity and constructivism; identity and the nation; identity and collective 
memory; identity, self-esteem and international recognition. After discussing 
the relevant aspects of identity in the individual sections, the insights drawn 
from the four literatures are integrated into a working conceptual framework 
on national identity. The rest of the chapter prefigures the three self-images of 
Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity, acting as a bridge towards the following 
empirical chapters. 
 
 
Identity and Constructivism 
 
The emergence of constructivism in IR can be traced back to the 1980s, 
within the larger context of the so-called ‘third debate’. The latter 
encapsulated an attempt by post-positivist scholars to contradict the 
dominant approaches in the field at that time, on the grounds of their 
scientific methodology.137 Constructivists favoured a middle position in the 
debate, seeking to bridge the gap between positivists (who believed that true 
results could only be obtained through natural science emulated empirical 
tests) and post-positivists (who argued that objective, neutral, value-free 
research was not possible). Constructivism, the ontological position which 
posits that ‘all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is 
contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction 
between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted 
within an essentially social context’, was used to counter various essentialist 
definitions of social actors as immutable and constant through time and 
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space.138 Since the 1980s, constructivism has developed into a well 
established IR framework that gradually incorporated new issues and 
strands, resulting in an ever increasing and varied body of work. Some 
authors even claim that it should be treated as a ‘meta-theoretical standpoint 
in the study of social phenomena’, rather than a specific theory of 
international politics.139 As an IR school that draws from various ideas on 
international relations, constructivism has few general or overarching 
assumptions, which means that its researchers might advance a palette of 
very different readings of the relationship between identity and foreign policy. 
Regardless of these many variations on the constructivist theme, all converge 
around the core understanding that reality and knowledge are socially 
constructed.140 Constructivists also emphasise that ‘[t]he social environment 
in which we find ourselves defines (“constitutes”) who we are, our identities as 
social beings’.141 
 
The most useful constructivist contributions for the conceptual 
dimension of my thesis are the ideational foundations of identity and the 
move away from exclusively rationalist approaches. Constructivism occupies 
the ‘middle ground’ between two very distinct and opposing groups: 
rationalists (e.g. realists, neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists) and 
supporters of interpretive epistemologies (e.g. postmodernists, 
poststructuralists, critical theorists like the Frankfurt school, feminist 
scholars).142 Rationalists tend to treat identity as unproblematic, hence 
excluding or marginalising it from empirical research agendas. They assume 
that all states have a series of fixed and objective preferences - usually 
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physical security, accumulating power or wealth - which form their identity 
and national interest. In this vein, accounts of a state’s foreign policy indicate 
that the ideas and choices contained in national identities ‘are governed by 
the material constraints elites face in a given situation’.143 By contrast, the 
post-modern subject has ‘no fixed, essential or permanent identity’; 
subjectivity is ‘formed and transformed in a continuous process that takes 
place in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed and alongside 
the production and reproduction of the social’.144 For interpretive 
epistemologies, identity does not exist outside the structures of discourse. As 
advocates of the middle ground, some constructivist scholars define identity 
in deceptively simple terms. Ted Hopf explains how identity fulfils two 
necessary functions - on the one hand, expressing to the self and others who 
the self is; on the other hand, communicating to the self who others are.145 
The first function of identity entails a ‘set of interests or preferences with 
respect to choices of action in particular domains and with respect to 
particular actors’.146 So a state’s identity influences its conduct towards other 
members and circumstances in the international system. For example, the 
interest to uphold norms of human rights is closely linked to a state’s identity 
as liberal democracy.147 The second function means that a ‘state understands 
others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously 
reproducing its own identity through daily social practice’.148 Hopf’s view on 
identity is deceptively simple since it clarifies what identity does, without 
actually saying what identity is and what elements constitute it. 
 
Both conventional and critical constructivism has been preoccupied 
with finding a definition of identity. Alexander Wendt is a good starting point 
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as his conventional constructivist work has triggered a lot of identity debates. 
Wendt defines state identity as the product of inter-subjective processes of 
meaning creation, ‘a property of intentional actors that generates motivational 
and behavioral dispositions’.149 Yet, consistent with the neorealist tradition, 
he regards states via the ‘black box’ metaphor, their domestic factors being 
irrelevant to the construction of identities. Wendt has argued that the 
meanings which states attach to phenomena and subsequently their interests 
and identities are shaped through inter-state interaction.150 This does reflect 
an important facet of identity formation, but also neglects the historical and 
internal contexts in which national identities are deeply embedded, because 
the interpretations that impact them cannot be restricted to the meanings 
and ideas stemming from inter-state dynamics. After all, a state’s national 
identity is inextricably related to the domestic actors that take decisions in its 
name. These agents internalise the norms characterising the international 
realm, yet they also approach politics with an already formed appreciation of 
the world, the international system and the position of their state within it.151 
Their articulations necessarily derive from collective understandings that 
have origins at least partly in domestic political and cultural settings. In the 
words of Edward Said, society is the ‘locale in which a continuous contest 
between adherents of different ideas about what constitutes the national 
identity is taking place’.152 Erik Ringmar summarises this problematic aspect 
of Wendt’s theory by arguing that it is – 
‘fundamentally one-sided: the problem of identity formation is constantly seen from 
the perspective of the system and never as a problem each state and each statesman 
has to grapple with. He can tell us why a certain identity is recognized, but not what 
that identity is’.153 
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Moreover, if one admits that identities are simply given via systemic 
socialisation, analysing why and how a specific self-image or identity is more 
relevant at a particular moment becomes a difficult if not impossible task. 
The structural nature of the international system cannot explain the reasons 
behind identity change.154 Relying on systemic premises also does not offer 
guidance as to ‘how each state, nation or other “unit” has to create its own 
terms or rationales, its identity and foreign policy’.155 Under both internal and 
external influences, the ‘content’ of identity comes into being through 
difference. Here critical constructivism has made substantial and provocative 
contributions, stressing the boundaries marked by identity and its 
connections to foreign policy. For instance, according to Roxanne Doty, the 
discourses promoting democracy and human rights produce two categories - 
a morally superior identity of ‘democratic’ compared to the inferior one of 
‘non-democratic’, which construct ‘the very differences that transformation 
would ostensibly eliminate’.156 David Campbell’s monograph on US identity 
and foreign policy rejects the conventional understanding of foreign policy as 
the ‘external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities’; 
instead it reverses the causal chain between state identity and foreign 
policy.157 In his opinion, national states are ‘paradoxical entities which do not 
possess prediscursive stable identities’.158 Since such identities constantly 
undergo some process of transformation, ‘for a state to end its practices of 
representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations’.159 
Campbell re-conceptualises a state’s identity as the ‘outcome of exclusionary 
practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the “inside” are 
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linked through a discourse of “danger” with threats identified and located on 
the “outside’”.160 
 
Therefore, my conceptual framework starts from the constructivist 
principle that identities have an ideational basis and fluid nature, being de-
fined and re-defined under the impact of systemic and internal factors. 
Another essential part of my position is the critical constructivist tenet that 
the content of national identity incorporates self-other relations. Still, while I 
agree that national identities can be subject to constant re-negotiation 
(depending on particular conditions or events), Campbell’s and other critical 
discursive approaches are not compatible with my view about the relationship 
between national identity and foreign policy. First, I subscribe to the idea that 
identity formation comes before and shapes the manifestation of a state’s 
international conduct, although I do not see any causal relationship between 
identity and foreign policy. Identities change if a certain set of circumstances 
occur. A highly important foreign policy situation or crisis, like the Kosovo 
intervention, 9/11, Iraq war, might trigger a shift in the discourses and 
ideational structures dominating the international environment. This 
discursive shift at international level may prompt in turn the re-articulation 
of a state’s national identity, or bring a specific facet of identity to the 
forefront and render it more relevant in that foreign policy context. Second, I 
think that national identity is a construct with a stable core, which draws 
meaning from a few continuously perpetuated self-images of the nation. 
These self-images originate in enduring historical traditions and collective 
memories. David Taylor makes an interesting point here – ‘[l]ong-standing 
historical notions of identity are not rendered irrelevant for all the arguments 
that they may be “mythical” or “imagined”’; such ‘imagined essences of 
identity are potent social forces’.161  
 
A key area where my framework disagrees with constructivism is the 
latter’s excessive rejection of rationalism. I do not consider national identity 
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and rational motivations to be competing explanations for foreign policy. 
Instead, they offer complementary accounts of a state’s international 
behaviour. Romania’s wish to join the EU and NATO was partly a rational 
foreign policy choice. NATO and EU accession would bring material 
advantages such as increased security and prosperity. Yet Euro-Atlantic 
integration was also about the international recognition of Romania’s national 
identity, about returning to the Western community from which it had been 
separated by communism. In addition to this, the external position of 
Romanian elites regarding critical events (e.g. Kosovo, Iraq) tried to please 
prominent NATO and EU members to some extent, in order to help gain 
membership in the two institutions. But that does not tell the whole story of 
Romanian foreign policy. For example, in chapter IV, rationalism cannot 
explain why Romania did not give unconditional assistance to NATO actions 
in Kosovo from the beginning. In October 1998, the Romanian response to a 
potential Alliance intervention in Kosovo was nuanced and granted partial 
support. NATO requested unrestricted airspace access and domestic leaders 
decided only on humanitarian relief efforts and approving airspace access in 
case of emergencies. It was a somewhat neutral stance for Romania which 
accommodated the tensions inherent in its national identity – whether to act 
as a European liberal democracy or prioritise the traditional Balkan affinity. A 
rational cost-benefit calculation would simply make Romania comply with 
NATO’s demands unconditionally, so as to prove its adequacy as an Alliance 
candidate. Thus, national identity and rationalism supplement rather than 
oppose each other to advance a complex picture of Romanian international 
rhetoric and actions.  
 
Another distinction between my conceptual framework and critical 
constructivism relates to the relationship between the self and others. The 
working of boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was initially discussed by 
social psychology and identification theories, which summarise the process as 
follows -  
‘[a] differentiation arises between oneselves, the we-group or in-group, and everybody 
else or the other-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of 
peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all 
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outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements 
have modified it’.162 
Similarly, some critical constructivists see the self-other dichotomy in terms 
of opposition and even hostility, whereby the other is endowed with a series of 
negative potentially threatening traits and the self with positive ones. The 
other may not necessarily be a different social entity, only being the self of the 
past, like the example of post-war West Germany who configured its identity 
largely in contrast to Nazi Germany.163 The ‘imagined other’ could also be 
constructed as a threat to the unity and intransigence of the self, its most 
radical embodiments being used as justification for ethnic cleansing.164 
Jennifer Milliken allows for more variation when analysing US identity during 
the Cold War, which was constituted on the dissimilarities between the non-
American West and the member-states of the ‘Free World’; US identity was 
represented by deploying a ‘leader-follower’ analogy.165 In this respect, I 
concur with critical constructivists that the self-images feeding into national 
identity are based on the self-other nexus, which is in turn constituted via 
difference. Yet I prefer a more accommodating and less inimical position on 
difference and the self-other nexus, which derives from the arguments put 
forward by Bahar Rumelili: ‘the constitution of identities in relation to 
difference does not necessitate a behavioural relationship between self (the 
bearer of identity) and other (the bearer of difference) that is characterised by 
mutual exclusion and the perception and representation of the other as a 
threat to one’s identity’.166 Such a premise opens up a wide variety of 
possibilities and relations on the self-other spectrum of difference. Unlike 
what some critical constructivists claim, a negative and even hostile 
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relationship is not the only option between the self and others. The self can 
also feel compatibility, friendship or indifference towards others. The 
concluding part of this chapter prefigures the three main identity themes 
circulating in Romania’s post-communist foreign policy imaginary, whereas 
chapter III discusses at length how Romanian self-images and overall national 
identity have been shaped vis-à-vis a crucial self (‘Europe’) and salient other 
(‘the Balkans’). 
 
The foreign policy imaginary is a key concept of my thesis and draws 
inspiration from Jutta Weldes’ notion of ‘security imaginary’, but takes things 
a step further by identifying the ‘real’ and ‘imagined’ basis of national identity. 
She introduces the security imaginary in her framework concerning the 
emergence of national interests – ‘A security imaginary is, quite simply, a 
structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which 
representations of the world of international relations are created’.167 Both 
adaptations originate from the ‘social imaginary’ of Cornelius Castoriadis, 
who starts with the conviction that the symbolic carries understandings 
which take into account the ‘real-rational’, but also includes an imaginary 
dimension which ultimately comes ‘from the original faculty of positioning or 
presenting oneself with things and relations that do not exist, in the form of 
representation (things and relations that are not or have never been given in 
perception)’.168 Consequently, the ‘social imaginary’ is conceptualised as ‘an 
original investment by society of the world and itself with meaning - meanings 
which are not “dictated” by real factors since it is instead this meaning that 
attributes to these real factors a particular importance and a particular place 
in the universe constituted by a given society’.169 To put it more simply, the 
foreign policy imaginary enables answers to existential questions like ‘[w]ho 
are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are 
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we? What do we want (…) what are we lacking?’170 Such questions need a 
reply because ultimately: 
‘society must define its “identity”, its articulation, the world, its relation to the world 
and to the objects it contains, its needs and its desires. Without the “answer” to these 
“questions”, without these “definitions”, there can be no human world, no society, no 
culture - for everything would be undifferentiated chaos’.171 
So the foreign policy imaginary offers ‘the cultural raw materials out of which 
representations of states, of relations among states, and of the international 
system are constructed’.172 For my identity framework, the foreign policy 
imaginary (defined as a ‘structure of well established meanings’) is basically 
an ideational foundation, which contains those stable self-images rooted in 
the nation’s memories of historical past and configuring national identity at 
present. Building on Castoriadis’ reasoning, I argue that the self-images 
feeding into national identity may have a ‘real’ (somewhat objectively 
identifiable) core – language and ethnicity, an ‘imagined’ basis or a 
combination of the two categories. I will expand upon this point in the 
subsequent section, since it relates to how the literature on nationalism can 
address one of the lacunae in constructivism. Regardless of the ‘real’ or 
‘imagined’ essences of national identity, the foreign policy imaginary as 
ideational structure influences how elites think about or perceive themselves 
and the state they represent. It conditions agents to an extent, yet they do 
retain freedom of action and choice. The foreign policy imaginary is not a 
fixed structure and has a variety of articulations, which allows decision-
makers to modify meanings or select the appropriate ones depending on the 
circumstances. 
 
Furthermore, before officials can act for their state, they need to engage 
with a process of interpretation. This enables them to understand both what 
situation the state faces and how they should respond to it. The process of 
interpretation requires a language shared at least by those state elites 
involved in determining state conduct, as well as by the audience for whom 
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state action must be accepted as legitimate.173 That is why inter-subjectivity 
plays an essential role in the multi-dimensional social process out of which 
foreign policy self-images emerge. For the representations of political reality 
expressed by elites (governing or opposition) to be legitimate or simply 
accepted, they have to be conceived with reference to the collective imaginary 
that dominates the intended recipient society; otherwise, they risk being 
marginalised or just ignored completely.174 So the meanings promoted 
become legitimate if they are publicly validated by the media, civil society 
representatives and the population in general. In the words of Friedrich 
Kratochwil, reality ‘is not the thing described but rather the intersubjective 
validity of a characterization upon which reasonable persons can agree’.175 
What the concept of inter-subjectivity contributes to the understanding of 
foreign policy and national identity is a specific take on reality. The political 
world and, more narrowly, the imaginary to which they refer has not been 
contoured in an isolated manner by one individual or a group of select few. 
No matter how powerful their authority might be, in democratic states it is 
not a question of ‘selling’ ideas to a passive or potentially ignorant audience. 
Those understandings derive from a complex combination of top and lower 
level social interactions during which the values, preferences and aspirations 
of a society are not only taken into account, but play an integral part in the 
formative process. Yet it should be noted that national identity is inter-
subjectively configured both internally and externally -  ‘one’s attitude, or 
disposition, toward another only emerges in that state’s encounter with its 
significant Other, and therefore, who or what a state becomes is the outcome 
of many intersecting and overlapping sequences of action and response 
[between the Self and Others]’.176 The international recognition aspect of 
identity verification will be dealt with in the last section of my conceptual 
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framework, where the socio-psychological issues of national identity 
formation will be considered in detail. 
 
To sum up this first section, constructivism has informed my national 
identity framework to a significant extent, but also contains some important 
lacunae which need to be supplemented with other literatures. My thesis 
employs the following general constructivist insights: the changing nature 
and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action 
without actually imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at 
work in identity formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and 
entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus; inter-
subjectivity as a feature of identity creation. Looking at each one separately, 
having a certain identity entails an inextricably linked array of appropriate 
foreign policy choices, responses and conduct. Constructivist theory has 
introduced the identity puzzle in IR, by rejecting the assumptions of 
rationalism which regard national identities and interests as fixed and 
unproblematic. By its lights, these should not be swept under the all 
encompassing umbrella of material constraints or pursuits (physical security, 
power, economic gains). On the contrary, identities have an ideational basis 
and do not possess a static nature, being defined and re-defined under the 
impact of both external (systemic) and internal factors. Inter-state 
socialisation as well as specific domestic contexts like cultural values and 
interpretations of history shape national identity. Despite its fluid nature, 
national identity draws self-images from long-standing meanings and 
articulations originating in the remembered historical past. These self-images 
and in turn national identity are constituted on the self-other nexus, being 
dependent on difference. The relationship between the self and others is not 
necessarily antagonistic and can range from friendliness or indifference to 
hostility. 
 
Nevertheless, my thesis is not intended to be a constructivist project 
because of two reasons: the complete separation of constructivism from 
rationalism and the former’s lacunae when analysing national identity. First, I 
view identity and rationalist motivations as complementary rather than 
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opposing explanations for foreign policy. Rationalism may offer a basic 
account of why Romanian elites chose a Euro-Atlantic direction for their state 
and wanted to curry favour with the EU and NATO or their prominent 
member states. Yet that is only part of the story and cannot unpack the 
nuances of Romania’s foreign policy responses. This is where national identity 
comes in to show that deciding on an external stance is not a straightforward 
or objective answer. Foreign policy decision-making is often subject to 
domestic contestation among elites. At various more or less critical points 
between 1990 and 2007, Romania’s rhetoric and actions changed under the 
combined influence of national identity, rational motivations and shifting 
international context. Second, some constructivists have explored the 
‘national’ component of national identity but with certain limitations. Weldes 
talks about American national identity and uniqueness as a construct created 
by discursive and non-linguistic practices such as waving the US flag, singing 
the national anthem, citizenship rites, establishing and patrolling borders 
around the national territory.177 Yet such accounts neglect to mention the 
fundamental domestic sources of the nation and national identity. Does the 
nation have a core that distinguishes it from others and can be somewhat 
objectively identified? What role do ethnicity, common ancestry and shared 
historical memories play in the emergence of national identity? 
Constructivism does not provide all the necessary resources to examine 
Romanian exceptionalism, which stresses its Western European heritage 
through the Roman ethnic descent and Latin language. Consequently, by 
necessity and choice, my framework must draw from other intellectual fields 
to specify both the internal and external elements of national identity. The 
logical next step is to think about national identity in relation to its first 
domestic source - ‘the nation’, how the latter’s origins and constitutive 
aspects shape a state’s national identity. 
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Identity and the Nation 
 
The literature on nationalism analyses the national foundation of 
identity, which contributes to the dynamic relationship between a state’s 
national identity and foreign policy by clarifying the former’s internal basis 
and components. The combined insights of scholars like Benedict Anderson 
and Anthony Smith shed light on the imagined nature of national identity 
which still retains a stable ethno-cultural core (same ancestry, language, 
territory, historical myths and memories). Within nationalism studies, 
primordialists (or essentialists) and modernists (or constructionists) have 
contrasting opinions on the nation.178 Primordialists treat nations as 
communities bound together by common biology and culture over centuries of 
a shared past. This perspective, which characterised most of the earlier 
literature on nationalism, says that nations are objective units and can be 
scientifically examined as a basic human group that has persisted 
throughout history.179 Primordialism regards national identity as an entity 
whose origins can be traced back to the ‘mythical times of the community’; it 
is considered a product of biological features, as well as social and cultural 
propensities. As Clifford Geertz points out,  
‘[b]y primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens” - or more 
precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “givens” - of 
social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them 
the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, 
speaking a particular language or even a dialect of a language, and following 
particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are 
seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of 
themselves’.180  
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Furthermore, Geertz’s elements and in turn national identity have both 
an essentialist and perennial nature. Here Kathryn Woodward unequivocally 
notes: an ‘essentialist definition of identity suggests that there is one 
authentic set of characteristics which all share and which do not alter across 
time’.181 Such a stance entails that identity is a ‘primordial given’ which the 
modern social actor completely embraces or not at all. More contemporary 
studies question the reification and objective nature of nations, instead 
arguing that they are constructed social entities which emerge out of specific 
social practices and contexts. Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, who stand 
at the opposite side of the spectrum to primordialism, view the nation as a 
purely modern phenomenon and product of social engineering. Using 
Gellner’s words, ‘[nationalism] invents nations where they do not exist’.182 
Hobsbawm goes even further and describes nationalism as a fabrication of 
elite groups; whereas Gellner accepts the sociological reality of nations and 
nationalism once they have been formed, Hobsbawm dismisses their reality 
as purely artificial and invented.183 Aspects of these two positions are 
synthesised in ethno-symbolism, represented prominently by Anthony Smith. 
He claims that, even though modern nations are constructed, they have 
stable historical roots in the ethnic groups (‘ethnies’); ethnies provide the 
shared ‘myths, memories, values and symbols’184 which are necessary for the 
formation of nations. Despite its elaborate presentation, Smith’s argument 
has been criticised for not giving a sufficiently persuasive reason to see 
‘ethnies’ as less constructed than ‘nations’.185  
 
This gap has opened the way for alternative approaches to analysing 
the nation, one of the most challenging being through discourse. The 
discursive conceptualisation of nations refers in many ways to Benedict 
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Anderson’s contributions, another advocate of modernism. He regards 
nations as an ‘imagined’ phenomenon because ‘the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion’.186 Printed standardised language helped to spread and forge the 
idea of a nation. As Anderson put it, ‘the convergence of capitalism and print 
technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of 
a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the 
stage for the modern nation’.187 In terms of national identity, the modernist 
school attempts to minimise the primordial notion of previously set and 
perennial traits, which become a fundamental property of national identity. 
According to Stuart Hall, national identity is a perpetually unfinished process 
of reconstruction: ‘perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already 
accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we 
should think, instead, of identity as “a production” which is never complete, 
always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, 
representation’.188 Madan Sarup agrees that ‘identity is a construction, a 
consequence of a process of interaction between people, institutions and 
practices’.189 This position thus embodies the idea of change, flexibility, 
fluidity, the negotiation of national identity in relation to social change and 
dominant cultural aspects. 
 
How are these debates in the literature on nationalism useful for my 
identity framework? Primordialism has a very restrictive viewpoint on the 
origins of national identity, which does not accept the possibility of change. A 
quite severe critique concluded that ‘[a] more unintelligible and unsociological 
concept would be hard to imagine (...) a variety of sources from sociology, 
anthropology, and psychology (...) render the concept theoretically vacuous 
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and empirically indefensible’.190 The modernist camp is much more 
accommodating towards change, yet its members disagree on the degree of 
construction or invention at work within national identity. For my purposes, a 
combination of insights from Anderson and Smith is most helpful for 
understanding Romanian national identity. If nations are ‘imagined 
communities’, then national identity is also ‘imagined’; it is not determined by 
material circumstances or objectified reference points, but rather emerges out 
of the agents’ interpretation of existing ideational structures. While Anderson 
emphasises how central the continuous issue of identity building is (‘the 
imagining of the community’), he does not imply that nations are fictitious. 
On the contrary, they are a genuine phenomenon rooted in historical 
processes.191 Smith’s ethno-symbolism similarly conceives nations as 
‘historical phenomena, not only in the generic sense that they are embedded 
in particular collective pasts and emerge (...) through specific historical 
processes, but also because, by definition, they embody shared memories, 
traditions, and hopes of the populations designated as parts of the nation’.192 
National identities are usually grounded in and ‘presume some prior 
community of territory, language, or culture, which provide the raw materials 
for the intellectual project of nationality’.193 Therefore, from Anderson my 
thesis adopts the imagined essence of the nation and national identity. From 
Smith, it takes the concept of ‘ethnie’ to identify an ethno-cultural core for 
national identity. They fit with the constructivist premise of identity being 
shaped by internal factors, but supplement it by clarifying what are the 
fundamental domestic sources of national identity. 
 
Within mainstream interpretations of the nation, many authoritative 
voices have tried to unpack the specific basis of national identity. Smith’s 
notion of ‘ethnie’ has utility in highlighting a core for national identity - ‘a 
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named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical 
memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an 
association with homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among 
élites’.194 Elsewhere, Smith lists historical territory, common myths and 
collective memories, mass public culture, common legal rights and obligations 
and common economy as sources for national identity.195 William Bloom also 
underlines the role of internalised national symbols196;
 
Hall again mentions 
the impact of national culture197, while Ernest
 
Rennan discusses the 
contribution of remembering and forgetting in creating the nation’s story.198 
These distinct yet inter-related issues are relevant to my framework because 
they circle around the ethno-cultural core of national identity taken from 
Smith. The ethnic component of national identity has resonated especially in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where the national consciousness of ethnic 
groups developed before they could institutionalise their nation as a sovereign 
state, since they belonged to different multinational empires.199 In this 
respect, Miroslav Hroch elaborates on the national movements in the region 
as follows: 
‘[their] goals covered three main groups of demands, which corresponded to felt 
deficits of national existence:  (1) the development of a national culture based on the 
local language, and its normal use in education, administration and economic life; (2) 
the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration, initially in the form of 
autonomy and ultimately (usually quite late, as an express demand) of independence; 
(3) the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group’.200 
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The ethno-cultural basis of the Romanian nation – language, ethnic 
descent, territory, collective memory - played a vital part in the contemporary 
articulation of national identity, considering that the modern state of 
Romania was achieved only in the early twentieth century (1918). At first, 
language unified the divided ethnic group and facilitated communication 
between those who eventually identified themselves as Romanians, being 
invoked even now as a putatively objective proof of the nation’s Roman 
ancestors and Western European heritage. The common language 
consolidated the idea of Latin origins in the Romanian consciousness, which 
meant that the Romanian nation had the same ethnic descent as the French, 
Italian, Spanish and Portuguese nations. The ancient Romanian land of Dacia 
had been conquered by Rome in the second century and then divided into 
three main historical provinces. Despite being separated into different 
territories and under the rule of various empires, the Romanian nation was 
bound by long-standing collective memories that circulated as shared 
historical narratives and symbols. Collective memories of past events are 
crucial to the transmission of national identity through time. They shape 
national identity from within (internal level) by giving meanings and 
articulations which reside and are interpreted in the state’s foreign policy 
imaginary. Yet constructivism and nationalism studies do not deal with these 
aspects in sufficient detail. So, to fully understand the internal dynamic of 
national identity, my framework turns to the literature on collective memory. 
 
 
Identity and Collective Memory 
 
Why is collective memory essential to the formation of national identity? 
Simply because a nation’s history and how the past has been remembered 
inform the very fabric and foundations of its national identity. In the words of 
Robert Bellah and his co-authors, 
‘[c]ommunities (...) have a history - in an important sense are constituted by their past 
- and for this reason we can speak of a real community as a “community of memory”, 
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one that does not forget its past. In order not to forget that past, a community is 
involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative’.201 
Common values, ideas and interpretations of events, stories of ancient 
descent situate ‘the collectivity inside a shared history’, which is ‘constantly 
reaffirmed and reproduced through resonant rituals and symbols’.202 Broadly 
defined, collective memory is ‘how members of society remember and 
interpret events, how the meaning of the past is constructed, and how it is 
modified over time’; it refers to the dissemination of beliefs, feelings, moral 
judgments and knowledge about the past, both for self-understanding and for 
winning power in an ever-changing reality.203 According to Maurice 
Halbwachs, the first social scientist to provide a systematic analysis of this 
concept, collective memory is a social construction that develops in specific 
social contexts which he termed ‘the social framework (cadres sociaux) of 
memory’.204 For Halbwachs, studying memory is not a matter of reflecting on 
the properties of the subjective mind; rather, memory is a matter of how 
minds work together in society, how their operations are structured by social 
arrangements:  
‘[i]t is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that 
they recall, recognize, and localize their memories’.205 
Halbwachs has thus pointed out that it is impossible for individuals to 
remember in any coherent and persistent fashion outside of their group 
contexts. Group memberships provide the materials for memory and prod the 
individual into recalling particular events and forgetting others.206 That is 
why the social group to which the individuals belong influences and 
conditions their memories of the past.  
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Moreover, collective memory originates from shared communications 
about the meanings of the past, anchored in the lives of individuals who 
participate in the life of a specific collective.207 Jay Winter and Emmanuel 
Sivan talk about ‘collective remembrance’ rather than ‘collective memory’, 
with an emphasis on social agency, activity and creativity.208 Their 
perspective is concerned with the middle ground - 
‘between those who argue that private memories are ineffable and individual, and 
those who see them as entirely socially determined, and therefore present whether or 
not anyone acts on them (…) In between is the palpable, messy activity which 
produces collective remembrance’.209 
Compared to Halbwachs’ collective memory, Winter and Sivan’s concept 
captures ‘an individualist notion of memory that underpins the collective acts 
of remembrance’.210 So collective memory or remembrance is ‘the result of the 
process whereby individuals interact socially to articulate their memories – of 
lost relatives, of protest and dissent, of days gone by’.211 Rafael Narvaez 
explains that ‘[c]ollective memory is not only about remembering (the past) or 
about social order and action (the present), but, critically, it is about how 
social groups project themselves toward the future’.212 Consequently, in my 
identity framework, collective memory is a group-based subjective perception 
of the past, which gives meaning to the group’s existence and conveys 
potential future aspirations. That is why a nation’s contemporary self-images 
feeding into national identity are based on memories about past 
accomplishments and trajectories. Similarly to the individual level, group 
memory combines the past, present and future to define the group’s 
identity.213  
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How states portray themselves, what they believe in and their reactions 
to more or less critical foreign policy situations are guided by the manner in 
which past experiences have been remembered. Stressing the close 
relationship between identity and memory, John Gillis notes that: 
‘the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa. The core 
meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time 
and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the 
assumed identity’.214  
Collective memory can be described as ‘a powerful cohesive force, binding the 
disparate members of a nation together’; it draws boundaries between the self 
and others, being ‘passed from generation to generation’ and ‘transmitted 
across multiple historical contexts’.215 Duncan Bell advances an interesting 
take on ‘the fluid interface between memory and political identity’; as 
identities are contested, memories are used ‘to defend unity and coherence, to 
shore up a sense of self and community’.216 A state’s national identity 
promoted from within may or may not receive external validation from fellow 
members in the international system. If its national identity is confronted 
with lack of recognition, the state falls back on the domestic source where 
more ideas about the self have been circulating. The purpose is to both 
reinforce national identity and hopefully find further arguments which will 
convince others to accept that self-image or national identity. It is worth 
clarifying that collective memories do not structurally determine a particular 
national identity or foreign policy behaviour. Instead, they are ideational 
structures whose meanings are interpreted and re-interpreted by elites. 
Collective memories internally influence national identity and the foreign 
policy imaginary, which is reflected in the state’s international relations. 
Thomas Berger’s words capture this aspect as he elaborates on the ‘practical 
function’ of collective memories: 
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‘[t]hey provide the collectivity with an identity and a common myth of origin. They 
endow it with emotional and normative underpinning. They simplify the task of 
organising collective action by providing its members with a common language and 
set of understandings about how the world functions and ought to function’.217 
 
When analysing the link between memory and national identity, Bell 
argues against the widespread ‘running together (and even conflation) of 
memory and mythology’.218 He particularly disagrees with Anthony Smith who 
has persistently illustrated the ‘relationship of shared memories to collective 
cultural identities: memory, almost by definition is integral to cultural 
identity, and the cultivation of shared memories is essential to the survival 
and destiny of such collective identities’.219 For instance, Romania’s National 
Day (December 1) celebrating the Great Unification of 1918 helps to re-
inscribe identification with the nation, whether or not people are actually old 
enough to remember the original day. Bell prefers to call this type of example 
a myth, a narrative which gives meaning to notable events, people and 
locations. He conceptualises a nationalist myth as ‘a story that simplifies, 
dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past and its place 
in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its 
contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past’.220 My thesis 
subscribes to a broader sense of memory which is prevalent in the related 
literature, while acknowledging that there is a mythological dimension to the 
historical narratives transmitted as collective memories in the nation’s 
evolution. By bringing the two sides together, collective memory-myths enable 
my framework to indicate how these stories about the historical past serve to 
anchor people’s identities within an overarching national identity. At the 
same time, collective memory-myths about history allow the multiple 
individual selves to be situated within wider temporal contexts of meaning 
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and belonging. The ‘Roman foundation myth’221 has a special resonance for 
Romanians that contributes to the articulation of their present Euro-Atlantic 
national identity, clarifying in a simple and selective manner their Latin 
origins and Western European ancestry.  
 
All these insights have been useful to find a definition for collective 
memory-myths, to show how they operate over time by binding the nation 
together and internally shaping national identity. The literature on collective 
memory has supplemented my framework by providing the second domestic 
source of national identity. While examining the latter’s first internal factor 
(the nation), nationalism studies mentioned collective memories as part of the 
ethno-cultural basis of the nation, yet did not explain in sufficient detail how 
their contribution to national identity works. Although collective memory-
myths suggest how a nation orientates itself towards the remembered past, 
the memory literature has a limitation when dealing with an identity 
framework that looks both within and outside for elements impacting on 
national identity. The formation of national identity is a two-level process 
where a domestic self-image needs to be validated by external audiences. 
Nationalism and collective memory studies have configured the internal 
components of national identity. Now the discussion needs to be brought 
back to IR and literatures that contain the two external and final dimensions 
of my perspective – the role of self-esteem and international recognition in 
shaping national identity. 
 
 
Identity, Self-Esteem and International Recognition 
 
Almost all strands of political theory can benefit from psychology in 
explaining or supplementing what is not easily accounted for by the dominant 
rational model of decision-making.222 Political psychology enriches the study 
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of international relations ‘by advancing our understanding of the individual 
and social cognitive and emotional mechanisms’.223 Perhaps the most 
straightforward justification for making connections between psychology and 
IR theory is that, in many respects, states behave just like individuals. This 
can certainly be a useful premise in foreign policy analysis, considering that 
the idea of states acting as people has become ‘so deeply embedded in our 
common sense that it is difficult to imagine how international politics might 
be conceptualized or conducted without it’.224 Somehow it is also unavoidable 
to treat states as individuals for another crucial reason - ‘unlike many of the 
other things that we commonly tend to anthropomorphize, states are actually 
governed by people in the form of their individual leaders’.225 Nevertheless, 
whether the state as a subject is comparable to a person has been contested 
on the grounds that this view embodies ‘an explicitly Eurocentric argument’, 
with ideational roots in the international system of late Renaissance 
Europe.226 Parallels between states and people are obviously problematic 
since a state ‘has no unified consciousness, no single memory, and no 
subjective will’.227 A convincing way of settling the dispute is that the 
subjectivity of states has been enshrined and become routine in international 
law, where a state is ‘a subject endowed with rights and obligations, and it is 
an actor who can think rationally and be held responsible for the 
consequences of its actions’.228 That is why my framework adopts the 
conception of states as subjects, as well as the idea that their national 
identity and rationality are very significant for foreign policy decision-making. 
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In the light of such opinions regarding the subjectivity of states, I want 
to briefly introduce the social identity approach as a psychological stepping 
stone for my framework and then focus mainly on the IR literature concerning 
self-esteem and international recognition. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
drawing on sociological and psychological insights, the social identity 
approach (social identity and self-categorisation theories) conceptualised the 
notion of ‘identity’ as the product of socio-cognitive processes of self-
identification and categorisation, with particular relevance to explaining 
intergroup behaviour.229 This perspective argued that identity was based on 
being the member of a specific social group, thus creating boundaries 
between the self and others. Talking about the psychological foundations of 
identity, Richard Mole mentions that, at its simplest, identity seeks to ‘convey 
who we are or are perceived to be’ and how we ‘locate ourselves and others in 
the social world’, either as individuals or groups.230 Therefore, according to 
the social identity approach, national identity can be defined as a form of 
collective self-identification which derives from membership in a social group 
called the nation. Although not a revolutionary deduction, this nonetheless 
lays the necessary groundwork for opening up another aspect of the identity 
puzzle.  
 
Romania as a state and its citizens proclaiming to have a Romanian 
national identity is not that surprising. But what if Romania is internally 
portrayed as part of a group (‘Europe’) and its national identity self-identifies 
with European identity, yet neither assumption is validated by external 
audiences? National identity formation is a two-way socio-psychological 
process that requires recognition, the latter being intertwined with self-
esteem. The social identity approach has strongly incorporated self-esteem as 
a motivator for outcomes. While it has not always been empirically clear that 
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self-esteem is important, studies have shown that group memberships are 
often a source of self-esteem.231 As Alicia Cast and Peter Burke conclude, self-
esteem comes from and is a key ingredient in the process of identity 
verification or recognition.232 In a number of projects, Burke and Jan Stets 
have researched the effects of failing to verify an identity on people’s 
emotions. When identities are verified by the responses of others, people 
experience positive emotions and generally have enhanced self-esteem; when 
an identity is not recognised, individuals feel distress, anxiety and other 
negative emotions, including lowered self-esteem.233 Since my thesis is 
primarily based in IR, it seems natural to explore and draw from intellectual 
applications of self-esteem and recognition to international politics, which are 
two separate literatures that can be fruitfully interpolated into a multi-
dimensional definition of national identity. 
 
Some IR authors have sought to mix psychological theory with 
constructivism, albeit not in an extensive manner.234 Ted Hopf engages with 
cognitive psychology to conceptualise identities as social cognitive structures 
shaped by internal factors. The result is a richly detailed study of Russian 
identity, which takes into account the impact of history and partly addresses 
the shortcomings inherent in Wendt’s purely systemic view.235 Hopf’s stance, 
however, favours a structural account of how identity influences conduct, 
neglecting agency and the possibility of identity change or re-definitions – ‘the 
unthinking, unintentional, automatic, everyday reproduction of the Self and 
Other through a collection of discursive practices that relies neither on the 
need for the denial and suppression of the Other nor on the conscious 
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selection of behaviour based on a particular norm’.236 As mentioned above, 
my framework adopts a middle position in the agent-structure debate. The 
foreign policy imaginary as ideational structure affects and sets certain 
parameters within which decision-makers interpret and respond to 
international situations. Still, it does not constrain actors to take a specific 
course of action; they have a variety of meanings and possibilities from which 
to choose.  
 
Anne Clunan has tried to remedy Hopf’s overt structural determinist 
approach by putting forward ‘aspirational constructivism’. Her monograph on 
Russia’s foreign policy starts with a theory building exercise, bringing 
together social psychology and constructivism to locate both external and 
domestic sources of national identity.237 This kind of dual focus on identity 
resonates with my conceptual blend, although there is an area where our 
stances diverge. Clunan explains how various competing self-images are 
introduced into the discourse, then tested for practicality (being effective 
given the prevailing environment) and historical legitimacy. The self-image 
that best fits both criteria becomes dominant, enabling elites to define 
national identity.238 She analyses at length the internal sources of national 
self-images and management strategies employed by the bearer of identity 
(Russia). Thus, the domestic context is implicitly given priority over external 
factors like identity verification or recognition by others. My framework pays 
greater attention to the external dimension of national identity, how self-
images are negotiated between Romania and its significant Euro-Atlantic 
selves (EU, NATO, US and Western European states in general). Clunan’s 
process of identity formation is also closely linked with political elites who 
seek to enhance their state’s collective self-esteem and look at the past when 
promoting future aspirations to international status.239 Self-esteem as 
motivator in foreign policy is certainly a useful idea and goes back to the 
social identity approach. Yet, despite incorporating aspirations and the need 
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to enhance self-esteem, Clunan continues to work within a constructivist 
framework that competes with rationalism in terms of understanding a state’s 
international relations. I prefer not to completely reject rationalism and to 
acknowledge a complementary rather than oppositional relationship between 
national identity and rationalist motivations, and this plays out quite 
interestingly in Romania’s case.  
 
Clunan’s ‘aspirational constructivism’ shares a common ground with 
another IR literature analysing self-esteem, prestige and status as general 
drivers of state foreign policy. Richard Ned Lebow introduces a cultural 
approach that takes a closer look at changes in norms, beliefs and values and 
how these changes are often brought about by factors called the motives - 
appetite, spirit, fear and reason - which may dominate political decision-
making in societies.240 Lebow argues that the spirit aspires to esteem through 
honour and standing, which renders self-esteem an important element in the 
formation of identity.241 Nationalities, nations and other cultural entities seek, 
at least to some degree, enhanced self-esteem through their victories and 
suffer a loss of esteem, even humiliation, when experiencing setbacks.242 For 
the ancient Greeks, honour was a status which described the outward 
recognition given by others in response to Greek excellence.243 Here Lebow 
touches on the connection between honour (self-esteem) and external 
recognition, although not in the explicit sense of identity validation which is 
necessary in my framework. 
 
Andrei Tsygankov’s first book on the evolving identity and foreign policy 
of Russia successfully integrated the key components of national identity. My 
thesis adopts a similar position without being a constructivist project. He 
argues that ‘interactions with external environment, as well as local 
conditions, establish identity as a relatively stable system of meanings with a 
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well-consolidated context in which to act’.244 Apart from the same two-level 
view on national identity, Tsygankov does not reject the input of rationalist 
theories and chooses to regard them as not ‘fully satisfactory’ in explaining 
the changes and continuity of Russian foreign policy.245 He does subscribe to 
social constructivism though, indicating that the national interest ‘is about 
social adaptation to the constantly changing international and local 
conditions, and it is about recognition by the identified significant Other’.246 
In a more recent monograph on Russian foreign policy, Tsygankov also places 
honour at the core of his analysis, in order to better understand the state’s 
perceptions and actions. He affirms that honour ‘defines what is a “good” and 
“virtuous” course of action in the international system vis-à-vis the relevant 
other’, hence containing ‘standards of appropriate behavior’.247 Lebow and 
Tsygankov’s work reinforces the intrinsic link between identity, self-esteem 
and a state’s external attitude, which is part of my multi-dimensional 
framework.  
 
On a similar note, Liah Greenfeld has said that national identity ‘is, 
fundamentally, a matter of dignity’.248 In other words, national identity is 
driven by the desire of the community to justify itself and legitimise its 
standing, at the minimum protecting what has been achieved, but ultimately 
seeking to enhance one’s position and credentials. This IR literature nicely 
bridges the gap between psychology and international relations, with self-
esteem as a defining element for national identity and foreign policy. Even so, 
with the exception of Tsygangov’s contribution, a recurring question remains 
– what about the external validation of identity? A state’s national identity 
does not circulate in a social vacuum and is highly dependent on whether 
other actors like fellow states accept it or not. Otherwise, that identity simply 
does not exist as a social construct in their bilateral or multi-lateral 
                                       
244 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity 
(Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p. 16. 
245 Ibid, p. 20. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 4. 
248 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), p. 491. 
  P a g e  | 75 
interaction. Together with self-esteem, should we not see international 
recognition as a motivator for state conduct? After all, ‘not only physical, but 
also social survival is at stake’ in international politics.249 
 
Social survival in the international system means having a stable 
national identity, which is not contested by others. In his path breaking 
study, Axel Honneth emphasises the key role of recognition in developing a 
stable identity which involved a basic sense of self-confidence, self-respect 
and self-esteem.250 That is why, in an anarchic international environment, 
one of the main motivations of states is to gain recognition for their self-
images and identity.251 Recognition can be defined as ‘a social act that 
ascribes to a state some positive status, whereby its identity is acknowledged 
and reinforced as meaningful by a significant Other, and thus the state is 
constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing’.252 Thomas 
Lindemann further describes that if ‘there is a rough equivalence between our 
asserted self-image and how we are treated, meaning that if others treat us 
according to what we consider ourselves to be, our self-image is 
recognized’.253 The configuration of national identity is hence understood as 
an inter-subjective negotiation and dialogue between the self and legitimate 
others. As succinctly put by Ringmar, ‘all stories require audiences’ and the 
latter must agree with the self-images and narratives expressed by a state.254 
The categories of audiences include variations on the ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
dichotomy, whether allies or enemies, partners or rivals. For example, 
representing a state as a liberal democracy would not be meaningful without 
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some form of confirmation from fellow liberal democracies. There must be 
‘visible signs’ for being part of a certain group so as to enable identification, 
because ‘we belong together if we simultaneously perform the same acts or 
utter the same words, and if we are aware that others are doing the same 
together with us’.255 A similar idea has been expressed by Bill McSweeney 
who thinks that telling a narrative of identity ‘means to sustain an account of 
a self which is already in the public domain and can therefore make sense to 
others’.256  
 
Furthermore, this external dimension of having self-images validated 
becomes vital because it renders the entire social process effective in practice. 
If external actors recognise the roles, ideas and identity internally attributed 
to a state, they give invaluable credibility to that domestic collective 
imaginary. In their search for international recognition of identity, political 
elites might attempt to not only present their state in accordance with 
national societal demands, but also constantly adapt the articulations 
depending on outside reactions conveying support, threat or simply 
indifference. So recognition is fundamental to securing a healthy sense of 
subjectivity; without it, actors are liable to feel shame and humiliation and 
taken further still, from a cognitive perspective, having one’s identity 
recognised and confirmed by others can be fundamental to establishing a 
sense of self in the first place.257 This is another reason why it is only possible 
for identities to develop a sense of self in dialogical relationships with external 
others.258 Non-recognition can be a significant source of psychological anxiety 
and anguish to the extent that it threatens an actor’s sense of self-esteem and 
self image.259 Indeed, at a collective level and taken to the extreme, non-
recognition represents a challenge to the symbolic existence of the group or 
nation. More usually, however, non-recognition adopts the form of positive 
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self-images not being verified by salient others, leaving the self with the 
dilemma to either redouble efforts to secure future acceptance of claims made 
about the self, or to take non-recognition to heart via the renegotiation of a 
new narrative for the self.260 That is why the state may engage in processes of 
re-narration and re-constitution by projecting an alternative biography of the 
self, perceived as being more suitable for the new situation and in turn 
establishing a new set of meanings and concomitant identity claims 
supportive of the new position. As a synthesis, Ringmar elaborates on three 
options that states have when confronted with denial of recognition. First, 
simply give up and find ‘an alternative self-description and re-brand itself as 
something else’, without any guarantees that a second attempt will be 
successful either.261 Second, ‘accept the verdict of the audience’ and maintain 
the self-images in question, at the same time ‘embarking on a program of self-
reformation’ (adopting the missing traits to hopefully be recognised).262 Third, 
preserve the national narratives, self-images and identity by trying to 
convince others of their validity.263 These strategies and general dynamics of 
international recognition will be seen as particularly relevant to Romania’s 
national identity and foreign policy. They underline how Romania reacted to 
having a ‘European’ self-image at least partially denied, since the 
authoritative Euro-Atlantic self continued to construct post-communist 
candidate states as ‘liminal Europe’ or ‘Europe but not quite Europe’.264 
 
 
Conclusions of a Multi-Dimensional View on National Identity 
 
To conclude this outline of my conceptual framework, the different 
sources and their useful insights need to be integrated into a coherent whole. 
A student of IR interested in identity tends to first make contact with a vast 
and rich constructivist body of work. Constructivism was my initial step 
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towards finding the suitable conceptual blend for understanding Romanian 
national identity and foreign policy. This thesis employs the following general 
constructivist ideas: the changing nature and ideational foundation of 
national identity; how it influences state action without actually imposing 
causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity 
formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety 
of possible representations on the self-other nexus; inter-subjectivity as a 
feature of identity creation. Taking each one in turn, identities are fluid and 
grounded in a shifting ideational basis, at the same time guiding a state’s 
foreign policy conduct without causally determining it. They might be subject 
to constant re-definition under the influence of both systemic and internal 
factors. More specifically, national identity is shaped by inter-state 
socialisation and domestic aspects such as cultural values and 
interpretations of the nation’s historical past. Although it has a changing 
nature, national identity draws self-images from a series of enduring 
meanings and articulations prevalent in the nation’s distant or more recent 
history. The self-images feeding into national identity are based on the self-
other dichotomy, being dependent on what distinguishes them from more or 
less salient others. As Bahar Rumelili states, ‘[i]dentities are always 
constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be known by 
what it is not’.265 Such a stance does not necessarily involve an antagonistic 
behavioural relationship between the self and others or their mutual 
exclusion. On the contrary, the scale of perception ranges from friendly to 
threatening others. 
 
Moreover, all these understandings relevant to identity circulate in a 
discursive space called the foreign policy imaginary - a key notion adapted 
from Weldes. This represents a structure of well established meanings, a 
reservoir which contains the long-standing self-images derived from a nation’s 
interpretations of the remembered past. The foreign policy imaginary 
influences national identity by affecting how elites perceive their state and 
decide the appropriate responses to international events. Yet leaders enjoy 
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freedom of choice and action, since the foreign policy imaginary offers many 
articulations and potential interpretive avenues, which may be selected 
depending on the actors and circumstances involved. These issues refer to my 
project’s favoured middle position in the agent-structure debate. On a related 
note, the foreign policy imaginary just like national identity is shaped both 
from within and outside. So the logical next step is to identify the internal 
factors of national identity formation, followed by the external ones. The 
nation constitutes a fairly obvious domestic source of national identity and 
has been the traditional concern of nationalism scholars. The debates in 
nationalism studies shed light on the imagined essence of the nation, which 
does not imply that nations are fictitious. They stem from and retain a stable 
ethno-cultural core based on ethnic ancestry, language, territory and 
collective memories like internalised historical narratives and symbols. The 
combined insights of Anderson and Smith not only configure a foundation for 
the nation and national identity, they also indicate another intellectual gap. 
The first three constitutive features of national identity (ethnic descent, 
language, territory) are quite straightforward in the Romanian case. But the 
concept of collective memory is much more problematic and represents a 
second internal factor of national identity creation. 
 
Generally speaking, my framework considers collective memory to be a 
subjective interpretation of the nation’s remembered past, which gives 
meaning to the self-images that make up national identity and conveys future 
aspirations. I prefer the term collective memory-myths, since they can be 
understood as historical narratives and symbols that bind members of a 
nation together under a common national identity over a long period of time. 
Having pointed out the two domestic sources of national identity, what has 
been left is the external dimension of the identity process: self-esteem and 
recognition. As my thesis incorporates socio-psychological insights, it is 
premised on the subjectivity of states; in other words, states behave like 
individuals and their national identity and rationality are essential to foreign 
policy. Self-images and in turn national identity also require validation by 
others to be effective in social practice. Identity verification is intertwined with 
self-esteem which is an important motivator in foreign policy decision-
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making. If identities are validated by the responses of others, this mechanism 
results in positive emotions and enhanced self-esteem. If a state’s national 
identity is not accepted by external audiences, then people and political elites 
by extension experience a host of negative feelings including lowered self-
esteem. Social survival and the pursuit of self-esteem explain why states seek 
to gain international recognition for their identities. Self-images and national 
identity are negotiated between the self and its significant others. If they are 
not internationally recognised, the state resorts to different coping strategies 
such as trying to adapt or re-define its self-images, in order to convince 
external audiences of their validity. While not denying the utility of 
Realpolitik, my multi-dimensional framework has compiled a conceptual 
toolbox for ‘a new Identitätsproblematik’266, which will show a different kind of 
perspective on Romania’s foreign policy. These views on national identity will 
be reflected in the following bridge section, which briefly introduces the key 
ideas of the Romanian foreign policy imaginary that will be explored in more 
depth in the rest of the thesis. 
 
 
Romania’s Foreign Policy Imaginary 
 
The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union generated a 
tectonic shift in the balance of constraints, freedom and ideas for countries in 
the affected regions. These changes produced critical ruptures that 
destabilised the boundaries of national identities, since the previously 
dominant Cold War representations were no longer valid. At the same time, 
the need for new ideational foundations and the shaping of more stable 
identities became imminent. That is why the seventeen years following the 
Romanian popular revolution against the communist dictatorship (1990-
2007) could be regarded as a series of ‘formative moments’ – a notion 
borrowed from Ringmar.267 He argues that in ‘normal times’ the matter of 
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identity is simply taken for granted, yet there are also ‘formative moments’ or 
certain periods in the life of individuals and societies when pre-conceived 
issues come under scrutiny. Formative moments should be seen as 
opportunities for new meanings to appear and new identities to be 
established.268 My thesis adopts the concept of ‘formative moment’ as 
symbolising a period in which the transformation of identity becomes more 
likely if compared to other times with less significant or smaller re-definitions. 
According to Ringmar, formative moments often appear as times of 
‘unprecedented poetic freedom’ when actors believe they can ‘become 
whatever they want to be’.269 Post-communist Romania was finally free to 
reject its totalitarian past and pursue the self-images it deemed appropriate 
in international politics.  
 
Before outlining the three main themes present in the Romanian 
foreign policy imaginary, some conceptual clarifications are in order about the 
connection between self-images and national identity. Burke and Stets affirm 
that the self ‘emerges in social interaction within the context of a complex 
differentiated society’.270 Because a state has several social positions in the 
international system, it needs to ‘reflect this differentiation into components’ 
or ‘multiple selves’.271 Each of these smaller selves or self-images feeds into 
an overall national identity. The self-image might be called an identity in its 
own right, but it also subsumes hierarchically to a larger identity. Looking at 
the Romanian case, the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ identity has become the supreme or 
overarching national identity. Post-communist Romania has come to view 
itself as part of the Euro-Atlantic community or Western world, which 
comprises of two key institutions: NATO and the EU. Romania’s ‘Euro-
Atlantic’ identity then encompasses three self-images: ‘European’, ‘non-
Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. These are the three main themes of Romania’s 
foreign policy imaginary and formed an ideational foundation that influenced 
external relations between 1990 and 2007.  
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After the tumultuous restoration of democracy in 1990, Romanian 
foreign policy decision-makers gradually advocated that accession to Euro-
Atlantic structures would be their state’s only ‘natural’ international 
orientation. The idea received strong support from political parties and the 
majority of the population. According to the Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian 
Năstase, 
‘[e]ven in December 1989 it was clear to us that the European dimension of Romanian 
foreign policy was to become a priority. There was domestic consensus, both political 
and at society’s level, regarding the need to detach ourselves from the Soviet Union’s 
sphere of influence (…) and one way or the other return to the interwar foreign policy 
traditions which sought to anchor Romania within the Western European bloc’.272   
Năstase’s words introduce a few aspects related to Romania’s ‘European’ 
identity, which is the first self-image of its national identity. Among the 
different facets of Romanian identity, the ‘European’ one was deeply rooted in 
the foreign policy imaginary and meant to show the state’s Western heritage. 
That is why, especially in the period 1990-1996, Romania was very frequently 
depicted as a ‘European’ state.  
 
The articulation started taking shape immediately after the fall of the 
communist dictatorship, as the provisional Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac 
underlined in January 1990: ‘Romania is a European country. That is 
something given by our history and spirituality’.273 Romania returning to 
Europe was seen as a natural direction because it resonated with the state’s 
interwar identity and foreign policy. In the realm of collective memory-myths, 
the interwar period has been constructed as a time of stability and prosperity, 
when Romania was internationally acknowledged as a European state. It was 
a defining moment for the Romanian people as the aftermath of World War I 
facilitated the unification of Great Romania in 1918. The historical provinces 
of Basarabia, Bucovina and Transilvania joined the Romanian Kingdom, 
made up of Valahia and Moldova that had already united in 1859. The 
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interwar years are still remembered and perceived as a time when Romania 
had a national identity worthy of its people’s neo-Latin origins. Therefore, 
national foreign policy elites discursively reinforced the ‘European’ self-image 
to dissociate the new state from its communist past and promote a collective 
identity with the West.  
 
Secondly, Romania’s relationship with ‘the Balkans’ embodied a 
mixture of rejection and acceptance. Foreign policy decision-makers put 
intensive efforts into conveying that Romania was not part of the Balkans, 
particularly to international audiences. In October 1993, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Meleşcanu argued that geography constituted Romania as a ‘non-
Balkan’ state – ‘Romania, being located north of the Danube, does not belong 
geographically to the Balkan region’.274 Such articulations aimed to detach 
the Romanian state from the negative connotations that had been associated 
with the Balkan region. The outbreak of the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s 
brought the proliferation of pejorative imagery and stereotypes in the West 
concerning the Balkan area. Romania’s national identity vis-à-vis the Balkans 
illustrates quite meaningfully how self-images are based on difference, 
without necessarily entailing animosity or depicting the other as threatening. 
Thus, the Romanian self-image of ‘non-Balkan’ coexisted with amicable 
representations (e.g. ‘our friends to the south’).275 Yugoslavia had been 
considered a long-time friend in the region, whether in its past political form 
or contemporary individual entities.  
 
Regarding the third key theme of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity, the 
post-1992 foreign policy discourse contained a range of interconnected self-
images: ‘security provider’, ‘source of stability’, ‘reliable partner’. Romanian 
officials frequently mentioned or alluded to their state’s contribution towards 
promoting stability among its turbulent neighbours. For example, Foreign 
Affairs Minister Teodor Meleşcanu said that: 
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‘Romania does not intend to simply be positioned at the receiving end of European 
security arrangements, instead wishing to play a role of security provider. The fact 
that Romania is considered a factor of stability in its geographical area speaks for 
itself in this respect. The political stability of Romania, its balanced, responsible and 
predictable international behaviour recommend it as an asset for NATO’.276 
The self-image of ‘security provider’ did not simply emerge as a response to 
NATO’s discursive influence. Its ideational roots were closely linked to an 
enduring articulation of Romania as defender of Europe or the West, which 
features prominently among the Romanian collective memory-myths about 
the national past. 
 
Apart from highlighting the identity palette within Romania’s foreign 
policy imaginary and their internal ideational sources, my conceptual 
framework will also help to explain why and how certain self-images become 
more visible in the state’s international affairs. As the general context of ideas 
shifted in the global system under the impact of powerful events (e.g. the 
Kosovo intervention, 9/11 and the Iraq war), Romanian leaders needed to 
respond by re-interpreting the meanings of their foreign policy imaginary. 
Such systemic ‘formative moments’ have engendered considerable 
contestation or dialogue between the Romanian self and its salient others. At 
various points throughout its foreign policy course, Romania’s national 
identity and its self-images were denied recognition or were only partially 
accepted by the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self; hence begins a Romanian 
story of identity re-definition and negotiation, which shaped foreign policy 
until 2007. 
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Chapter III: To Be or Not to Be ‘European’?  
(1990-1996) 
 
 
 
The years 1990-1996 were one of the key formative periods of 
Romania’s post-communist national identity and they exhibited a bewildering 
array of emerging and re-emerging ideas. The restoration of democracy 
provided Romania with the opportunity to freely choose a new international 
direction. As Eva Hoffman observed, Romanian history has been shaped by 
‘discontinuity more than continuities, by oppression more than 
independence, by various forms of authoritarianism more than by 
liberalism’.277 This chapter aims to explore how Romania chose a European 
orientation, despite internal contestation over this foreign policy decision. 
Another aim is to analyse some of the complexities entailed in that choice, by 
discussing how the ‘European’ self-image circulated in the foreign policy 
imaginary with the other two self-images (‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security 
provider’), as well as by examining debates about what it meant to be 
‘European’ – and to be partially accepted as such – through the lens of the 
case study of the Romanian-Hungarian treaty. During 1990-1996, there were 
three crucial ‘formative moments’ for Romanian identity and foreign policy. 
The first one defined the state’s international course towards ‘Europe’. 
Political leaders had to decide whether post-communist Romania would 
become closer to the Euro-Atlantic community or opt for Russian influence. 
In this context, the 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ was a 
controversial foreign policy move that was contested among domestic elites. 
President Iliescu’s support for the treaty was not shared by the majority of 
state officials, who envisioned a European identity and future for Romania. 
 
Having made the definitive choice for Europe, the second key ‘formative 
moment’ dealt with Romania’s foreign policy imaginary, which articulated 
three main discursive themes: ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security 
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provider’. These self-images feeding into national identity formed an 
ideational foundation that shaped Romanian international behaviour between 
1990 and 2007. The ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’ self-images became 
particularly relevant during critical events like the 1999 Kosovo crisis and 
2003 Iraq war. As for Romania’s ‘European’ identity, it was intensely re-
defined in the period 1990-1996. At the same time, the European self-image 
impacted on the state’s problematic relations with Hungary. This brings us to 
the third ‘formative moment’ of Romanian identity and foreign policy, which 
focuses on the process of European identity contestation, dialogue and 
external recognition between the self and other. The Romanian-Hungarian 
treaty story revealed the intersection of three discourses – international 
(Euro-Atlantic), Hungarian and Romanian, which said different things about 
Romania’s European self-image. The international narratives had gradually 
evolved towards placing human rights outside the domestic jurisdiction of 
states. Euro-Atlantic discourses also portrayed Romania as not fully 
complying with liberal democratic norms in terms of minority rights. 
Romanian leaders in turn challenged the European meanings on minority 
rights by depicting the latter to be an internal affair. At stake were two 
contrasting views of what ‘European’ identity meant with respect to minority 
rights. Romania argued that its democratic Constitution, individual rights 
and extensive minority language provisions were sufficient to protect ethnic 
minorities. For Hungary, collective rights and some form of ethnic autonomy 
for its co-nationals living abroad was the appropriate ‘European standard’. As 
these aspects were still debated by the authoritative ‘Europe’, the inflexible 
stances of both Romania and Hungary prevented the signing of a bilateral 
treaty until mid-1996.  
 
Therefore, the chapter has been structured according to these three key 
‘formative moments’. During the first ‘formative moment’, Romania had to 
answer an existential question - to be or not to be ‘European’? The second 
‘formative moment’ included the three main self-images of national identity: 
Romania as ‘non-Balkan’, Romania as ‘security provider’ and Romania’s 
‘European’ self-image. The third ‘formative moment’ contained the story of the 
Romanian-Hungarian treaty, which has been divided into two sections: 
  P a g e  | 87 
international narratives on human rights and Romania, and Hungarian vis-à-
vis Romanian meanings on minority rights and European identity. 
 
 
To Be or Not to Be ‘European’? 
 
In terms of the nuances of Romanian identity and foreign policy, the 
period 1990-1996 featured a rich variety of re-emerging meanings and a 
crucial ‘formative moment’ which defined the state’s international orientation. 
After many decades of communist dictatorship, Romania’s political elites had 
the opportunity to freely find the answer to an existential question: to be or 
not to be ‘European’? Should the new democratic state become closer to the 
Euro-Atlantic community or gravitate towards Russian influence? The answer 
was not straightforward (at least not for all the actors involved) and the years 
1990-1991 showed a degree of internal contestation regarding Romania’s 
national identity and external direction. The most compelling evidence in this 
respect was a Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, which was negotiated by 
Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Năstase in March 1991, signed by President 
Iliescu during his official visit to the USSR in early April, yet never ratified by 
Romania’s Parliament. The wider international context had been changing 
rapidly and in January 1991 the Soviet Union adopted a set of initiatives 
towards the democratic Central-Eastern Europe. The USSR aimed to pay 
greater attention to Europe’s post-communist states and prevent them from 
becoming ‘sources of anti-Soviet sentiments’; it also intended to keep them 
‘free of foreign military bases and forces’.278 The Warsaw Pact (a military 
alliance between the USSR and its satellite socialist states) was declared 
disbanded in February 1991. So the Soviet Union tried to establish some sort 
of cooperation with Central-Eastern Europe and states in the region were 
more or less receptive to this new arrangement.  
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Romania was the only post-communist country that signed a 
‘Friendship Treaty’ with the USSR. The document triggered intense 
international speculation about relations between the two states, including 
the claim that Bucharest identified itself with the Russophile group from the 
Balkan area, together with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.279 At a domestic level, 
the main controversy surrounding the Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ stemmed 
from the inclusion of a few rather vague ‘security clauses’ that could have 
conceivably impacted on Romanian foreign policy actions. Three articles 
proved to be the most problematic. First, Romania and the USSR agreed not 
to participate in ‘any kind of alliances against each other’.280 Second, other 
parties would not be allowed to use the signatories’ territory ‘for committing 
aggression against each other’. Third, if Romania or the USSR entered an 
armed conflict with a third state, neither the Romanian nor the Soviet side 
would ‘give any type of assistance to such a state’.281 Consequently, by 
signing the terms set in the ‘Friendship Treaty’, Romania consented not to be 
involved in any organisation, alliance or security arrangement which went 
against Soviet interests. This obstructed and potentially jeopardised the 
state’s independent foreign policy decision-making. In other words, an 
alarming reading of the document was that Romania would not be able to 
choose its European identity or pursue the latter’s external recognition by 
seeking NATO and EU membership without Soviet approval. Finalising the 
treaty and having it ratified in Parliament would have arguably ‘mortgaged’ 
Romania’s future and condemned it to the Russian sphere of influence for a 
long time, if not irrevocably.282 
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To this day, many aspects concerning the episode of the aborted 1991 
Romanian-Soviet treaty remain somewhat mysterious. Why would some 
political leaders (i.e. President Iliescu and Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase) 
accept stipulations that could have prevented Romania from joining NATO 
and the EU? Other post-communist states rejected such articles in their 
treaties with the Soviet Union, specifically on the grounds of those restrictive 
‘security clauses’. Instead, they later signed bilateral agreements with the 
Russian Federation: the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1 April 1992), Poland 
(22 May 1992) and Bulgaria (4 August 1992). The memoirs and statements of 
relevant Romanian elites contain contradictory stories that are further 
complicated by the scarcity of available official documents. The Romanian 
Prime Minister, Petre Roman (1990-1991), accused Năstase of ‘duplicity and 
premeditated misinformation’ about the negotiations for the treaty’s content; 
the Premier was allegedly trying to persuade Iliescu that the document should 
not be adopted, a request which was apparently refused by the President.283 
Roman also described his premiership as a ‘de facto cohabitation’; he thought 
that the ‘two opposing wills, one installed at the presidency, the other within 
the government’ were the reasons behind ‘the hesitancies and ambiguity’ 
noticed by foreign observers.284 
 
Although Năstase conducted the treaty negotiations in 1991, the 
directives and final say belonged to Iliescu. The President argued that the 
document had been misinterpreted and it was only meant to build a different 
‘positive’ relationship with the USSR, based on ‘the principles of international 
law and the new post-Cold War realities’.285 He denied the idea that the Soviet 
Union was effectively given the right to veto Romania’s alliances and NATO 
accession; in the same context, Iliescu declared that his signing the 
‘Friendship Treaty’ was a collective decision from all the main state 
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institutions – Government and Parliament.286 The President also pointed out 
that, throughout 1992, NATO representatives had stopped considering 
‘Russia’ as ‘an adversary’, which eventually materialised in ‘the NATO-Russia 
special partnership’.287 The latter statement suggests that in 1991 Romania 
was ahead of the Alliance in promoting security cooperation with the USSR. 
This does not take into account the fact that, for the Euro-Atlantic 
community, the Soviet Union (a dictatorship) was very different and a much 
less acceptable ally compared to the Russian Federation (a state supposedly 
undergoing democratisation). Regardless of how one interprets the treaty (in a 
more or less alarming light), the fact remains that Romania through President 
Iliescu was the only post-communist state to accept such a controversial text. 
So it was not surprising that, after the treaty’s signing and content was made 
public, a large part of the Romanian media accused Iliescu of favouring a 
close relationship with the USSR and ignoring the will of Romanians who 
overwhelmingly aspired to a European future.288 
 
Further controversial evidence for this assumption was recently found 
in the Russian archives. It was a note containing the detailed minutes of a 
meeting between Vadim Zagladin (Mikhail Gorbachev’s adviser) and his 
Romanian counterpart - Ioan Mircea Paşcu (presidential foreign affairs 
counsellor 1990-1992) on 9 February 1991.289 The meeting had been 
requested by Romania’s Presidency to directly convey ‘Iliescu’s message’ to 
the USSR leader.290 Concerning the future of their bilateral relations, Paşcu 
said that President Iliescu believed in the deepening of political and economic 
cooperation. Romania was not attempting to weaken its ties with the USSR; 
on the contrary, it ‘expected the Soviet side to replace the Warsaw Pact with a 
“new strategic initiative”’ and become more involved in post-communist 
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Europe.291 These aspects indicate that up to 1992 Iliescu’s perspective on 
Romanian foreign policy leaned towards the Soviet Union/Russia, in spite of 
his public declarations about Romania being ‘European’ and developing ties 
with the Euro-Atlantic community. Here a few clarifications about the 
differences between the international and Romanian discourses are relevant. 
At the international level, President Gorbachev and NATO representatives 
talked in earnest about their future close cooperation, which meant that 
Russia would be included in the ‘Common European Home’. According to this 
understanding, Romanian foreign policy elites did not necessarily have to opt 
between the West (Euro-Atlantic community) and the Soviet Union/Russia. 
Even so, Romania’s dominant internal discourses conveyed the inevitability of 
such a choice because Russia was not articulated as ‘Western’. Russia in its 
various incarnations had been considered the ‘barbarous East’ since the 
interwar period, the Bolshevik revolution and the later forceful imposition of 
communism. Therefore, in the Romanian collective imaginary, a potential 
close security relationship with Russia was the equivalent of an Eastern 
orientation that excluded the West (NATO and EU). 
 
That said, clarity on what transpired in Moscow is not easy to attain. 
Paşcu has disputed the authenticity of the above note and offered another 
version of what was discussed with Zagladin on 9 February 1991. According 
to him, the meeting had also been witnessed by the Romanian ambassador to 
the USSR (Vasile Şandru). Paşcu stated that the topic did not refer to Soviet-
Romanian bilateral relations, but rather ‘the situation of military operations 
in the Gulf’ and a Romanian request for the USSR to fulfil its commitment in 
delivering a specific amount of gas.292 He stressed that, ‘at least on the 
Romanian side, no one can verify the document’s authenticity’ and it simply 
constituted a means of spreading falsehood.293 Simion Gheorghiu is the 
researcher who found the note in the Archives of the International 
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Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Research (Gorbachev section), 
while undergoing archival work for his PhD thesis. He gave full reference 
details when publishing the Romanian translation of his finding and 
explained there was no apparent reason to suspect the document’s 
authenticity.294 Amidst conflicting claims, the Moscow episode remains 
impossible to verify definitively with the evidence available currently. If the 
note in question is authentic, it reinforces the idea that President Iliescu was 
pro-active in pursuing a close security relationship with the Soviet Union. 
This went against the wishes of domestic public opinion and the proclaimed 
intentions of other foreign policy leaders like the Prime Minister, who aimed 
to validate Romania’s European and Euro-Atlantic identity through EU and 
NATO integration. If the note is indeed fabricated, then the context goes back 
to the opposing statements of key actors (President, Premier, Parliament 
members) who have told different stories about the same event. This adds 
another uncertain layer to the unclear circumstances surrounding the 
‘Friendship Treaty’. Yet whatever the precise truth of what occurred and the 
individuals’ motives, the treaty was widely regarded as a moment of foreign 
policy decision which was internally contested. 
 
Thus far, the treaty narrative emerges as an intriguing and quite 
elusive puzzle. President Iliescu’s main argument for signing it was that he 
implemented a decision made together with Parliament and Government 
representatives. If the text was indeed agreed upon by every relevant 
institution, then why not take the next logical step and legalise it through 
parliamentary ratification? Why was the document not officially forwarded to 
Parliament, at least for deliberation? Despite Iliescu’s claims of unanimity, 
important parliamentary figures and members of the government party 
declared that they had no knowledge of the treaty prior to its signing. The role 
of the legislative body was discussed by two members who had been involved 
in those events: Alexandru Bârlădeanu, National Salvation Front (FSN – 
governmental party) senator and chairman of the Senate (the higher chamber 
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of Parliament), and Sabin Ivan – PNL senator in the opposition. Bârlădeanu 
said he was not aware of such a treaty with the USSR and had not been 
informed of President Iliescu’s decisions.295 He had first heard about it from 
Cornel Mănescu, another FSN senator and head of the Parliament’s Foreign 
Policy Commission.296 Mănescu had read the treaty text and wanted 
Bârlădeanu’s support to block the ratification of it in Parliament, mainly 
because the document did not denounce the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.297 
Bârlădeanu advised Mănescu to first talk with the President about his serious 
objections and the matter was not brought up again in their discussions.298 
Furthermore, senator Sabin Ivan concluded from various conversations with 
FSN members of Parliament around March-April 1991 that they disagreed 
with the USSR treaty and would have voted against it.299 He also speculated 
that Mănescu had explained to President Iliescu the governing party’s 
widespread negative reaction, which prompted Iliescu to stop pursuing the 
‘Friendship Treaty’.300  
 
Therefore, the 1991 Romanian-Soviet treaty was a ‘formative moment’ 
which defined for Romania an essential identity and foreign policy question: 
to be or not to be ‘European’? Realist scholars think that the state displayed 
the typical behaviour of a ‘minor power’, seeking to ‘hedge’ or simultaneously 
balance between the two regional hegemons (NATO and the USSR/Russia).301 
However, such an account is not persuasive since it operates on two 
problematic assumptions: that close security cooperation with the Soviet 
Union was a unanimous option among Romanian elites (realists avoid 
opening the ‘black box’ of the state and do not explore what happens inside 
it); it seems that some Romanian leaders (i.e. President Iliescu) were not 
hedging but making a rather firm choice to gravitate towards Moscow. On 
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that second aspect, the available documents do not allow us to identify 
without doubt the President’s intentions. Yet his endorsement of the 
‘Friendship Treaty’ was clearly not shared by the majority of elites.  
 
Apart from the memoirs and statements of the relevant actors already 
mentioned, the most concrete evidence of a domestic contestation about 
Romania’s identity and international course is the fact that the controversial 
text was not ratified in Parliament. Even more interestingly, the document 
was never officially submitted to the Romanian Parliament for either 
deliberation or approval. If all state institutions had consented to its signing, 
the governmental party’s majority would have made the ratification process 
smooth and quick. Although Iliescu appeared to favour the Soviet ‘Friendship 
Treaty’, the dominant opinion among decision-makers including his loyal 
political party did not support a potentially non-European vision for Romania. 
For example, in February 1991 at the Warsaw Pact meeting, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Năstase declared that Romania opted for Euro-Atlantic integration: 
‘[w]ithin this context, a priority direction for Romania after 1989 is to promote 
wide partnership relations with the North-Atlantic Alliance and the Western 
European Union, to associate with the European Economic Community and 
to participate in the other European structures’.302 Among the three key 
themes in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, the ‘European’ self-image 
was the most intensely re-defined between 1990 and 1996. The reason is that 
Romanian national identity tends to be first associated with a European 
subjectivity by both elites and the general public opinion. As the provisional 
Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac said in January 1990 - ‘Romania is a European 
country. That is something given by our history and spirituality’.303 
 
Whatever his personal affiliation or convictions, President Iliescu 
needed to adapt to what the elite-level and popular majorities wanted: a 
European and Euro-Atlantic identity confirmed via NATO and EU accession. 
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Following the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the ‘Friendship 
Treaty’ became obsolete. During 1992-1996 diplomatic exchanges with the 
Russian Federation were tentative at best and the negotiations for another 
bilateral agreement fell through. The internal contestation surrounding the 
Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ marked the emergence of Romania’s firm 
European choice. The years 1990-1996 resonate especially with Romania’s 
European orientation and what meanings of national identity and 
international conduct it translated into. As outlined in chapter II, two other 
self-images were present and re-articulated in the foreign policy imaginary 
(‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’). They were slightly overshadowed by the 
‘European’ self-image in this period, but would become highly significant in 
the subsequent foreign policy contexts (the Kosovo crisis and the Iraq war). 
The foreign policy imaginary with its three main themes configured between 
1990 and 1996 formed an ideational foundation that has shaped Romanian 
identity and external relations until the present.  
 
 
Romania’s Self-Image as ‘Non-Balkan’ 
 
As prefigured in chapter II, another main self-image feeding into the 
Romanian national identity derives from the state’s complex relationship with 
the Balkans. This self-image was part of a wider international context that 
shaped the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, especially Western 
perceptions of the Yugoslav wars. In July 1990, NATO invited the Central-
Eastern European states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and 
Bulgaria) and the Soviet Union to create regular diplomatic relations with the 
Alliance. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was founded in 1991 
as another step in the institutionalised dialogue between NATO and the post-
communist states. Since the USSR disintegrated later that year, NACC 
became the suitable mechanism through which to enhance cooperation with 
Central-Eastern Europe. By the early 1990s, many post-communist states 
had expressed their wish to join NATO. Following the end of the Cold War, the 
Alliance faced an ‘identity crisis’ and ‘had to reassess its strategic concept, its 
views of the types of war or hostilities it could expect to deter and fight and, 
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more broadly, re-evaluate its role in international security and politics’.304 
Given this post-Cold War identity crisis, some argued that enlargement would 
provide NATO with a new purpose. Alliance expansion to newly democratic 
Central-Eastern Europe sparked a lot of debate and the first wave would 
eventually occur in 1999. Meanwhile, the EU was re-considering its identity 
as well. Post-1990 the supranational organisation had to decide whether it 
aimed to be something more than a ‘problem-solving entity’ that only 
promoted the interests of its member states.305 The collapse of communism 
confronted the EU with the opportunity to become a ‘value-based community’, 
which would extend its principles and form a common identity with Central-
Eastern Europe.306 At the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the EU 
decided to enlarge and drafted a set of political and economic criteria that 
candidate states would have to fulfil to obtain membership. Yet both the EU 
and NATO proved to be unprepared to deal with what was happening in 
Yugoslavia. 
 
The Yugoslav Federation had six constituent republics: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. By 1990 
Yugoslavia was undergoing drastic transformations. Croatia and Slovenia 
declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, followed by Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1992. The Serbs living in these republics retaliated and were 
supported by Belgrade, leading to armed inter-ethnic conflicts. The timing of 
such outbreaks relates to the wider global context. When the international 
order maintaining a certain level of regional security disappears, individuals 
search for security in their national or ethnic identity.307 The revolutions in 
communist Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union helped to break 
down the dictatorial system ensuring a tentative stability in the Balkan area. 
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Long-standing inter-ethnic tensions resurfaced and turned into the Yugoslav 
wars of the early 1990s. Unfortunately, the ‘well established derogatory 
connotations’ also re-emerged, as ‘the fighting precipitated by the break-up of 
Yugoslavia has probably left these more entrenched in the popular 
imagination than ever’; not only communism was ‘blamed for the mass 
violence, but ethnic diversity itself, and historical cleavages between religions 
and cultures’.308 Nevertheless, the causes of the Yugoslav wars are complex 
and varied. One of them was the aspiration of Balkan peoples to create viable 
nation-states, which differed little from what the rest of Europe had 
experienced in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Gale Stokes explained 
this process: 
‘[r]emapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the major threads of post-
French Revolutionary European history. The process began with the unifications of 
Italy and Germany, ran through the creation of new states at the end of World War I, 
and had its most catastrophic outcomes (...) with the Holocaust and the [later] 
expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe (…) [T]he wars of Yugoslav succession 
are not some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they are the last stages of a process of 
European redefinition that has been going on since the French revolution’.309 
 
Another cause of the Yugoslav wars referred to controversial figures like 
Slobodan Milošević, who manipulated national sentiments for their personal 
gains or for what they perceived to be the benefit of their ethnic group. Since 
Western political elites ‘struggled to make sense of an otherwise perplexing 
conflict’, simplistic accounts of the Yugoslav wars became increasingly 
appealing.310 These explanations were rooted in negative stereotypes of ‘the 
Balkans’, which had been articulated as ‘Balkan ghosts, ancient Balkan 
enmities, primordial Balkan cultural patterns and proverbial Balkan 
turmoil’.311 The negative imagery of ‘the Balkans’ dated back to the early 
1900s and gradually intensified to the point that even World War II was seen 
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as the Balkans’ fault.312 For example, the journalist Robert Kaplan said that - 
‘Nazism (...) can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a 
breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, 
Hitler learned how to hate so infectiously’.313 In the case of the Yugoslav wars, 
such pejorative stereotypes and derogatory remarks proliferated. Ioan M. 
Paşcu regretfully noted that: 
‘the conflict is usually viewed as another irrefutable instance of the perpetual violence 
and proverbial lack of civilization characterizing a region incapable of overcoming its 
traditional condition as Europe’s powder keg. In today’s vocabulary, these terms imply 
a judgement that Balkan peoples exhibit a total incapacity to learn and practice 
democracy and market economy’.314 
As a State Secretary in the Ministry of National Defence, in 1994 Paşcu 
elaborated upon Romania’s stance on the Yugoslav wars: 
‘Romania’s official position with regard to the Yugoslav conflict has three major 
components. First, we hold the view that the only viable solution is to be reached by 
the parties which are directly involved. Regardless how impatient the outside world 
might become – and for good reason – its main mission would be to create conditions 
for bringing the parties to the negotiating table and to facilitate their agreement. 
External efforts aimed at finding a solution to the conflict should not be viewed, in 
other words, as a substitute for an accord between protagonists (...) Second, Romania 
has firmly abstained from any military involvement in the conflict (...) Third, Romania 
has declared that she is disposed to explore diplomatic solutions to Yugoslav wars. 
Romania is thus materializing her uncontested advantages (lack of any interest in the 
conflict itself, good relations with practically all former Yugoslav republics, and a 
relatively correct understanding of the situation, given her knowledge of the Balkan 
region)’.315 
The Yugoslav wars and their connection to ‘the Balkans’ impacted on the 
Romanian foreign policy imaginary and a key self-image of national identity - 
Romania as ‘non-Balkan’.  
 
Romania’s discursive relationship with ‘the Balkans’ has been an 
interesting combination of rejection and acceptance. Foreign policy decision-
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makers put great effort into explaining that Romania was not part of the 
Balkans, particularly to international audiences.316 They promoted instead 
the subjectivity of a Central European state neighbouring or ‘in immediate 
proximity’ to that region.317 Similarly to the ‘Eastern European’ articulation, 
Romania’s post-communist national identity was dissociated from 
representations like ‘Oriental’, 'Byzantine' or ‘Balkan’, which illustrated 
‘biased’ and ‘bad faithed’ categorisations with the intent of ‘stigmatizing the 
perspectives of our [democratic] evolution’.318 In October 1993, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Meleşcanu argued that not only geography constituted Romania as a 
‘non-Balkan’ state – ‘[w]e Romanians prefer to describe ourselves as a Central 
European country close to the Balkans (…) Romania, being located north of 
the Danube, does not belong geographically to the Balkan region’; since a 
‘country belongs to the area where its problems lie’, Romania’s ‘well-known’ 
good relations with ‘any Balkan or successor states in the former Yugoslavia’ 
lead to the conclusion that Romania cannot be Balkan.319 Within the same 
context, Meleşcanu went on to add: ‘[t]his clarification might help our friends 
to the south to understand that the way we characterize Romania implies 
neither a denial of enduring economic, political and cultural ties, nor a 
diminution of the important Balkan dimension of our foreign policy’.320 In the 
light of such constructs, Romania shaped its national identity to be different 
from two significant others – ‘Eastern’ and ‘Balkan’. Like the underlying 
Orientalism of Western narratives, Balkanism explores a more geographically 
specific but equally problematic and negative representation of ‘otherness’. 
Maria Todorova aptly concludes in this respect: ‘[a]s in the case of the Orient, 
the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against 
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which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and the 
“West” has been constructed’.321 The urgency of Romanian efforts to 
dissociate national identity from the label ‘Balkan’ was related to 
international Western debates about the ‘Balkan’ character and the Yugoslav 
wars, which abounded in negative stereotypes. A key text of this Balkanist 
pejorative discourse, influential in the West, was Kaplan’s ‘Balkan Ghosts’ 
based on his travels in several countries including Romania. For Kaplan and 
his growing number of readers, Romania was emphatically ‘Balkan’. 
 
Upon closer examination of the Romanian foreign policy discourses, the 
self-image of ‘non-Balkan’ coexisted with articulations like ‘our friends to the 
south’. The long-time ‘friend’ in the region was Yugoslavia, whether in its past 
political form or contemporary individual entities. President Iliescu clarified 
and reinforced those understandings:  
‘[w]e have a good tradition in terms of relations with Yugoslavia. We could even say 
that Yugoslavia was our best neighbour, the history of our relations having never 
known any conflict. We had permanent communication and supported each other; a 
solidarity based on common history was created. We are very sensitive from that point 
of view. The Romanian people show a certain solidarity and a feeling of frustration 
because of this tragedy322 affecting a heroic people with a rather tumultuous past’.323  
The representations of Balkan states as ‘friends’, ‘best neighbour’, two 
mentions of ‘solidarity’ in quick succession and ‘common history’ suggest that 
Romania’s national identity was not constructed by applying a mutually 
exclusive and hostile relationship of otherness vis-à-vis the Balkans. 
Romanian identity was defined as ‘non-Balkan’, yet retained a Balkan affinity 
and traditional friendly rapport with the Balkans. Once Romania was 
accepted as an EU and NATO candidate, its official discourses gradually 
encountered external sources that promoted different articulations about 
Romanian identity. It is essential to remember that national identity 
formation involves both self-projection and external recognition. In other 
words, Romanian discursive attempts to portray the state as ‘non-Balkan’ 
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would be unsuccessful without Western validation. So, even though 
Romanian political leaders sought to dissociate their state from ‘the Balkans’ 
by invoking geographic, historical and cultural arguments, their 
representation was partially supported by international narratives. Many 
external audiences did not seem inclined to differentiate between Romania 
and the Balkan region. Their influence needed to be accommodated by 
national discourses, shaping modified meanings for Romanian identity. From 
1994 onwards, Romania was often depicted as ‘marking the border of 
different, even divergent, areas of civilization: Central, but also South-Eastern 
Europe’.324 Apart from the ‘European’ and ‘non-Balkan’ self-images, 
Romanian national identity had historically resonated with the idea of being a 
‘security provider’. 
 
 
Romania’s Self-Image as a ‘Security Provider’ 
 
The second self-image of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity and 
discursive theme of its foreign policy imaginary is that of ‘security provider’. 
The post-1992 Romanian discourse showed a range of interconnected 
articulations – ‘security provider’, ‘source of stability’, ‘reliable partner’. 
Romanian elites often explicitly mentioned or suggested their state’s 
contribution to generating stability among its troubled neighbours. For 
instance, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu stressed the following:  
‘[Romania’s] internal stability and responsible, predictable international conduct have 
so far made it possible to physically separate two areas of open or latent conflict. The 
mutual reinforcement of the eastern and the southern “arcs of crises” has been 
prevented. Had this not happened, the problems currently confronting the European 
Union, NATO and the WEU [Western European Union] would have been considerably 
greater, perhaps even unsolvable’.325   
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President Iliescu said on several occasions that ‘we are deeply concerned with 
the tragic developments in the former Yugoslavia’ and that Romania, ‘situated 
in the immediate vicinity to areas with high possibility for conflict’, can play 
an important role in ensuring regional security.326 Even though variations on 
this theme also circulated in the foreign policy imaginary pre-1992, 
Romania’s official discourse indicated a notable emphasis on the ‘security 
provider’ self-image after November 1992 when Meleşcanu (the new Foreign 
Affairs Minister) came into office. He insisted on depicting Romania as a 
‘security generator’ that could export democratic stability to the Balkans. 
Such external efforts would be supported by the ‘unbiased’ and ‘traditional 
good relations’ with former Yugoslav states -  
‘[w]hether it is openly admitted or not, Romania has been perceived more and more by 
all its southern neighbours as a factor of stability for the Balkans (…) Romania does 
not intend to comfortably position itself as mere beneficiary of the security 
arrangements in Europe. Commensurate with our resources, military capability and 
comparative advantages in terms of strategic position and infrastructure facilities at 
Romania’s disposal, we are also able and willing to play the role of security 
generator’.327   
 
Meleşcanu had an important role in configuring this self-image and 
appeared to be the most emphatic about it in 1993-1996. His professional 
background as a long-time diplomat brought another type of elite perspective 
on Romanian national identity and external relations. Unlike President 
Iliescu, who was generally perceived to have a strong affinity towards Russia 
(due to his education in Moscow and especially due to the 1991 Soviet treaty 
episode), Meleşcanu had been socialised in a different and more ‘Western’-
oriented setting. He had attended postgraduate courses in IR and earned a 
PhD in International Law at the University of Geneva during 1966-1973328, 
during which he was exposed to several ideas that affected the future 
Minister’s interpretation of the Romanian and international imaginaries. 
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Meleşcanu’s studies influenced him as a foreign policy practitioner who 
distinctly reinforced Romania’s chosen European and Euro-Atlantic direction. 
Being a firm advocate of it, the Foreign Affairs Minister elaborated on the 
‘security provider’ self-image (as opposed to consumer) in the context of NATO 
accession: 
‘Romania does not intend to simply be positioned at the receiving end of European 
security arrangements, instead wishing to play a role of security provider. The fact 
that Romania is considered a factor of stability in its geographical area speaks for 
itself in this respect. The political stability of Romania, its balanced, responsible and 
predictable international behaviour recommend it as an asset for NATO’.329   
These speeches were delivered in London and Washington, where the 
intended audiences were highly influential Alliance members. Romania, just 
like the other post-communist candidate states, needed to highlight and 
convince NATO decision-makers that it could contribute to allied capabilities. 
A purely rational account would argue that Romanian officials created the 
representation of ‘security provider’ in order to alleviate NATO’s concerns 
about Romania becoming a potential net consumer of security once given 
membership. Yet the evidence shows that there is more to the story of foreign 
policy than mere cost-benefit calculations. This is particularly relevant in the 
Romanian case, where deeply ingrained meanings about national identity 
shaped the state’s main self-images and international behaviour. 
 
Thus, the construct of ‘security provider’ did not simply emerge as a 
response to NATO requirements. Its ideational roots were closely linked to a 
long-standing collective memory-myth of Romania as defender of Europe and 
the West, which features prominently in the Romanian imaginary. As 
discussed in chapter II, collective memory-myths are a domestic factor of 
national identity formation, a source from which elites draw understandings 
about the state’s self-images. They also constitute subjective interpretations 
regarding the nation’s remembered past. When talking about the construction 
of Romanian ‘uniqueness’ or exceptionalism in historiography, Anca 
Baicoianu distinguishes three major coordinates – geographic, historical and 
cultural. Geographically, Romania occupied the strategic position of a 
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‘turning point’ between the East and the West, as well as a necessary ‘defence 
line against all invasions’.330 Second, the historical coordinate obsessively 
portrayed the ‘heroic and civilizing’ double descent (Dacian and Roman), 
which was invoked to ‘claim superiority over the closest neighbours and to 
legitimate Romania's place as a rightful member of the European choir of 
nations’.331 Third, culturally speaking, ‘the ever increasing feeling of isolation’ 
turned ‘the idea of uniqueness into a true framework of Romanian identity’; 
unable to find a suitable pace and constantly fearing exclusion from an 
ideally imagined Western Europe, Romanian culture ‘struggles to achieve a 
however fragile balance between its specificity and a longing for 
integration’.332 The collective memory-myth of Romanian exceptionalism, its 
articulation as defender of the West and stronghold protecting European 
civilisation against invading foreigners, was sometimes openly expressed in 
the foreign policy texts: ‘[s]ituated in Central Europe, Romania has certainly 
been central to Europe. For centuries, the Romanian countries were the 
bastions of European civilisation, independence and freedom’.333   
 
The above quote is a good example of how the Romanian past has been 
dramatised under the ‘remarkable functionality’ of the myth of the struggle 
for independence.334 In this respect, Lucian Boia explains how the ‘pressure 
of foreigners from outside and from within, real up to a point but hyperbolized 
in the national imaginary, generated the besieged fortress complex which is 
so typical of the Romanian mentality of the last two centuries’.335 Such inter-
connected collective memory-myths hold a triple purpose: ‘highlighting the 
virtue and heroism of the Romanians, justifying their historical late-coming in 
terms of the sacrifices imposed by ceaseless aggression, and, finally, 
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attracting the attention of the West to its debt of gratitude towards the 
Romanians who defended it from the Ottoman onslaught’.336 So the ‘security 
provider’ self-image had a solid and older ideational foundation to be built 
upon, resonating with Romanian understandings of the nation’s past. It 
hence drew on a historical reference point to mould and guide one of the 
main facets of Romania’s post-communist national identity and foreign policy 
role. As Boia concludes,  
‘[t]he image of a West protected thanks to Romania’s sacrifice and a Romanian society 
strained and held back by fulfilling the function of defender of the European 
civilization has become deeply ingrained in the political vision of the Romanians, in 
their behavior and their reactions’.337  
The various articulations on the ‘security provider’ theme are enduring yet 
fluid meanings of Romania's Euro-Atlantic identity and foreign policy 
imaginary, influencing international positions in critical events like the 
Kosovo crisis and Iraq war which will be analysed in chapters IV and V. 
Although all three self-images (‘non-Balkan’, ‘security provider’, ‘European’) 
have an equal significance when defining national identity in 1990-2007, 
each one becomes more relevant in certain temporal and situational contexts. 
European identity was the prominent focus of Romania’s official discourse 
between 1990 and 1996, because post-1991 the state had opted for a firm 
European orientation. Romanian foreign policy leaders persistently promoted 
their state’s ‘European’ identity, but it needed to be negotiated and at least 
partially recognised or accepted by the salient external self – ‘Europe’. 
 
 
Romania’s ‘European’ Self-Image 
 
Among the three main self-images circulating in the Romanian foreign 
policy imaginary, the European one was the most intensely re-articulated 
during 1990-1996. The reason is quite simple, as Romanian national identity 
tends to be first associated with a European representation by both elites and 
the general population. Broadly defined, being a ‘European’ state or having a 
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European identity refers to being known and accepted as a Western European 
inspired liberal democracy, which upholds two key principles – the 
organisation of regular democratic elections and the protection of human and 
civil rights and liberties. In this time frame, the European self-image was 
subjected to particularly frequent re-definitions because it had to 
simultaneously converse with influential domestic and international 
discourses. The process of European identity contestation, dialogue and 
external recognition with its foreign policy implications will be analysed in the 
case study of Romanian-Hungarian relations. For now, a detailed account of 
what meanings were constructed in relation to Romania’s European self-
image is in order. Point nine of the statement proposal issued by the National 
Salvation Front in December 1989 hinted at a European direction for 
Romania: ‘[t]he country's entire foreign policy is to promote good neighbourly 
relations, friendship and peace in the world, integrating itself in the 
construction process of a united Europe’.338 Following the first post-
communist parliamentary and presidential elections of May 1990, at the 
Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in 
November, President Iliescu gave a clear indication of the state's foreign policy 
goals: ‘[t]he new Romania resulting from the Revolution of December 1989 
has adopted a policy oriented towards re-establishing historical and 
traditional relations with the other countries of Europe and North America, as 
well as towards developing relations with states sharing the same Latin 
culture and civilisation’.339 
  
Romania’s second post-1989 democratic elections in September 1992 
reconfirmed Iliescu as President and placed the centre-left Social Democratic 
Party of Romania (PDSR) in government. Throughout the electoral campaign 
for a new mandate, Iliescu argued that his main vision of the country’s 
external trajectory was ‘integration into (…) the structures dominating the 
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European and Euro-Atlantic area’.340 The message delivered in Parliament by 
the re-elected President indicated the same foreign policy choice, as he 
stressed that ‘[Romania's] long-term interests demand, in my opinion, the 
development of privileged relations with the United States, Germany, Great 
Britain, France and with all the other European states’.341 The official 
discourse evolved in 1992-1996 towards the recurring representation of NATO 
and EU accession as Romania’s ‘natural’ direction. Meleşcanu, the new 
Foreign Affairs Minister appointed in November 1992, declared that: ‘the 
option of Euro-Atlantic integration is a natural choice. It is a well known fact 
that the institutions, the political, cultural and economic life of modern 
Romania have always – with the exception of the Cold War period – been an 
intrinsic part of European civilisation’.342 Or as President Iliescu explained in 
November 1994 - 
‘[t]he central orientation of Romanian foreign policy is based on the decision adopted 
in the first day of the Romanian revolution and supported, then and now, by all 
political forces in the country – full integration into the political, economic and 
security structures of democratic Europe. This decision was nothing short of natural, 
considering that, through its civilisation, culture, history and geographical position, 
the Romanian nation has always been an inseparable part of European culture and 
civilisation’.343 
 
In terms of targeted audiences, Romania’s decision-makers were 
addressing such speeches to mostly external recipients. Their messages 
indirectly aimed to remind the Euro-Atlantic community of the ‘kidnapped, 
displaced West’, the European peoples who had not abandoned their identity 
even during communism.344 This notion of ‘natural’ choice certainly belied the 
range of foreign policy and security alternatives actually available to post-
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communist Romania and Central-Eastern Europe in general, which included 
‘a reformed alliance with the former Soviet Union, neutrality or non-
alignment, regional security cooperation within Eastern Europe, pan-
European collective or common security through the CSCE, a realpolitik 
balance of power or reliance on national defence’.345 Yet the Euro-Atlantic 
orientation was domestically validated ‘with an impressive unanimity by the 
entire political elite’ gathered for consultations at Snagov in 1993.346 If 
Romania had a range of international security options, why did the post-1992 
official discourse construct Euro-Atlantic accession as natural? NATO and EU 
membership provided the surest and fastest way in which Romania could 
receive international recognition for its desired Euro-Atlantic identity. The 
Western self would thus validate unequivocally that the Romanian other was 
part of the Euro-Atlantic community in both civilisational and institutional 
meanings. Among the different discursive facets of Romanian identity, the 
‘European’ self-image was deeply rooted in the foreign policy imaginary and 
was meant to show the country’s Western origins. Since the Euro-Atlantic self 
continued to construct candidate states (including Romania) as ‘liminal 
Europe’ or ‘Europe but not quite Europe’347, the foreign policy imaginary 
needed to be re-defined in reaction to Western representations. 
 
In the 1990-1996 official discourses, Romania was very frequently 
depicted as a ‘European’ state. This self-image started taking shape soon after 
the fall of the communist dictatorship, as the newly appointed Foreign Affairs 
Minister Năstase stated in the wake of Romania’s first free elections (May 
1990) - ‘[t]o my view, things are clear. Romania is a European state’.348 
President Iliescu also summed up what this identity meant for the country 
historically and in terms of values:  
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‘[d]ue to its culture, civilisation and political tradition, Romania decidedly belongs to 
classical Europe, inheriting both the ancient Greek-Roman tradition and the modern 
principles of statehood – citizenship, freedom, fundamental human rights, the 
separation of powers within the state, the rule of law’.349  
When studying the evolution of Romania's post-communist foreign policy 
articulations, two recurring and interconnected themes become apparent - 
recovering the ‘European’ identity and ‘returning to Europe’, both politically 
and economically. This was definitely not a unique approach, as obtaining 
Euro-Atlantic membership was the general aspiration for Central and Eastern 
European states, while most of their leaders gradually incorporated in 
speeches the concept of ‘European identity’.350 Despite the common theme, 
there were specific nuances and meanings associated with the overarching 
European identity in each state. In the Romanian case, the official discourse 
articulated several variations (‘European’, ‘Western’, ‘Latin’), all of which were 
meant to dissociate the new state from its communist past and promote a 
collective identity with the West. The latter two are inextricably linked, if one 
takes into account the shared ethnic, cultural and linguistic origins of the 
French, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian peoples as descendants of the 
ancient Romans. The Latin identity of Romanians was portrayed as ‘an 
undeniable sign of our connection to the great family of Western European 
peoples’.351 The state’s Western subjectivity and ‘return to Europe’ were 
associated with key moments of European history –  
‘[t]he generation of 1848 and that of the Union [1918] linked the Romanians’ country 
to Western civilisation, extricating it from Oriental rule. The current generation of the 
Romanian nation will re-adopt that tradition’.352   
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So the approximately fifty years of communism were seen as yet another 
period which had forcefully separated Romania from its Western family, or ‘a 
sort of parenthesis in the country’s historical destiny’.353 
 
In early 1991, a pivotal shift occurred in the foreign policy discourse, 
which attempted to distance Romania from its traditional ‘Eastern European’ 
representation, moving towards that of ‘Central European’. The motivations 
behind the change in terminology could be attributed to the fact that ‘Eastern 
Europe’ had acquired specific political and ideological connotations during 
the Cold War, primarily defining the Soviet Union’s satellite states.354 It 
should be noted that the political entity of ‘Eastern Europe’ had been created 
in the aftermath of the Yalta Conference (1945), where the United States, the 
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom discussed and controversially decided 
the reconfiguration of war-torn Europe. The concept of ‘Eastern Europe’ was 
invented by Western Europe as its other half in the Enlightenment 
(eighteenth century), the imagined space where ‘European’ civilisation 
encountered ‘Oriental’ barbarism.355 During the Cold War, NATO and the EU 
defined their eastern boundary as a defence line for ‘European unity’, which 
enabled them to construct a superior Western identity based on shared 
democratic values.356 Or, to adapt the Orientalism of Edward Said, the Euro-
Atlantic community developed a ‘Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over’ Eastern Europe.357 Being articulated as part of 
‘Eastern Europe’ did not help the efforts of a state aspiring to form a collective 
identity with the West. Romania’s discursive responses were a combination of 
acceptance and resistance: accepting the authority of the Western European 
self yet refusing to be placed in the ‘East’. Therefore, the official discourse 
started describing Romania as ‘Central European’. The re-defined self-image 
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became most obvious in foreign policy documents - ‘[Romania’s] geopolitical 
location is that of a country belonging to Central Europe’.358 In April 1992, 
the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister defined ‘Central European’ states to be 
all those forcefully placed behind the borders of the extended Soviet 
empire.359  
 
As the contemporary articulation and heir of ‘Mitteleuropa’, this notion 
of ‘Central Europe’ was advocated by candidate states in the early stages of 
NATO and EU enlargement, trying to symbolise a stronger European 
subjectivity.360 It had been first revived in February 1991 by three post-
communist states (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), in an attempt to 
stand out among fellow Euro-Atlantic aspirants. They formed the self-entitled 
‘Visegrad Group’, which ‘reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central 
European region to work together in a number of fields of common interest 
within the all-European integration’.361 Romania opposed the Visegrad 
Group’s discursive differentiation and exclusive appropriation of ‘Central 
Europe’. On 19 June 1992, the Western European Union (WEU later 
incorporated into the EU) issued a statement in which it included all post-
communist states as part of ‘Central Europe’.362 Talking about the WEU 
declaration, the then Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase mentioned the 
importance of external validation and clarified what being ‘Central European’ 
meant for Romania: 
‘I think that things are now better because this document  certifies our philosophy 
concerning the area where we are situated, so there can be no more discussions about 
a division between Central (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) and Eastern European 
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countries (Romania, Bulgaria and, perhaps, the Baltic states). We have managed to 
express our view: the area between the former Soviet Union and Western Europe is a 
unitary zone, which is indivisible from the security perspective and must be treated as 
such (...) all these countries belong to Central Europe’.363 
The next years highlighted the articulation of different versions on the same 
‘Central European’ theme, which showed the fluid process of national identity 
formation and how the discourse did not crystallise a specific image. For 
example, according to President Iliescu, Romania ‘is an intrinsic part of the 
Central-European area’364; and since ‘the map of Europe’ stretched ‘from the 
Atlantic to the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea’, Romania was located 
‘not only in the centre of Europe, but even in the centre of Central Europe’.365 
Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu reinforced a similar line – ‘Romania is 
situated at an equal distance from the western and northern, as well as the 
eastern borders of Europe (…) [it] is the second largest country in Central 
Europe after Poland’.366  
 
Having established the ideational parameters of the post-communist 
foreign policy imaginary, the focus of this chapter shifts to the Romanian-
Hungarian basic treaty. It was one of Romania’s most important foreign policy 
accomplishments during 1990-1996 and a product of difficult negotiations. 
The bilateral document brought the long awaited historical reconciliation 
between the two states in 1996. The treaty story is a natural extension to the 
European self-image, which underlines the key role of external recognition in 
legitimating Romanian national identity. Romania chose and professed to be 
‘European’, but only the self (‘Europe’) had the authority to validate such an 
identity in the international realm.  
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What does ‘European’ Identity Mean? Narratives around ‘The Treaty between 
the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and 
Good Neighbourhood’ 
 
The basic bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary reflects their 
problematic and sometimes conflictual post-1989 relations. Treaty dialogue 
did not actually start until mid-1995, due to the inflexible foreign policy 
positions of both Hungary and Romania. In addition to this, the international 
context was in a state of flux. During 1989-1994, the EU lacked a coherent 
policy towards Central-Eastern European states seeking to become members 
in the organisation. The EU’s uncertain attitude is understandable 
considering the divergent internal opinions as to whether it should enlarge at 
all. Instead, the EU initially decided not to differentiate between post-
communist candidate states.367 In the Romanian case, a Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement was initiated in early June 1990. But the EU 
postponed it when the Jiu Valley miners attacked democratic protestors in 
Bucharest. Romania and the EU eventually signed the Trade Agreement in 
October 1990 and the Europe Association one later in February 1993. At the 
EU level, there was a much clearer stance towards Central-Eastern Europe 
after 1993. The ‘Stability Pact’ (introduced by French Prime Minister Édouard 
Balladur in 1993) established the requirements of good neighbourliness, 
ethnic minority rights protection and the resolution of any disputes as 
compulsory conditions for EU accession or simply ‘European 
respectability’.368 The Stability Pact or Balladur Plan was the result of France 
being frustrated with ‘the EU’s inability to bring about a diplomatic end to the 
Yugoslav wars’; it was ‘positively received in EU capitals’ and finalised in 
December 1993 as ‘the first Joint Action of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’.369 The pact aimed to prevent the reoccurrence of ethnic 
conflicts, like the Yugoslav wars, in post-communist Europe. The EU 
candidate states were supposed to sign bilateral Treaties of ‘Cooperation and 
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Good Neighbourhood’, which would codify their mutual agreement that 
problems of borders and ethnic minorities had been settled. 
 
The treaty between Romania and Hungary is significant because it 
encapsulates the meeting point of three discourses: international (NATO, EU, 
other Euro-Atlantic voices), Hungarian and Romanian, which told different 
stories about Romania’s European self-image. The case is a micro study of 
what it means to be ‘European’, through the lens of minority rights. No matter 
how intensely national leaders promoted the European facet of their state’s 
national identity, only the European self held the authority to recognise that 
the Romanian other identified with ‘Europe’. In that respect, the international 
narratives described Romania as not fully embracing liberal values and being 
unstable due to ethnic tensions, which contrasted with and did not validate 
the state’s internal European self-image. International discourses also 
constructed human and minority rights as not being the exclusive domain of 
state jurisdiction. Romania challenged the European meanings on minority 
rights by portraying the latter to be a domestic affair. The state further 
contested European opinion trends by saying that its democratic 
Constitution, individual rights and extensive minority language provisions 
were sufficient to protect ethnic minorities. Thus, it fulfilled the criteria of 
being ‘European’ and faced no danger of inter-ethnic conflict. But Hungary 
had a very different set of definitions of what ‘European’ identity meant for 
national minority rights. So negotiations for the much anticipated basic treaty 
between the two states could not move beyond their intransigent positions on 
ethnic minorities particularly, and divergent views on European identity more 
generally. Romania advocated individual rights and no minority autonomy, 
while Hungary wanted collective minority rights and some type of territorial 
autonomy based on ethnic grounds. In the early 1990s, Western Europe did 
not have a definitive interpretation about what being European meant in 
these terms – the concept of minority rights and its implications were still 
being debated. In this sense, Romania and Hungary were active agents in the 
struggle to define European identity with respect to minority rights. The 
undisputed European stance and appropriate meanings for minority rights 
were not clarified by the international and European community until 1996. 
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Without the discursive intervention of the authoritative European self, it is 
highly doubtful that that the two aspiring European states would have 
reached a mutually agreeable compromise. 
 
a. The International Narratives on Human Rights and Romania 
  
After two devastating world wars, the international community evolved 
towards a conception of human rights that saw the individual as the focal 
point of societal development. Matters related to the protection and promotion 
of human rights were gradually transferred from the domestic realm to the 
international level. The United Nations (UN) Charter signed in June 1945 
stipulates at article 2.7 that nothing will authorise interference in ‘matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.370 But 
subsequent amendments placed human rights outside national sovereignty, 
at least in normative terms. In December 1946, during the first session of the 
UN General Assembly, Resolution 96(I) was passed on genocide, which 
officially became a crime against international law; its punishment was 
defined as ‘a matter of international concern’.371 On 10 December 1948, the 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and addressed three 
main categories of rights: the integrity of the human being or freedom from 
state intervention against the individual, political and civil liberties and social 
and economic rights. Article 30 concluded that ‘[n]othing in this Declaration 
may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights and freedoms set forth herein’.372 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights proved to be a source of inspiration for another relevant 
document - the Helsinki Final Act. The latter was drafted by the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE later OSCE) in August 1975. 
The Helsinki negotiations lasted three years and resulted in ten principles 
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that were supposed to characterise inter-state relations: i) ‘sovereign equality, 
respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty’; ii) ‘refraining from the threat or 
use of force’; iii) ‘inviolability of frontiers’; iv) ‘territorial integrity of states’; v) 
‘peaceful settlement of disputes’; vi) ‘non-intervention in internal affairs’; vii) 
‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion or belief’; viii) ‘equal rights and self-
determination of peoples’; ix) ‘co-operation among states’; x) ‘fulfilment in 
good faith of obligations under international law’.373  
 
The first principle dealt specifically with sovereignty – ‘[t]he 
participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, 
individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the 
domestic jurisdiction of another participating State’.374 The seventh principle 
tried to ensure respect for human and minority rights, as well as certain 
provisions to foster them: ‘[t]he participating States on whose territory 
national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such 
minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for 
the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in 
this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere’.375 Both the US 
and Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Final Act, but it was not legally binding. 
As Sarah Snyder noted, ‘it was a declaration of intention, and therefore the 
obligations therein were only moral and political’.376 She also argues that ‘a 
transnational Helsinki network’ was gradually developed, where individual 
and groups across state borders ‘pressed for adherence to the human rights 
and human contacts provisions of the Helsinki Final Act’.377 The end of the 
Cold War brought increased international concern about human and minority 
rights. Several catalysts that had been emerging since the 1970s culminated 
in this intensified Western interest. Soviet and Central-Eastern European 
dissidents talked about the abuses of communist dictatorships. The US 
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foreign policy had undergone a liberal shift after the disastrous Vietnam war 
(1954-1975), whereas Europe was searching for a new post-Cold War 
identity.378 The international context of post-1989 facilitated the appearance 
of normative changes regarding human rights. 
 
Other texts underlying the international dimension of human rights 
continued to be drafted. Even more significantly, Resolution 688 of the UN 
Security Council explicitly linked adherence to human rights with 
maintaining international peace and security.379 This resolution authorised 
the 1991 intervention in Iraq of a multi-national coalition under the UN flag; 
its humanitarian purpose aimed to protect the Kurdish minority who had 
been repressed by the Iraqi government.380 The many and very serious 
humanitarian crises, which occurred in the last decades, showed the 
diminishing of rhetorical support for the rule of non-intervention, particularly 
in the case of states that visibly perpetrate violence against their citizens. It 
could even be argued that modern attempts to breach the principle of non-
intervention, in order to foster fundamental human rights, invariably 
undermined the foundation of the sovereignty doctrine.381 As a UN special 
rapporteur aptly concluded in 1992, the stipulations of article 2.7 in the 
Charter ‘are not applicable to issues pertaining to international protection of 
human rights (…) human rights are a matter of international concern and do 
not fall under the internal jurisdiction of states’.382 
 
To reflect these changing international norms, CSCE specifically 
engaged with minority rights: 
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‘[i]ssues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international 
obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are 
matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute 
exclusively an internal affair of the respective State’.383 
The topic of protecting minority rights and preventing ethnic conflict was 
especially sensitive in the European context, where the atrocities of the 
Yugoslav wars brought increased humanitarian awareness and a more pro-
active attitude to avoid such tragic developments. Similarly, other 
organisations re-defined their perspectives on ‘security’ or ‘security risks’. The 
Western European Union signed a declaration with post-communist states 
(including Romania) in June 1992, which noted that - ‘security in its broadest 
sense encompasses not only military but also political aspects, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as economic, social and 
environmental aspects’.384 NATO's 1991 strategic concept was elaborated to 
incorporate the new post-Cold War environment and security challenges. 
Paragraphs 9 and 15 contained ideas relevant here: 
‘[r]isks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the 
territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that 
may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic 
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and 
eastern Europe (...) Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just 
and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged’.385   
From the strategic concept’s viewpoint, it was quite clear that NATO would 
only consider ‘stable’ post-communist states as suitable candidates for 
accession, meaning those not posing any potential security risks such as 
‘ethnic rivalries’ and/or ‘territorial disputes’. This was underlined by Warren 
Christopher’s succinct claim that ‘a future new member will have to 
demonstrate that it complies with the principles of democracy, individual 
freedom and respect for human rights (…) in short, the values that NATO 
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embodies’.386 The EU followed the same line and had proclaimed to be 
founded on principles like human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights; all of these norms formed the 
ideational basis for integration and cooperation criteria applied to EU 
candidates.387   
 
Romania was generally found wanting by the standards of these 
international benchmarks. The international narratives on Romania were far 
from describing a European-inspired liberal democracy or a stable state 
upholding minority rights. In his 1990 article on European security, John 
Mearsheimer discussed ‘the serious tensions’, which had the potential of a 
‘future war’388, between Hungary and Romania over the situation of the 
Hungarian minority in Transilvania. The communist era had displayed two 
radically different approaches to engaging with the Hungarian minority. The 
first two decades brought a moderate stance which organised a complete 
educational system (including university) in the mother tongue for the 
Hungarian community. In the late 1970s, the communist dictatorship 
adopted an aggressive nationalist policy to surmount its legitimacy crisis and 
harshly restricted native language education.389 European institutions were 
aware of the negative turn for handling minority issues taken by the 
Romanian state under Ceauşescu. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe opined that human rights violations in communist 
Romania were ‘more specifically directed against the Hungarian and the 
Tzigane minorities’.390 Post-1990, Mearsheimer's war scenario between 
Hungary and Romania was perhaps too pessimistic, yet his opinion on highly 
strained inter-ethnic dynamics was shared by many international observers.  
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For example, a special report presented in the North Atlantic/NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly portrayed Romania as ‘one of the European 
countries where issues of minority rights protection are the most pressing’.391 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published a report 
which argued that:  
‘[o]ver the past three years, Romania has developed a tremendous sense of insecurity 
from the existence of such a large Hungarian minority in Transylvania and has gone 
to extraordinary lengths to defend itself from Hungarian charges of discrimination. 
However, there is a great deal of evidence that over the past two years inter-ethnic 
relations in the region have polarized dramatically and that much of the trouble has 
been caused by Romanian extremists, working with the “approval” of seemingly 
compliant officials’.392   
Other external sources reinforced the same image of instability and volatile 
minority problems. This ranged from ‘nationalist tensions have not 
disappeared (…) both the Romanian and Hungarian sides are guilty of 
instigation’393 to Romania being depicted as a ‘potential theatre of inter-ethnic 
conflicts like in the former Yugoslavia’.394 The mildest representations were in 
the Association Agreement signed by the European Community/EU and 
Romania on 1 February 1993. Its main objective was to help prepare the state 
for future membership. The document highlighted ‘the importance of the 
traditional links existing between the Community, its Member States and 
Romania and the common values that they share’.395 Nevertheless, it 
identified ‘the need to continue and complete, with the assistance of the 
Community, Romania's transition towards a new political and economic 
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system which respects the rule of law and human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities’.396  
 
To sum up, between 1990 and 1994, the international narratives on 
Romania contained mostly negative articulations which had been fuelled from 
within by the state’s violent and somewhat questionable transition to a 
democratic regime. A common point of alarming criticism in such external 
voices configured Romania as not fully complying with liberal democratic 
values and being unstable due to ethnic tensions that could imminently 
degenerate into conflict. While international norms evolved towards placing 
human rights outside the internal jurisdiction of states, the CSCE stated that 
minority rights were not the exclusive concern of domestic affairs. These 
dominant Euro-Atlantic discourses need to be kept in mind to understand 
Romania’s foreign policy reactions, how national identity and its European 
self-image were discursively negotiated between the self and other. Romania 
challenged European meanings by arguing against the internationalisation of 
ethnic and minority issues. It is interesting to note that, although the broader 
trend internationalised human and minority rights, Romania was eventually 
successful in promoting a narrower interpretation of these aspects. The state 
also contested the international narratives which constructed it as not being 
sufficiently ‘Western European’. Romanian-Hungarian relations constitute a 
story of ‘European’ identity with contrasting notions, acceptance and 
rejection, dialogue and ultimately reaching a rather unexpected agreement. 
 
b. The Treaty Story: Hungarian vis-à-vis Romanian Meanings on Minority 
Rights and European Identity 
 
The story of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty spanned the period 
1990-1996, being alternatively marked by regression and tentative progress. 
Throughout his electoral campaign in May 1990, the future Hungarian 
Premier József Antall announced on several occasions that he would like to 
                                       
396 Ibid. 
  P a g e  | 122 
be the prime minister ‘in spirit’ of fifteen million Hungarians.397 This figure far 
exceeded the people residing within national borders, made up of 
approximately ten million citizens. After being elected, Antall organised the 
Secretariat of Hungarians Abroad, which was under the direct coordination of 
the Hungarian Prime Minister’s office. The initiative became a concrete 
example of the Hungarian administration’s external agenda and its claim that 
‘it was entitled to defend the interests of co-nationals’ in neighbouring 
countries and the rest of the world.398 The Antall government actually 
prioritised the improvement of status and treatment for ethnic Hungarians 
living abroad, which took precedence even over domestic reforms. The main 
targets were territories redistributed by the Treaty of Trianon signed at the 
end of World War I (1920); they were mostly returned to contemporary 
Romania, Slovakia and the former Yugoslavia.399 Thus, President Arpad 
Göncz defined ‘the enforcement of collective and personal rights for the 
Magyars400 living in the Carpathian Basin’ as the main objective of Hungary’s 
foreign policy. State Secretary Géza Entz added that ‘ethnic Hungarians 
beyond borders form an integral part of the Hungarian nation’.401 The 
discourse gradually gained more momentum and conveyed the Hungarian 
nation's re-birth, recently freed from communism and which could not be 
fulfilled without at least the spiritual reunification of Great Hungary.  
 
On 25 September 1991, in front of the UN Security Council, the Foreign 
Affairs Minister (Géza Jeszenszky) declared the following: ‘We must resolutely 
condemn any efforts or attempts at the forcible change of borders, external 
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and internal alike’.402 Jeszenszky only denounced the forceful reconfiguration 
of borders, which indirectly suggested the possibility for a peaceful revision of 
the Trianon Treaty and Peace Conference in Paris. This would allow the 
Hungarian state to recover some of the lands given to Romania and 
Czechoslovakia. In 1992 the Defence Minister Lajos Für said that ‘the 
safeguarding of Hungarians everywhere is inseparable from the security of his 
nation and the Hungarian government and parliament should do everything 
in their power, using all legal and diplomatic means, to end the threat to the 
minority and to guarantee their survival’.403 The Antall government refused to 
sign bilateral agreements or basic treaties with its neighbours, unless the 
documents guaranteed collective rights for ethnic minorities.404 As Jeszenszky 
underlined using quite radical language in 1993, external relations would 
depend on ‘when and which of our neighbors recognize the need to abandon 
the policy of oppression (…) petty restrictions on Hungarian minorities and of 
trying to create homogeneous nation-states’.405 All these aspects prompted 
some academics like László Kiss to talk about the ‘ethnification’ of Hungary’s 
foreign policy.406 
 
However, the so-called ‘petty restrictions’ derived from a much more 
problematic issue – the legal difference between individual and collective 
minority rights. A long-standing and as yet unresolved matter is whether the 
minority rights stipulated by international conventions, declarations and 
other frameworks should be awarded to the group as a whole or only to its 
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members as individual right-holders.407 The fundamental legal basis for 
minority protection is article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which entered into force in March 1976. It says that: 
‘[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own language’.408 
A recurring phrase in all such international or regional documents is ‘persons 
belonging to’, which configured the individual nature of minority rights. The 
more recent UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities was adopted in December 1992. 
Although the Declaration on Minorities is not legally binding, article 1 ‘goes 
beyond the tentative article 27’ before reverting to the ‘cumbersome “persons 
belonging to” formula’409 – 
‘[s]tates shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage 
conditions for the promotion of that identity’.410 
Patrick Thornberry argued that this Declaration contained a limited collective 
dimension for minority rights, which represented ‘a via media between the 
rights of individuals and full collective rights’.411 
 
Narrowing things down to the European level, the Council of Europe 
made some attempts to differentiate between individual and collective 
minority rights, but they remained inconclusive. Its Parliamentary Assembly 
issued Recommendation 1134 (1990), which introduced the following 
minimum principles on the rights of minorities: 
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‘10.1 every citizen must have equal access to the courts and be afforded the rights 
safeguarded by the European Convention on Human Rights including the right of 
individual petition set forth in Article 25; 10.2 introduction of a general non-
discrimination clause in the European Convention on Human Rights; 10.3 the special 
situation of a given minority may justify special measures in its favour; 10.4 
minorities shall be allowed to have free and unimpeded peaceful contacts with citizens 
of other states with which they share a common origin or heritage, without, however, 
infringing the principle of the territorial integrity of states’.412 
The text carefully balanced between a minority’s ‘special situation’ calling for 
potential ‘special measures’ and the state’s territorial integrity, in order to 
avoid legitimising separatist movements. Recommendation 1134 further gave 
‘national minorities’ a range of rights - ‘the right to be recognised as such by 
the states in which they live’; ‘the right to maintain and develop their culture’; 
‘the right to maintain their own educational, religious and cultural 
institutions’; for this purpose, ‘the right to solicit voluntary financial and 
other contributions including public assistance’; ‘the right to participate fully 
in decision-making about matters which affect the preservation and 
development of their identity and in the implementation of those decisions’; 
‘every person belonging to a national minority is required to comply with the 
obligations resulting from his citizenship or residence in a European state’.413 
Still, the subsequent Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (1995) re-introduced the phrase ‘persons belonging to’ even in 
those areas where Recommendation 1134 had identified the rights of 
‘national minorities’.414 Its article 3(2) states that: ‘[p]ersons belonging to 
national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing 
from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention 
individually as well as in community with others’.415 All in all, international 
law advocates an individual emphasis on minority rights, because the 
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ongoing debates about collective rights focus on ‘the perceived threat to state 
security that these would entail’ like irredentism or secessionism.416 
 
The Hungarian views were simultaneously shaped at an external level 
(through the elites of Hungary) and at an internal level in Romania. There 
were domestic voices who wanted collective rights for the Hungarian minority 
in Transilvania. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) 
played an important role in the treaty story. It had been established as a 
political party representing the Hungarian minority and won seats in the 
Romanian Parliament since 1990. In late 1993, UDMR intensified its ethnic 
programme and demanded the ‘territorial autonomy’ of some counties in 
Transilvania, where a larger proportion of the Hungarian minority resided. 
The party submitted a ‘Draft Law on National Minorities and Autonomous 
Communities’ to Parliament in November 1993. The text defined a national 
minority of Romania as an ‘autonomous community’ that exercised its ‘rights 
according to the principles of self-determination’.417 UDMR depicted the 
Magyar ethnic group as ‘a constitutive factor’, having the same function of 
‘political subject’ like the state. The current Romanian Constitution limits 
state authority through the rule of law and individual human rights; if the 
UDMR project were to be applied, the Romanian state would have to compete 
with an ‘autonomous Magyar entity’ and this would inevitably cause the 
fragmentation of sovereignty.418 Both Romania’s government and political 
opposition found unclear the logic underlying that draft law and had 
suspicions about the idea of minority self-determination. Any form of minority 
autonomy was considered an unacceptable challenge to Romania as a unitary 
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state because it was associated in the collective imaginary with possible 
separatism and even annexation of Romanian lands by Hungary.419 
 
With regard to the Romanian foreign policy discourses, the state 
challenged European meanings on minority rights by constructing the latter 
as an internal affair. Romania also rejected the international narratives which 
portrayed it as not embracing European liberal values and being plagued by 
instability due to ethnic tensions. To begin with, article 6.1 in the Romanian 
Constitution stipulates individual minority rights – ‘[t]he State recognises and 
guarantees to persons belonging to national minorities the right to maintain, 
develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity’.420 
The non-discriminatory treatment of people belonging to minority groups is 
conveyed by article 4.2: ‘Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of 
all its citizens, without any discrimination in terms of race, nationality, ethnic 
origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth or social 
origin’.421 The Hungarian government’s rhetoric on minorities in general and 
collective rights in particular was interpreted as threatening by Romanian 
elites. As noted by Paşcu (presidential adviser), ‘one of our former allies 
Hungary has transformed herself openly into a potential enemy’; he invoked 
as evidence ‘statements and actions that interfere in Romania’s domestic 
politics’.422 At the CSCE meeting in March 1992, Foreign Affairs Minister 
Năstase highlighted that ethnic minorities needed to respect the territorial 
integrity of states, while insisting that minority rights were already codified in 
the Romanian Constitution and international law.423 Elaborating upon 
Năstase’s arguments, in April 1993 President Iliescu described the internal 
situation using the following terms: 
‘the Romanian legislative level has the most extensive rights for minorities in political 
and cultural practices. I do not believe you will find many states in Europe where 
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national minorities have representatives in the country's Parliament. Not to mention 
their representation in the local administration and native language education. The 
Hungarians at least enjoy [the latter] from primary education to university. An entire 
network of schools exists in the areas where they live, along with cultural institutes, 
magazines, newspapers, radio and television programmes exclusive to the Hungarian 
population. So, from this point of view, no restrictions are in place’.424   
 
The above excerpt remained a meaningful indication of Iliescu's foreign 
policy discourse on Hungarian minority rights in Romania. It basically 
suggested that the state had not only adopted European values, but had gone 
a step beyond them via the presence of UDMR in Parliament. Article 32.3 in 
the Romanian Constitution stressed the educational rights of minorities quite 
strongly, ensuring the teaching of the mother tongue in compulsory school, 
as well as making arrangements for minorities’ full education in their native 
language – [t]he  right  of  persons  belonging  to  national  minorities  to  
learn  their  mother tongue, and their right to be educated in this language 
are guaranteed; the ways to exercise these rights are established by law’.425 
Apart from educational and linguistic rights, ethnic minorities benefited from 
political representation in Parliament and local authorities. The Council of 
Europe invited Romania to join in July 1993 at the recommendation of the 
König report, which made some proposals - 
‘[b]ecause of the often difficult relationship between Romania and its Hungarian 
minority (…) further confidence could be built if the Romanian Parliament adopted 
legislation on the rights of minorities and on education. If Romania, as emphasised by 
members of the government and several political parties, already grants many rights 
to its minorities de facto, the adoption of these texts, which are already pending before 
parliament, should not pose insurmountable difficulties’.426   
The Council of Europe acknowledged that Romania granted many minority 
rights, but also recommended the adoption of separate special laws in this 
respect. It received assurances that the Romanian authorities would base 
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‘their policy regarding the protection of minorities on the principles laid down 
in Recommendation 1201 (1993)’.427 Yet, in February 1995, the Parliament of 
Romania issued an official declaration that clearly configured its position 
concerning minority rights and UDMR demands for Hungarian autonomy:  
‘the citizens [of national states], regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy the same 
rights, same protection on the part of the state and are the bearers of national 
sovereignty (…) The Romanian state has never undertaken any measures to assimilate 
its citizens belonging to national minorities and neither does it have such aims’.428 
The text mentioned the ‘internationalisation’ of minority problems in 
disapproving terms – ‘[w]e believe that statements according to which the 
matter of minorities cannot be solved in Romania denote the attempt to 
“internationalise” this issue at a time when the image of Romania’s stability 
can be decisive to its integration into Euroatlantic structures’.429 President 
Iliescu reinforced a similar idea in April 1995: ‘in our country tendencies have 
appeared that exaggerate local misunderstandings, convert them into “inter-
ethnic conflicts” at national level, even internationalise the so-called “ethnic 
problems”’.430  
 
Within a relatively short complex sentence, there are several linguistic 
devices that downplay the seriousness of ethnic minority topics - the 
articulation of the Romanian story through words such as ‘exaggerate’, 
‘misunderstandings’, the juxtaposition of contrasting notions (‘local’ versus 
‘national’), the use of inverted commas to emphasise with a hint of irony the 
inaccurate nature of the phrases in question. The President seemed to 
disapprove as well of actors trying to ‘internationalise “ethnic problems”’, 
which again contested the European narrative on minority rights. Moreover, 
in the same context, Iliescu indirectly referred to the main problematic 
aspects of the basic treaty with Hungary. He did not see any reason to move 
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beyond the existing democratic legislation and qualified as ‘unacceptable’ the 
territorial autonomy advocated by UDMR for Hungarians - 
‘[t]he democratic system ensures the right of minorities to preserve and express their 
ethnic identity in the existing legal framework, rejecting any discrimination which 
could affect fundamental human rights. In this sense, we consider unacceptable the 
tendencies to institute forms of isolation or “autonomy” based on ethnic criteria that 
lead to ethnic segregation’.431   
Consequently, the Romanian and Hungarian foreign policy imaginaries 
operated on two different conceptions of ethnic minority rights - individual 
versus collective, which also reflected different notions of what being 
‘European’ entailed. For Romania, having a European identity meant that a 
democratic Constitution, individual rights and wide native language 
regulations were sufficient provisions for minorities. Hungary and UDMR 
disagreed with such ideas, refusing to acknowledge Romania’s European 
identity because they viewed collective rights and some form of ethnic 
autonomy as the appropriate European standard. The inflexible stances of 
both Hungary and Romania led to heightened tensions between the two 
states, as well as the inability to start a proper dialogue on the bilateral treaty 
throughout 1990-1993. 
 
The year 1994 brought several shifts in the international context and 
the foreign policies of individual states. The Stability Pact or Balladur Plan, 
adopted by the EU in December 1993, began to exert a more solid pressure 
on the EU candidates. The plan represented ‘the solemn commitment of all 
the governments of post-Cold War Europe to political stability and abstention 
from war to solve conflicts and disputes over borders, territory and national 
minority problems’.432 Post-communist Europe welcomed the pact ‘to 
manifest both compliance with Western values and their commitment to act 
as reliable partners’, with the prospect of EU membership.433 Alluding to the 
still inexistent Romanian-Hungarian treaty, Foreign Affairs Minister 
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Meleşcanu subtly recalled that ‘a considerable part of Romania’s roads 
towards Europe pass through Hungary’.434 Poland managed to establish a 
good relationship with its neighbours, while also supporting Polish minority 
groups who resided in those states. The Czech Republic remained largely 
indifferent, since it had few ethnic minorities either at home or abroad.435 In 
Hungary, the Antall government’s focus on collective rights and vague 
statements about the peaceful revision of borders did not sit well with the 
objective of EU and NATO integration. By 1994, some international officials 
and journalists ‘hinted that Hungary was no longer on the list of states likely 
to join NATO in the first wave’.436  
 
Considering the problematic status of Hungary’s NATO and EU 
candidacy, it is not surprising that a new socialist administration led by 
Prime Minister Gyula Horn was elected in July 1994. He underlined in an 
address to Hungary’s Parliament – ‘this government will complete the process 
of accession to the EU and NATO (…) [it] will subordinate everything else to 
this end’.437 Horn even declared that Hungary ‘is ready to begin discussions 
regarding those basic treaties that could contain the reciprocal renunciation 
of territorial demands and the recognition of present borders (…), as well as 
the commitment to ensure the recognition, guarantee and practical 
application of national minorities’ rights living in their countries, in 
accordance with EU norms’.438 The new socialist-liberal coalition renounced 
the militant foreign policy of the Antall government and espoused more 
moderate attitudes. It also unequivocally gave up talks about territorial 
claims and peaceful revisions of borders. This facilitated the signing of a basic 
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treaty with Slovakia in March 1995, in which Budapest denied any 
‘irredentist notions’ and Bratislava granted more extensive rights (albeit not 
collective ones) to its ethnic Hungarians.439 Arguably, the criteria of Euro-
Atlantic integration acted as an incentive for both states to settle their long-
standing disputes, before the conference on the EU’s Stability Pact in Europe 
(1995). But EU and NATO conditionality did not work so well in the 
Romanian-Hungarian case, since the two countries were unable to reach a 
mutually agreeable solution at that time. The individual or collective 
dimension of minority rights was still pending. And the ambiguous content of 
Recommendation 1201 from the Council of Europe had to be clarified as well. 
 
On the one hand, Hungary insisted on including Recommendation 
1201 in the treaty text because it viewed the document as ‘the acceptable 
standard for the protection of national minorities’.440 On the other hand, 
Romania’s government and political opposition had serious concerns about 
the content of article 11: 
‘[i]n the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national 
minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or 
autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical 
and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the 
state’.441 
Certain phrases like ‘autonomous authorities’ and ‘special status’ were 
associated in the Romanian imaginary with UDMR articulations for a 
Hungarian minority’s ‘special status’ and ‘autonomous community’. 
Territorial autonomy based on ethnicity had been constructed as 
unacceptable by Romanian official discourses and perceived as a challenge to 
the unitary state. Domestic anxieties about the potential implications of 
Recommendation 1201 were so great that the last part of article 11 did not 
                                       
439 Sabrina P. Ramet, Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective 
Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p. 133.  
440 Paul Roe, ‘Misperception and Minority Rights: Romania's Security Dilemma’ in European 
Academy (ed.), European Yearbook of Minority Issues, volume 1 (Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), p. 260. 
441 The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1201 (1993) - 
Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human 
Rights;http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta93/EREC1201.h
tm (April 2014).  
  P a g e  | 133 
register – ‘in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state’. Some 
academics argued that, in practice, these stipulations ‘offer the possibility to 
choose, depending on the respective country’s internal legislation and the 
political will of the state, between three variants: local authorities, autonomous 
authorities and special status’.442 Romanian negative interpretations were 
reinforced by the fact that Hungary abruptly changed its moderate foreign 
policy rhetoric. On 4 July 1996, Prime Minister Horn held a meeting with the 
representatives of Hungarian organisations abroad. At the end, a ‘Joint 
Declaration’ was published which called for ‘establishing local governments 
and granting autonomy’ to Hungarians living abroad; concrete measures were 
discussed in order to develop a ‘national strategy’ for achieving such a goal in 
neighbouring states.443 
 
The above Hungarian declaration seemed to prompt the international 
community to finally clarify its narratives on minority rights. This indicates 
that both Romania and Hungary were active participants in defining what 
being European meant with regards to minority rights. In late July 1996, the 
American State Department rejected the concept of territorial autonomy on 
ethnic grounds and expressed hope that Hungary was not changing its 
government policy.444 To address Romanian and Slovakian concerns about 
Hungary’s external attitude, the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities sent a letter to the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister in August 
1996. Its content dealt extensively with minority rights, the Council of 
Europe’s Recommendation 1201 and territorial autonomy: 
‘[m]y hope and expectation is that Hungary, in trying to promote the interests of 
Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, will respect the limits drawn by 
international law, including bilateral treaties, and will equally respect the constitution 
and the laws of the neighbouring states (...) I noted that article 3 of the Joint 
Declaration refers to autonomy as a means of settlement of the situation of the 
Hungarian communities abroad based on constitutional equality. In this context I 
permit myself to underline that even the right provided in article 11 of 
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Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
according to the expert interpretation of the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (the Venice Commission), “does not imply for States either its acceptance 
of an organised ethnic entity within their territories, or adherence to the concept of 
ethnic pluralism as a component of the people or the nation, a concept which might 
affect any unitarity of the State”.’445 
 
Indeed, on 25 June 1996, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
Assembly adopted Recommendation 1300 on the protection of minority rights. 
It considered the opinion of the Venice Commission on interpreting article 11 
of Recommendation 1201 as ‘a most important reference document’.446 The 
Venice Commission in turn concluded that - 
‘international law cannot in principle impose on States any territorial solutions to the 
problem of minorities and that States are not in principle required to introduce any 
forms of decentralisation for minorities’.447 
Both the OSCE and the Council of Europe based their perspectives on the 
Venice Commission, which had the legal and political authority to impose 
certain European understandings of minority rights. It removed any possible 
basis for collective rights and any obligation for states to give territorial 
autonomy. For once European narratives validated Romania’s foreign policy 
discourse on what were the sufficient provisions for minorities. So the 
European self-image of Romanian national identity was partially recognised 
by the shifting discourses at international level. Full external recognition 
would only be attained through EU membership. Since the international 
community clarified these matters on minority rights, the Romanian-
Hungarian treaty negotiations were quickly finished in September 1996. The 
two states compromised by introducing Recommendation 1201 as an annexe 
and by including a footnote to it. Romania used the footnote to state that - 
                                       
445 The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Letter to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Hungary (13 August 1996); available at 
http://www.cilevics.eu/minelres/count/hungary/960813r.htm (April 2014). 
446 The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1300 (1996); available 
at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta96/EREC1300.htm 
(April 2014). 
447 The Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol 
to the European Convention on Human Rights appended to Recommendation 1201 (1993)’ – 
Appendix IV in Council of Europe, Protection of the Rights of Minorities, Doc. 7572 (5 June 
1996); http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=7510&Language=EN 
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‘[t]he Contracting Parties agree that Recommendation 1201 does not refer to 
collective rights, nor does it impose upon them the obligation to grant to the 
concerned persons any right to a special status of territorial autonomy based 
on ethnic criteria’.448 
 
What does the Romanian-Hungarian treaty story tell us about 
Romania’s foreign policy and identity? No matter how intensely Romanian 
elites promoted the ‘natural’ Euro-Atlantic orientation and the European self-
image of national identity, the latter was not accepted by external audiences. 
Only the European self held the authority to legitimate that the Romanian 
other was part of ‘Europe’ in both identity and institutional terms. Yet 
Western Europe preferred to construct its post-communist candidate states 
as ‘liminal Europe’ or ‘Europe but not quite Europe’. Thus, in the treaty 
context, Romania was viewed as a democratising country with possible 
instability due to ethnic tensions; an aspiring European liberal democracy 
that needed to work further on minority rights. On the one hand, Hungary 
agreed with such assessments and advocated that collective rights leading to 
potential territorial autonomy would settle the pending minority issues. On 
the other hand, Romanian officials argued that their state’s democratic 
Constitution, individual rights and wide Hungarian language regulations were 
sufficient provisions for minorities and complied with European values; 
autonomy based on ethnicity was considered unacceptable and a threat to 
Romania as a unitary entity. All three narratives contained valid points to 
some extent. 
 
Although Romania implemented constitutional minority rights 
concerning native language education, these had to be separately stipulated 
in the national legislation. Romanian decision-makers could also have been 
more open to alleviate the concerns of ethnic minorities, who had been 
subject to assimilationist treatments during communism. But where to draw 
the line and obtain European acknowledgement that the state was a stable 
                                       
448 The Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation 
and Good Neighbourhood (1996); http://www.gyula.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=50107 
(August 2012).  
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liberal democracy upholding adequate minority rights and had a partially 
recognised European identity? Here European institutions like the Council of 
Europe showed double standards at times, since it was not clear what being 
‘European’ actually entailed. As previously mentioned, the Council of Europe 
was reluctant to codify collective rights as an appropriate form of protecting 
national minorities. It still refused to partially validate Romania’s European 
identity and compliance with liberal values, even though prominent members 
like France did not recognise minority languages and provided limited 
legislation to foster ethnic diversity and bilingual education.449 In addition to 
this, many liberal democracies did not offer even ‘limited ethnic autonomy’ 
and refused to be forced to do so.450 Therefore, Romania was somewhat 
justified in challenging the ambiguous European position on minority rights – 
individual or collective rights? Yes or no to territorial autonomy? Which of 
these elements defined ‘Europe’ in the end? Clarifying the European 
meanings on minority rights was essential both in moving forward the 
Romanian-Hungarian treaty and in partially legitimating Romania’s European 
self-image. On this occasion, international discourses agreed with Romania 
that individual minority rights without territorial autonomy were sufficient to 
protect ethnic minorities and constituted the ‘European’ standard. The 
Romanian-Hungarian treaty was a significant episode in Romania’s longer 
Euro-Atlantic journey towards international recognition and inclusion. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, the period 1990-1996 was quite fertile for Romania’s 
national identity and foreign policy. It featured a rich palette of re-emerging 
meanings and three key ‘formative moments’. The first one defined the state’s 
international orientation towards ‘Europe’. The newly restored Romanian 
democracy provided the political leaders with the opportunity to answer an 
                                       
449 Stephen May, Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of 
Language (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 171. 
450 Robert Weiner, ‘Romanian Bilateral Relations with Russia and Hungary’ in Henry F. Carey 
(ed.), Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society (Oxford: Lexington, 2004), p. 495. 
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existential question: to be or not to be ‘European’? Should post-communist 
Romania look towards the Euro-Atlantic community or opt for the Russian 
sphere of influence? The 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ is an 
important episode of foreign policy decision which was internally contested. 
The available evidence makes it difficult to establish whether or not President 
Iliescu had a non-European agenda on Romanian identity and international 
relations. But his endorsement of the Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ was not 
shared by the majority of elites who wanted a Euro-Atlantic future for 
Romania. Although signed by the President in April 1991, the treaty was 
never ratified by the Romanian Parliament and became obsolete when the 
USSR disintegrated in December 1991.  
 
After Romania chose the European course, another key ‘formative 
moment’ shows how its European self-image was contested by and negotiated 
with external audiences. Romanian foreign policy discourses consistently 
constructed the state’s European identity between 1990 and 1996. Yet the 
Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty underlined the problematic aspects of 
obtaining partial identity validation from the authoritative European self. 
Hungary and Romania had two contrasting conceptions of what European 
identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights. For Romania, European 
identity entailed a democratic Constitution, individual rights and wide native 
language regulations as sufficient provisions for minorities. Hungary and the 
UDMR disagreed with such views because they considered collective rights 
and some form of ethnic autonomy as the suitable benchmarks for European 
identity. As ‘Europe’ was still debating these issues, Romania and Hungary 
were active participants in defining what ‘European’ identity meant with 
respect to minority rights. Once the international discourses on minority 
rights were clarified, the two states found a mutually agreeable compromise 
for the treaty text in September 1996. Sometimes compared to the historical 
reconciliation between Germany and France, the signing and parliamentary 
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ratification of the Hungarian-Romanian treaty was ‘a very clear signal’ that 
their relations would finally be ‘normal or rather “European”’.451 
 
The years 1990-1996 also crystallised the ‘formative moment’ of the 
three main self-images of Romania’s national identity: ‘European’, ‘non-
Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. The ‘European’ self-image was more 
prominent in this time frame, but the others were articulated as well. 
Together they formed the foreign policy imaginary which would influence 
Romanian international behaviour between 1990 and 2007. Romania’s 
relationship with the Balkans has been characterised by a combination of 
rejection and acceptance. State officials explained at length that Romania was 
not a Balkan country, especially to external audiences. However, the ‘Balkan 
other’ was not represented as a threat. On the contrary, the region was often 
described as ‘our friends to the South’, with Yugoslavia depicted as 
‘traditional partner’ and ‘best neighbour’. These meanings configured a ‘non-
Balkan’ Romania that retained an affinity with the Balkans. The ‘security 
provider’ self-image of Romanian identity had a range of representations, 
including ‘reliable partner’ and ‘source of stability’. To some extent, this self-
image was related to NATO accession since Romania needed to convince 
Alliance members that it could contribute to military capabilities. 
Nevertheless, the construct of ‘security provider’ was not merely a response to 
NATO rhetoric and membership criteria. Its ideational origins were closely 
linked to a long-standing collective memory-myth of Romania as defender of 
Europe and the West. The self-images of ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’ 
will become particularly relevant in subsequent chapters, when discussing 
Romania’s external reactions to the Kosovo intervention and Iraq war. As 
Romania has re-articulated its European self-image, the state’s story of 
national identity and foreign policy moves on to the inherent dilemmas of a 
European liberal democracy and security provider that also has Balkan ties. 
 
 
                                       
451 Mihai-Romulus Vădean, Relaţiile româno-ungare în contextul integrării în structurile 
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Chapter IV: The Inherent Dilemmas of Acting as a ‘European’  
Liberal Democracy and Security Provider (1996-1999) 
 
 
 
Among the formative periods of Romanian national identity and foreign 
policy, the years 1996-1999 were marked by a series of important re-
definitions which predominantly occurred during the Kosovo crisis. This 
chapter aims to show how Romanian self-images translated into the post-
1996 discourse and the events surrounding the NATO summit in July 1997. 
Although they represented the same Romanian self-image, the ‘liberal 
democratic’ facet of national identity circulated more frequently than the 
‘European’ one in the post-1996 internal discourses. The ‘security provider’ 
self-image was reinforced by domestic elites and usually connected to the 
area where it could be externally validated – the Balkans. Romania’s national 
identity also retained a Balkan affinity, which continued to manifest itself 
after 1996 through traditional amicable relations with rump Yugoslavia 
(essentially Serbia). Considering the Alliance’s refusal to include Romania in 
the first wave of enlargement, a large part of the chapter has been devoted to 
the ‘formative moment’ of the Kosovo conflict and Romanian responses to it. 
NATO allies had initially tried to solve the Kosovo crisis by using peaceful 
methods, such as multilateral negotiations and imposing economic sanctions 
on the Yugoslav government. Yet the escalating violence in Kosovo and the 
failure of diplomatic dialogue forced both the Alliance and the international 
community to adopt an even firmer stance, which eventually led to NATO 
initiating Operation ‘Allied Force’ on 23 March 1999. Romania exhibited an 
evolving foreign policy position regarding Kosovo, which started with partial 
support for NATO (October 1998) and later changed to unconditional 
assistance for the Alliance’s military intervention (March-April 1999). The 
initial reaction was a nuanced and relatively comfortable middle ground, 
which had a dual purpose. First, partial support (airspace access in case of 
emergency) did not oppose NATO or undermine Romania’s Euro-Atlantic 
identity. Second, partial assistance for the Alliance campaign accommodated 
the dilemmas inherent in the state’s national identity – whether to act as a 
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‘European’ liberal democracy and ‘security provider’ or choose the traditional 
Balkan ties.  
 
This foreign policy response was re-defined under the combined 
influence of three elements: national identity, rational interest and shifting 
international context. Romanian leaders anticipated that NATO air strikes on 
Yugoslav territory would bring substantial economic costs and a drastic 
decline in their popularity, since the state’s public opinion was 
overwhelmingly against a military intervention in Kosovo. From a rational 
perspective, they were necessary sacrifices to obtain the ultimate goal of 
NATO membership. The rational factor of Romania’s journey towards Euro-
Atlantic integration contributed to its decisions on Kosovo, but cannot explain 
why the state did not opt to fully support the Alliance from the beginning. 
This is where national identity supplements the analysis by identifying the 
tensions between the two self-images - ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and 
‘security provider’ – and Balkan sentiments, which shaped Romanian foreign 
policy. Critical events like the Kosovo conflict facilitate the re-articulation of 
international discourses. In March 1999, the rational component of 
Romania’s NATO accession was still present but, more importantly, the 
international ideational context had changed. Many authoritative Euro-
Atlantic voices endorsed a discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo. The normative pressure had increased so much that any established 
liberal democracies or those in the course of gaining recognition had to act 
decisively without delay. This ideational background influenced a hierarchical 
process within Romanian identity, with the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ 
self-image and the ‘security provider’ one becoming more relevant than 
traditional relations and affinity with the Balkans. Once the tensions within 
national identity were resolved, any past dilemma was replaced with the 
appropriate international choice of fully and unconditionally supporting 
NATO. With regards to chapter structure, the discussion begins with a section 
on the re-definitions of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary, followed by the 
volatile context of the Kosovo conflict and the evolving Romanian foreign 
policy on Kosovo. 
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The Re-definitions of Romania’s Foreign Policy Imaginary 
 
Romania’s political administration changed after the parliamentary and 
presidential elections of November 1996, the third general round of free 
elections following the 1989 revolution. The centre-left government (Social 
Democratic Party of Romania – PDSR) under the leadership of President 
Iliescu was replaced by a mostly centre-right governing coalition which had 
the majority of votes in both houses of Parliament. The new governing 
coalition included three parties: the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) 
with 37.06% of seats, the Social Democratic Union (USD) with 16.08% and 
the ethnic Hungarian political party (UDMR) with 7.69%.452 CDR was in turn 
made up of two historical pre-1947 parties - the National Peasant and 
Christian Democratic Party (PNŢCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). The 
1996-2000 coalition was heterogeneous and contained parties with different 
ideological affiliations, which caused Government incoherence and lack of 
consensus about domestic reforms. CDR and UDMR were centre-right 
political entities, while USD was centre-left. PDSR gained 28.67% in the 
parliamentary elections and formed the opposition, together with two right-
wing parties - the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR – 4.9%) and the 
Great Romania Party (PRM – 5.59%).453 In the second ballot of presidential 
elections, Emil Constantinescu defeated Iliescu by obtaining 54.4% of the 
votes and thus became the new President of Romania.454 Internationally, 
these shifts in governmental and presidential power were seen as positive 
outcomes, which clearly indicated that the Romanian democratic system was 
more consolidated and would not be reverting to some form of 
authoritarianism. As the NATO Secretary General put it in February 1997, 
                                       
452 The Central Electoral Bureau, ‘The Parliamentary Elections Results (3 November 1996)’, 
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453 Ibid. 
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‘[t]he way this important election has been conducted is a sign of your country’s 
commitment to democratic and pluralistic values. Within a short time, Romania has 
gone very far indeed’.455 
Some analysts even argued that the 1996 electoral events ‘culminated in the 
first democratic and peaceful change in Government since 1937’, 
demonstrating that the post-communist state ‘had overcome many of [the] 
earlier problems and its slow political development’.456 
 
As the most popular post-1996 political party and de facto leader of the 
governing coalition, CDR had said before the elections that the main goal of 
the state’s foreign policy should be ‘convincing the international community 
of the Romanian people’s attachment to the principles of democracy’, while 
also identifying the state’s past and present ‘European role’ and stressing the 
need to ‘cultivate its vocation as partner and mediator, open to dialogue and 
cooperation’; in other words, the party’s aim would be ‘to give the world the 
true image of a resurrected Romania’.457 So the new government’s self-
declared mission was to consolidate the internal democratisation process and 
gain its external recognition, thus contributing towards restoring Romania’s 
‘natural place’ in Europe. The discursive themes crystallised in the period 
1990-1996 were also expressed by the new administration, although with 
some re-definitions. According to Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, ‘[h]istorically 
and culturally Romania belongs in the West’ even if it was previously 
alienated due to the fifty years of communist dictatorship.458 On 4 February 
1997, President Constantinescu highlighted the main principles of Romanian 
foreign policy in front of the North Atlantic Council: ‘[t]he essential message 
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that I wish to convey is the firm option of the Romanian people to integrate 
into the Euro-Atlantic structures, as soon as the gates of the Organization 
open to receive new Member States’.459 Apart from reaffirming the Euro-
Atlantic course, Constantinescu advanced some interesting articulations 
which suggested an ideational shift towards the role of democracy in 
Romanian present and future:  
‘[m]ore than fifty years ago, Romania suffered from essential evil. She was detoured 
from her normal path, that of a democracy (...) The only substantial remedy for 
Romania is reintegration into the democratic world. The willingness of the Alliance 
Member States to be the guarantors of democracy and freedom is the main reason for 
which Romania wishes to join You’.460 
 
At first glance, the latter meanings seem somewhat different from the 
prevalent national discourses of 1990-1996, when Romania’s ‘European’ self-
image held a central role and particularly influenced the state’s external 
relations with both Hungary and ‘Europe’. They are actually variations on the 
same European identity theme, whose broad definition entails being known 
and internationally accepted as a Western European inspired liberal 
democracy which upholds two key principles – the organisation of regular 
democratic elections and the protection of human rights and freedoms. If the 
period 1990-1996 shows Romania’s journey towards opting for a European 
direction and what that choice meant for its foreign policy, the years 1996-
1999 bring forward the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity. 
What is the appropriate ‘European’ course of action when faced with a 
humanitarian crisis in the Balkan area? How should a legitimate liberal 
democracy react when its loyalties are divided, considering Romania’s friendly 
relations and great affinity with the Balkans? Post-1996 elite discourses 
referred to the liberal democratic facet of national identity more often than the 
‘European’ one, but they both represented the same self-image. For instance, 
President Constantinescu had strong beliefs about the ‘essential good’ of 
democratic regimes - 
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‘[w]e are realistic in our approach. We do not believe Romania is threatened by 
another nation. On the contrary, we think that when democracy triumphs all over the 
world, wars of aggression should be excluded from our vocabulary. For precisely this 
reason we would not want our quest for NATO membership to be understood as a cry 
for help for someone else to take charge of our defence’.461 
 
The ‘essential good’ of democracy was a recurring notion, which 
indirectly configured NATO as not simply a military alliance but rather an 
embodiment for the peaceful association of liberal democratic states. In this 
sense, Romania was reiterating NATO’s self-image as it had been constructed 
by the Alliance discourse after 1991: ‘[b]ased on common values of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since 
its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in 
Europe’.462 The state’s aim was both to ingratiate itself and show ideational 
compatibility with NATO. In June 1997, the Romanian President expressed 
these ideas more explicitly – 
‘[f]ar from being a mere coalition around increasingly sophisticated weapons, NATO 
has been conceived and developed until today as an alliance based on values: 
representative democracy, political pluralism, freedom of economic initiative, defence 
of human rights, tolerance and the right to be different’.463  
Constantinescu attributed the aforementioned values to ‘Western civilisation’ 
and argued for their extension to Europe as a whole, emphasising that Euro-
Atlantic integration would be the deserved validation for Romania’s national 
identity: 
‘Romanian society does not regard accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
as a form of protection against a threat, but rather as a way to regain an identity that 
was unjustly denied to it for five decades. For us, NATO is not a shelter but a 
community based on shared values, now recovered’.464 
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The ‘European’ (‘liberal democratic’) self-image of Romania was not the 
only one re-defined after 1996. To give external credibility and substantiate 
the state’s self-image of ‘security provider’, the two key foreign policy decision-
makers - President Constantinescu and Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian 
Severin - initiated a network of trilateral cooperation arrangements 
surrounding Romania, which placed the country as mediator of potential 
conflicts in neighbouring regions: Romania-Bulgaria-Greece; Romania-
Ukraine-Poland; Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey; Romania-Republic of Moldova-
Ukraine; Romania-Hungary-Austria. As Severin explained, his perspective on 
foreign policy included the fact that Romania ‘needed to adopt a sub-regional 
role which would demonstrate its Euro-Atlantic vocation’, combined with 
more open pathways towards Poland, Hungary and settling unresolved issues 
with Ukraine, Russia and Moldova.465 The Romanian self-image of ‘security 
provider’ was also more explicitly reiterated in the post-1996 foreign policy 
discourse. According to Severin, ‘[r]egional cooperation has emerged as a 
significant dimension of the stability and security in Europe and Romania has 
committed itself to be an active promoter of such cooperation’.466 In a June 
1998 speech, Constantinescu made a reference to Nicolae Iorga (prominent 
Romanian historian and politician), who had created the modern concept of 
‘South-Eastern Europe’ – ‘close to the Balkans yet different from them 
because it encapsulates, north of the Danube, Romania’s connection to the 
centre of the continent’.467 It was a diplomatic way of reinforcing the state’s 
national identity as ‘Central European’ and introducing the area where 
Romania could externally validate its self-image of ‘security provider’: 
‘Romania truly has a South-Eastern European vocation, increasingly 
manifested today though its role as equilibrium factor and place of dialogue 
                                       
465  Adrian Severin – Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (December 1996 – December 1997) 
in dialogue with Gabriel Andreescu, Locurile unde se construieşte Europa/ Where Europe is 
Built (Bucharest: Polirom, 2000), p. 45. 
466  Adrian Severin, Address at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Brussels, 17 December 
1997); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25498.htm?selectedLocale=en (May 
2014).  
467 Emil Constantinescu, ‘Romania in the New Millennium’ (New York, 10 June 1998) in The 
Archives of Romania’s Presidency; available at 
http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=6372&_PRID=arh (May 
2014). 
  P a g e  | 146 
between Europe and the Balkans still torn apart by conflicts’.468 The quote 
prefigured how Romania’s international stance on the Kosovo situation would 
be shaped by the tensions within its national identity – ‘European’ (‘liberal 
democratic’) and ‘security provider’ self-images versus Balkan ties. The 
foreign policy decision on Kosovo had to accommodate the identity 
requirements of being a liberal democracy with a regional security role, as 
well as the traditional friendly relations with Yugoslavia. 
 
To be consistent with its self-image of ‘security provider’, Romania was 
always quite eager to show its strategic and military potential. In late 1993, 
the state’s accession into NATO had been unequivocally declared by political 
leaders as a top foreign policy objective. President Iliescu addressed a letter to 
the Secretary General in September 1993 where he reinforced ‘Romania’s 
decision to effectively participate alongside the NATO member states in their 
efforts to strengthen European and regional security and stability’.469 The 
international context brought a promising opportunity in January 1994, 
when NATO heads of state and government decided to ‘reaffirm that the 
Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries’.470 On 
the same occasion, they also announced the formation of the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP), an initiative which aimed to forge stronger political and military 
ties with candidates from Central-Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. The goal of PfP was to foster a closer cooperative relationship with the 
Alliance at ‘a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the 
individual participating states’; to work ‘in concrete ways towards 
transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence 
ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to 
operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue 
and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed’.471 In strategic 
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terms, constituting the PfP was beneficial to NATO for three key reasons. 
First, it put in place a process that indicated membership to be the eventual 
target for some partners. Second, the PfP allowed for self-differentiation 
among partner states without giving them the full benefits of Alliance 
integration. Third, it served NATO’s mission of exporting stability as 
configured in the 1991 Strategic Concept.472 At the same time, candidates 
benefited from a more extensive access to NATO’s political and military 
bodies, as well as a ‘flexible and practical set of mechanisms that went far 
beyond the soft dialogue and cooperation framework’ set up by the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).473 
 
On 26 January 1994, Romania was the first post-communist state to 
sign the official documents and join the PfP. In April 1994, a formal 
application for NATO accession was submitted and concrete discussions with 
Alliance representatives started. Under the coordination of President Iliescu, 
Romanian authorities debated and elaborated ‘The Strategy for Romania’s 
Integration into NATO’ in June 1994.474  The text was then sent to Parliament 
for approval and further improvement, its broad ideas being presented by 
Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu at a NACC meeting soon after. During the 
first year as a PfP member, Romania took part in 58 related activities and 
four exercises or joint training sessions with the Alliance, allotting $0.8 
million for these efforts; by 1997, the sum of almost $8 million had been set 
aside to cover PfP expenses.475 As much as its resources allowed, the 
Romanian state contributed to a variety of peace-keeping missions like Desert 
Storm (Saudi Arabia), UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNAVEM III (Angola), 
IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia) to name but a few; the involvement mostly consisted of 
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sending field hospitals, military observers and engineers.476 The PfP put 
forward ‘a set of criteria that the emerging democracies would have to satisfy 
to ensure their political, economic and military compatibility’ with NATO.477 
The state’s participation in the PfP was the main instrument for achieving the 
interoperability between Romanian and NATO armed forces, but also an 
important step in the bilateral military cooperation with the US. The PfP was 
a necessary evaluation stage that helped prepare Romania and the other 
post-communist candidates for eventual NATO membership.478 
 
The post-1996 Romanian administration was very preoccupied with 
NATO entry and the upcoming Madrid summit in July 1997. In June 1996, 
Romania’s Parliament adopted a decision and formulated an appeal which 
was sent to all of the Alliance member state Parliaments. Article 1 of that 
decision contained the following: 
‘[t]he Parliament of Romania considers vital, in order to consolidate the Romanian 
modern democratic society, Romania’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures as a 
free, independent, sovereign and democratic country, and requests the Government, 
as well as the other institutions and state bodies involved in this process, to intensify 
their actions towards accelerating Romania’s accession as a member with full rights 
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’.479 
A highlight of early 1997 was the French President Jacques Chirac’s official 
visit to Romania, which launched the special partnership between the two 
states and cemented France’s strong support for Romanian Euro-Atlantic 
membership. Chirac’s declaration encapsulated that attitude - 
‘France wishes to build with Romania, in all fields, an exceptional relationship worthy 
of our common history. I realised with great satisfaction that you share this objective 
(...) There is more than friendship between Romania and France. We have the same 
origins, the same struggles and hopes, our two nations have forged very close ties (...) 
France supports with enthusiasm your European commitment. She will do everything 
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possible to ensure your accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. She will be the 
advocate of Romania’s candidacy to the European Union (...) My country will not 
spare any effort to help Romania recover its family: Europe’.480 
Constantinescu’s response expressed the Romanian appreciation for French 
diplomatic efforts and concluded that: 
‘I believe in a future when our countries will share the same European destiny within 
an inevitable new global architecture. I believe in France’s greatness, generosity and 
vision, in its firm and consistent actions towards a united Europe’.481 
 
In the months leading up to the 1997 Madrid summit, NATO decision-
makers engaged in detailed evaluations of the reform process in candidate 
states. The prevailing view on Romania was that, after seven years of delays 
under the socialist government of President Iliescu, the state had finally taken 
serious steps towards liberalisation and democratisation. The socialists’ 
electoral defeat in 1996 and the establishment of a different government 
opened a new chapter in the process of redefining Romania’s post-communist 
identity and made possible a new type of engagement with Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, including NATO. Nevertheless, substantial reforms had yet to 
take place before Romania could be a serious candidate for admission to 
NATO. In the words of Ronald Asmus who was an active contributor to 
NATO’s Eastern enlargement, 
‘Romania’s prospect for NATO membership had been considerably strengthened by 
the election of a new pro-reform government led by President Emil Constantinescu (...) 
Domestically, he was committed to making a clear break with the country’s 
nationalist and xenophobic past and to mending fences with the Hungarian minority. 
In foreign policy terms, he was pro-Western and determined to anchor his country to 
the West as well. Constantinescu was an impressive figure and these were admirable 
goals, but Bucharest’s economic backwardness left it with little chance of being 
included in the first round of EU enlargement’.482 
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Except for a brief time in the late 1960s, Romania lacked economic and 
political openness before 1989. The first post-communist administration 
(1990-1996) ‘preferred governmental stability to reform’ and ‘refused to take 
unpopular and radical measures, adopting chaotic changes and avoiding 
systematic reforms’.483 
 
Apart from the slow pace of internal reforms, another significant 
impediment to Romania’s NATO accession was related to memory-myths and 
their influence on national identity. After 1990, a considerable number of 
Romanian political and intellectual elites refused to acknowledge the state’s 
complicity in the Holocaust and tried to rehabilitate Marshal Ion Antonescu. 
He had installed a fascist military dictatorship in Romania (September 1940) 
and been instrumental in the extermination of thousands of Romanian Jews 
and Roma mostly between 1941 and 1943.484 But institutionalised anti-
Semitism was not just a characteristic of the Antonescu regime. As Alexandru 
Florian explained, 
‘[s]imilar to the Nazi policy in Germany, the Holocaust in Romania had as its base the 
legal identification of the “enemy”. All the Romanian governments from December 
1937 to August 23, 1944 promulgated anti-Semitic legislation. The foundations were 
laid well before Antonescu’.485 
The International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania (directed by 
Nobel Peace prize laureate Elie Wiesel) published a final report in 2004, which 
noted the contradictory aspects of the Antonescu dictatorship and the 
Holocaust in Romania: 
‘[t]he Antonescu regime, which was rife with ideological contradictions and was 
considerably different from other fascist regimes in Europe, remains difficult to 
classify. It was a fascist regime that dissolved Parliament, joined the Axis Powers, 
enacted antisemitic and racial legislation, and adopted the “Final Solution” 
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[extermination] in parts of its territory (...) At the same time, however (...) the regime 
did succeed in sparing half of the Jews under its rule during the Holocaust’.486 
 
Antonescu became a controversial figure in Romanian historiography 
post-1948, who was alternatively condemned or applauded by the communist 
propaganda. The historical narrative was initially re-written to legitimise the 
communist dictatorship and depicted Romania as a ‘heroic victim’ of fascism; 
‘the issue of anti-Semitism was avoided and the word Holocaust never 
used’.487 After Nicolae Ceauşescu came to power in 1965, communism 
underwent a nationalist shift and Antonescu’s anti-Soviet attitude was useful 
for the ‘new national saga’; the Marshal was officially rehabilitated, ‘with the 
fascist dimensions of his regime downplayed and his anti-Semitism presented 
as moderate, non-Romanian, and thus anti-popular, an error that was due 
only to Nazi Germany’s overwhelming pressure’.488 The decades of communist 
indoctrination have impacted on the memory-myths about the Holocaust in 
Romania. During the 1990s, the newly democratic Romanian discourses were 
infused with various meanings which negated the state’s involvement in the 
Holocaust. In this sense, Michael Shafir has introduced four main categories 
to describe the Romanian post-communist discursive practices: the ‘outright’ 
denial, ‘deflective’ negation, ‘selective’ negation and ‘comparative trivialisation’ 
of the Holocaust.489 
 
First, outright denial was a rare occurrence illustrated in Romania by 
Corneliu Vadim Tudor, leader of the Great Romania Party (PRM). In March 
1994, Tudor claimed to have ‘learned that English and American scientists 
are contesting the Holocaust itself, providing documentation and logical 
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arguments proving that the Germans could not gas six million Jews, this 
being technically and physically an impossibility’.490 PRM had been a 
parliamentary party between 1990 and 2004, which suggests that a part of 
the Romanian public opinion agreed with Tudor’s views. Second, deflective 
negation of the Holocaust portrayed Romania as ‘a victim, rather than a state 
sharing the Nazis’ antisemitic ideological credo and participating in the 
perpetration of crimes’.491 Romanian guilt was transferred or externalised to 
other parties like the Germans or the Jews themselves. For example, Petre 
Ţurlea – a member of the National Salvation Front (FSN) – declared in June 
1991 that responsibility for the Holocaust of Romanian Jews belonged to 
‘special repression troops of the German army’; at the same time, he proposed 
‘a moment of silence’ in Parliament to commemorate Marshal Antonescu.492 
Third, selective negation admitted that the Holocaust happened elsewhere in 
Europe, yet denied that Romania had contributed to the tragedy. This 
discursive method also rehabilitated Antonescu and regarded him as innocent 
of any wrongdoing.493 Fourth, Shafir defined the practice of ‘comparative 
trivialisation’ with respect to the Holocaust as follows: 
‘the wilful distortion of the record and of the significance of the Holocaust, either 
through the “humanization” of its local record in comparison with atrocities 
committed by the Nazis, or through comparing the record of the Holocaust itself with 
experiences of massive suffering endured by local populations or by mankind at large 
at one point or another in recorded history’.494 
 
The varied meanings on the Holocaust negation were not only a 
Romanian phenomenon. Such interpretations of history were present to 
different extents in all the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. Romania’s 
circumstances were the most complicated because memory-myths denying 
participation in the Holocaust did not help its already precarious case for 
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NATO and EU accession. The allegations of individuals like Tudor and Ţerlea 
were particularly visible since they were members of Parliament. And the fact 
that they had been elected as parliamentary representatives indicated that a 
segment of the Romanian population resonated with their viewpoints. 
According to Maria Bucur, the ‘perverse image’ of Marshal Antonescu was not 
‘the product of a propaganda campaign led by right-wing extremists, but a 
pervasive myth fed by historical debates and political contests’, to which the 
Romanian public seemed ‘indifferent’ or ‘unproblematically’ accepting.495 At 
the very least, attempts to rehabilitate Antonescu and to downplay or negate 
the state’s role in the Holocaust of Romanian Jews and Roma reinforced 
doubts about Romania’s commitment to a Western and European path. 
Combined with the slow progress of reforms, it was unlikely that Romania 
would join NATO in the first wave of enlargement. Yet post-1996 Romanian 
foreign policy decision-makers made a last-chance effort to obtain NATO entry 
at the Madrid summit in July 1997.  
 
At the NATO Council ministerial meeting in Sintra (29-30 May 1997), 
Romania managed to gain support for its inclusion in the first enlargement 
wave from most European member states, including France and Germany. At 
the Madrid summit (8-9 July), President Chirac argued in favour of five not 
just three states to be invited, with clear emphasis on the Romanian 
candidacy – ‘[b]eing democratic, at peace with its neighbours, Romania will 
strengthen the southern flank and the geographical cohesion of our 
Alliance’.496 But five invitations constituted ‘a more ambitious expansion than 
the [William] Clinton administration felt it could defend when the time came 
for US Senate ratification’; the US was also ‘mindful that adding Romania and 
Slovenia would reduce the likelihood of a follow-up round of enlargement in 
the near future to include the Baltic States’.497 The US was not prepared to 
admit more than three new members into the Alliance, partly due to the vocal 
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domestic opposition to NATO expansion. Romanian candidacy had three 
strikes against it in 1997: the slow pace of reforms, the failure to acknowledge 
the state’s complicity in the Holocaust and the unfavourable American 
internal context. Asmus aptly summarised this situation: 
‘[w]e had great sympathy for the people in these [candidate] countries and, in 
particular, for the new Romanian government. But our primary responsibility was to 
think about what was best for the U.S. and NATO (...) Romania was not yet ready for 
NATO—and we were not ready for it’.498 
 
The US, along with the UK and Iceland, remained inflexible and 
Romania was denied accession at Madrid. The official press statement did 
give some form of acknowledgement and hope for the future - 
‘[w]ith regards to the aspiring members, we recognize with great interest and take 
account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a 
number of Southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia (...) So 
it is not a question of whether they join but when’.499 
On 11 July 1997, only days after the NATO summit, President Clinton made a 
conciliatory visit to Bucharest. The idea was proposed by Mircea Geoană 
(Romanian ambassador to Washington) to encourage the state’s efforts 
considering the rejection at Madrid.500 Perhaps overwhelmed by the extremely 
warm reception of the Romanian public despite his opposition to Romania’s 
entry, Clinton remarked that he ‘can see no stronger candidate’ when 
referring to the state’s future chances at Alliance membership.501 This was a 
more or less reliable consolation statement, which still prompted Foreign 
Affairs Minister Severin to think that ‘Romania could be labelled a leading 
candidate and a motor of further NATO enlargement’.502 President 
Constantinescu was firm about the state continuing its external direction: 
‘[o]ur irreversible option towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration translates 
not only in accelerating the transformation processes of Romania into a credible and 
useful partner of these two cooperative structures, but also in complementary policies 
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– bilateral and multilateral relations. We will continue our efforts to develop efficient 
forms of regional and inter-regional collaboration, with our neighbours and states 
from the area. We consider these actions as a basis for regional stability’.503 
Being left out of the first wave of NATO enlargement was not the only key 
international episode faced by Romania between 1996 and 1999. The state 
also had to formulate foreign policy responses to the Kosovo inter-ethnic 
conflict. The significance of Romania’s reactions to the Kosovo military 
intervention derives from showing how foreign policy is re-defined in times of 
crisis, when certain self-images of national identity (‘European’/‘liberal 
democratic’ and ‘security provider’) become more relevant and eventually take 
precedence over other affiliations (Balkan ties). 
 
 
Romania and the Military Intervention in Kosovo 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, a substantial part of this chapter has 
been devoted to the escalating Kosovo crisis and Romania’s evolving foreign 
policy stance on it. The case study is particularly meaningful because NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo represents another ‘formative moment’ of Romanian 
national identity. The state’s foreign policy on Kosovo was re-defined under 
the combined influence of three factors: national identity, rational interest 
and shifting international context. Rationalism is a component of Romania’s 
wish to join NATO that also impacted on Kosovo decisions. Yet it cannot 
explain why the state did not fully support Alliance actions in the province 
from the beginning. In October 1998, Romanian elites settled on partial 
support for NATO operations - airspace access only in case of emergencies. 
This position accommodated the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national 
identity, which stemmed from the two self-images (‘European’/‘liberal 
democratic’ and ‘security provider’) versus Balkan sentiments. But critical 
events like the Kosovo intervention facilitate the re-articulation of 
international discourses. Many authoritative Euro-Atlantic voices promoted a 
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discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The normative 
pressure was so high that liberal democracies or those seeking recognition for 
their liberal democratic credentials had to act without delay. The changing 
international context of ideas enabled a hierarchical process to occur within 
Romanian identity, with the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image and 
the ‘security provider’ one becoming more relevant than the traditional 
Balkan affinity. Once the tensions within national identity were resolved in 
March-April 1999, Romania’s dilemmas of appropriate behaviour were 
replaced with unconditional assistance for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. 
 
a. The Volatile Context of the Kosovo Conflict 
 
The literature on the Yugoslav wars has tried to understand why the 
different ethnic Balkan groups resorted to violence for the pursuit of their 
goals. One factor is that controversial figures like Slobodan Milošević 
manipulated national sentiments for personal gains. For instance, as Warren 
Zimmerman affirms, ‘Yugoslavia’s death and the violence that followed 
resulted from the conscious actions of nationalist leaders who coopted, 
intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their demagogic 
designs’.504 Sabrina Ramet insists that the Balkan communities nurtured 
‘differing truths’ about the same issues or events, which contributed to the 
outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict.505 In the specific case of Kosovo, as 
Christopher Layne succinctly argues, the ‘immediate cause of the struggle’ 
was ‘the clash of rival Serbian and ethnic Albanian nationalisms, which led to 
a situation in which the political demands of the two sides were 
irreconcilable’.506 Kosovo seemed to be the location where regional ethnic 
tensions culminated to the most dangerous degree. The ethnic Albanians, 
who were the majority among the province’s population, invoked the principle 
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of national self-determination and were seeking independence in a place of 
great historical symbolism for Serbia. Since the Serbs regarded Kosovo as a 
crucial part of their national identity, they adamantly refused to lose the 
province.507 Kosovo had been the core of the Serbian medieval empire, but 
constituted a key landmark for the history of both Serbs and Albanians and 
their respective nineteenth century evolution.508  
 
Although ‘the confrontation between the province’s Albanian leadership 
and the Serbian regime had been simmering’ for many years and was visible 
to international public opinion, the Kosovo conflict appeared to catch most 
Western leaders unprepared.509 In the early 1990s, the ethnic Albanian 
movement, under the leadership of the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK), 
had used peaceful methods to achieve the goal of independence. Yet over time 
many Kosovar Albanians became dissatisfied with the lack of results from 
LDK’s moderate policy.510 By 1996 they organised the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), whose purpose was to wage an ‘armed insurgency and other unsavoury 
activities’ with terrorist roots against the Yugoslav government, in order to 
create a Greater Albania.511 Belgrade’s brutal military responses ‘triggered a 
spiral of rising violence’, which prompted the reactions of international 
observers and eventually required NATO’s involvement.512 The US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright, speaking before a meeting on Kosovo in London 
(March 1998), urged her colleagues from the UN Ministerial Contact Group to 
push for immediate actions, rather than rely on diplomatic relations and 
rhetoric: 
‘[w]hen the war in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the international community 
did not react with sufficient vigor and force. Each small act of aggression that we did 
not oppose led to larger acts of aggression that we could not oppose without great risk 
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to ourselves. Only when those responsible paid for their actions with isolation and 
hardship did the war end. It took us seven years to bring Bosnia to this moment of 
hope. It must not take us that long to resolve the crisis that is growing in Kosovo; and 
it does not have to if we apply the lessons of 1991. This time, we must act with unity 
and resolve. This time, we must respond before it is too late’.513 
 
Initially, a series of economic sanctions on the Yugoslav government 
were attempted, but their implementation took a long time. Five of the six 
Contact Group states agreed ‘to consider additional measures, including 
instituting a complete arms embargo, denying visas to senior Serb 
government and security officials, placing a halt on export credit financing, 
and freezing Serb-held funds abroad’.514 Only three months later did NATO 
allies start to analyse how military force could be used to pacify the situation 
in Kosovo. During a meeting in May 1998, the North Atlantic Council 
announced the following: 
‘in order to have options available for possible later decisions and to confirm our 
willingness to take further steps if necessary, we have commissioned military advice 
on support for UN and OSCE monitoring activity as well as on NATO preventive 
deployments in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (...) We are 
determined, through the ongoing activities of the Alliance through Partnership for 
Peace and the additional measures we have decided today, to contribute to the 
international efforts to solve the crisis in Kosovo and to promote regional security and 
stability’.515 
In his remarks to the press after the meeting, Secretary General Solana 
emphasised – ‘[t]he North Atlantic Council will also keep the situation in and 
around Kosovo under very close review. It will consider further deterrent 
measures, if the violence continues. Let me stress, nothing is excluded’.516 
Since the violence in Kosovo was escalating, certain NATO members argued 
for more practical approaches like military actions to settle the inter-ethnic 
                                       
513 Madeleine K. Albright – US Secretary of State (1997-2001), Statement at the Contact Group 
Ministerial on Kosovo (London, 9 March 1998); available at http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980309.html (May 2014).  
514 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 29. 
515 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement on Kosovo (Luxembourg, 28 May 1998); 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm (May 2014).   
516 Javier Solana, Remarks to the Press (Luxembourg, 28 May 1998); available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980528a.htm (May 2014).  
  P a g e  | 159 
conflict. For example, the German Defence Minister Volker Rühe was firmly 
against continuing inconclusive sanctions and said that: 
‘[w]e cannot afford any longer to focus on hollow solutions of rather symbolic 
character like border-securing missions in Albania or Macedonia, thus sealing off 
Kosovo from the outside (...) What we now have to focus on in order to support the 
ongoing political process is to elaborate credible military options aiming at the core of 
the problem: the extensive use of violence by Serbian security or military forces 
against the Albanian civil population in Kosovo’.517 
 
There were three obstacles that prevented a NATO consensus. First, 
some allies ‘feared that NATO intervention against Serb forces would favour 
the military and political fortunes of the KLA’.518 Second, even those who felt 
that military action was necessary did not agree on the most effective and 
least risky strategy.519 Third, the legal basis of an Alliance intervention was 
still uncertain because Russia threatened to veto ‘any UN resolution 
authorising NATO’s use of force’.520 Through the voice of Secretary of Defence 
William Cohen, the US declared in June 1998 that a UN mandate was 
optional in the end - ‘as most members agree, I believe, that we would like to 
have UN or OSCE endorsement. The United States does not feel that that is 
imperative – it’s desirable, not imperative’.521 Even though the allies had been 
debating the possibility of a UN mandate for quite some time, by early 
October 1998 they were no closer to finding a solution than they had been at 
the beginning. Some NATO states reasoned out that ‘the humanitarian 
urgency, combined with the Security Council’s inability to act, created a 
situation in which an exception to the agreed norm could be justified’.522 This 
last point convinced even France of the need to intervene, despite being 
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concerned about using force without UN approval. As President Chirac said 
on 6 October, 
‘France (...) considers that any military action must be requested and decided by the 
Security Council. In this particular case, we have the resolution which does open the 
way to the possibility of military action. I would add, and repeat, that the 
humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, 
however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation required it, then 
France would not hesitate to join those who would like to intervene in order to assist 
those that are in danger’.523 
 
As the international community became increasingly preoccupied with 
the subject of Kosovo, Romania had to configure its external responses to the 
escalating crisis, including to a potential military intervention. To understand 
why Romanian elites first decided to provide only limited support for NATO 
actions regarding Kosovo in October 1998, but then shifted to a position of 
unconditional support in April 1999, one needs to look at the tensions 
between the three self-images of Romania’s national identity. Early on in his 
presidency, Constantinescu’s discourse suggested he believed communism 
and any form of dictatorship to be ‘evil’, although the case of Yugoslavia was 
complicated for the Romanian imaginary. During the ‘formative moment’ of 
1990-1996, along with articulations of European and Western identity, 
Romania’s foreign policy discourse also promoted traditional ties and an 
affinity with the Balkans. The discursive themes were discussed at length in 
chapter III and the key point to be born in mind was that the ‘Balkan other’ 
had not been constructed as a threat. On the contrary, the region was often 
referred to as ‘our friends to the South’, with Yugoslavia particularly 
described as ‘traditional partner’ and ‘best neighbour’. In May 1996, these 
aspects were formalised though a bilateral treaty of friendly relations signed 
by the two states.524 Therefore, when formulating a clear Romanian stance on 
the Kosovo conflict became urgent, it was interesting to look at how the 
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inherent tensions within Romanian national identity played out, how the 
‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images vis-à-vis 
Balkan affinity competed for precedence in the collective mindset of state 
officials.  
 
b. Romania and Its Evolving Foreign Policy Decisions on Kosovo 
 
Romania’s general international stance on the Balkan area was already 
prefigured in December 1996, through the voice of Secretary of State Lazăr 
Comănescu: 
‘although a deterrence capability is still needed, the future of the Balkans cannot be 
built by military force (...) we believe that it is [European] integration rather than 
deterrence that must be a key instrument for long-term stability of the region (...) 
These countries should be offered a vision for the future which would detach them 
from the obsession of the past. International assistance should not be construed by 
them as an ever lasting means of existence, but as an instrument for the development 
of trade and economic cooperation among them and with other countries’.525   
Specifically asked about how his state would react to a military intervention 
in Kosovo, Defence Minister Victor Babiuc said the following on 18 June 
1998: 
‘Romania is part of the Partnership for Peace and as such has a series of 
commitments towards its partners. If the allies intervene in Kosovo, Romania will 
honour those commitments. Still, I hope that the wisdom of Yugoslav and Albanian 
leaders will find a political solution to the crisis’.526 
The above quote exemplifies how the responses of foreign policy decision-
makers were shaped by the Romanian self-image of ‘security provider’ and its 
related articulation of ‘reliable partner’, when thinking about future 
international conduct. From a strictly formal point of view, the PfP framework 
document required its signatories to comply with two provisions regarding 
military actions: ‘c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, 
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subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of 
the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; d. the development of 
cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, 
training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake 
missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian 
operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed’.527 A military 
intervention orchestrated by NATO is neither an exercise nor a mission under 
UN and CSCE flag. It constitutes a planned aggression, legitimate if given a 
UN mandate, to impose peace via force. So Romania was under no obligation 
to wage war together with NATO members against Yugoslavia. But the PfP 
had been interpreted by most post-communist candidates as a training and 
evaluation stage towards eventual NATO integration. Considering Romania 
wanted to be recognised as a liberal democracy worthy of Alliance 
membership, it would have been difficult to explain why domestic elites did 
not agree with NATO’s military intervention. After all, a conscientious 
democratic student is expected to follow the example of its much older and 
wiser Euro-Atlantic teachers, who had the authority to decide if the former’s 
performance was satisfying enough to pass the quite fluid criteria of NATO 
accession. Even though allied members had been divided on how to deal with 
the Kosovo crisis and needed a long time to reach the final resort of armed 
force, once air strikes were agreed upon, NATO candidates had little choice in 
supporting these actions. Otherwise, they could have been seen as not fitting 
in with the established liberal democratic club. 
 
The story of Romania’s reactions to the Kosovo conflict contains two 
distinct episodes: first, the international response of October 1998 when 
NATO initially requested unrestricted airspace access for operations which 
were aborted by resumed peace talks; second, the position around March-
April 1999 when the violence re-escalated, ‘Allied Force’ was launched and 
another request for NATO aircrafts’ access was received. According to 
President Constantinescu, on 7 October 1998 he was informed that the 
situation in Kosovo had become ‘explosive’, which prompted the urgent need 
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to configure a foreign policy position and to prepare for any potential negative 
developments. During informal consultations with Prime Minister Radu 
Vasile, Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Pleşu, Defence Minister Victor Babiuc, 
General Constantin Degeratu – Chief of the General Staff (the highest rank in 
the Romanian Armed Forces), presidential advisers Zoe Petre and Dorin 
Marian,528  the widespread idea was for Romania to support a military strike 
against Yugoslavia only if all other means of dialogue and peaceful solution to 
the conflict had been exhausted.529 Constantinescu also asked for the 
Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) to convene in a few days’ time, 
so as to reach an official agreement and issue a public statement regarding 
the recent developments in Kosovo. But the premises of the scheduled CSAT 
meeting were drastically altered in the evening of 9 October, when the official 
note number 98/1023 came in and communicated NATO’s request to be 
granted ‘unlimited access’ to Romanian territory for the air campaign directed 
against Yugoslavia.530 
 
Establishing a semi-presidential system based on the French model, 
the 1991 Romanian Constitution gave considerable prerogatives to the 
President in terms of foreign policy and national security. During the 1996-
2000 administration, the three Premiers (Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile, Mugur 
Isărescu) were content to only deal with the multitude of domestic problems 
and left President Constantinescu to be the primary foreign policy decision-
maker. Thus, while he did consult with other prominent members of the 
executive and presidential advisers, the final say on NATO’s request for 
unrestricted airspace access was solely Constantinescu’s responsibility. His 
resolution would then be moved to Parliament for deliberation, where the 
normal expectation would be for the legislative majority of the governing 
coalition to approve it. The President’s letter addressed to Parliament on 14 
October 1998 summarised four main ideas. First, it was an appeal to find a 
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peaceful solution for the Kosovo crisis. Second, the letter requested the 
Parliament of Romania to grant NATO allied aircraft access to the state’s 
airspace ‘in case of emergency and unexpected situations’.531 Third, the 
President thought that Romania should choose not to be directly involved in 
the intervention from a military point of view. Fourth, the letter asked the 
legislature to debate the possibility of sending a mobile multi-functional 
contingent for humanitarian assistance on the ground.532 
 
Before going into the parliamentary debates, the pending question 
would be how Romania decided on refusing NATO ‘unlimited access’, instead 
offering humanitarian relief efforts (medical section, refugee housing, 
reconstruction division) and help to air operations only in emergencies. 
Constantinescu’s memoirs indicate that he was very torn about the 
appropriate course of action. On the one hand, despite the rejection at 
Madrid, he believed that Romania ‘should act like a de facto NATO member’ 
and fully support the Alliance’s intervention in Kosovo. On the other hand, 
the target of NATO’s campaign was Yugoslavia – a country towards which 
‘Romanians have truly fraternal feelings’.533 The CSAT convened on 11 
October to discuss things further and elaborate an official response to NATO. 
The context was further complicated by the fact that Bulgaria, fellow 
candidate and close competitor towards Euro-Atlantic integration, had just 
declared ‘its readiness to grant NATO access to Bulgarian airspace’ without 
limitations and contributed materially with ‘a military reconnaissance aircraft 
for participation in the NATO-led operation “Eagle Eye”, the NATO Air 
Verification Mission in Kosovo’.534 The pressure on Romania to fully support 
the Alliance had substantially increased, since Bulgaria displayed little 
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apparent hesitation in doing so and was not hindered by Balkan ties. A 
purely rational analysis of the costs and benefits regarding Romanian 
involvement in the Kosovo military intervention underlines several 
drawbacks. Governmental elites had a lot to lose (economically and in terms 
of public opinion) because of the war. As a frontline state during the crisis, 
Romania would be faced with serious financial costs derived directly and 
indirectly from the air campaign targeting Yugoslav infrastructure. The 
national economy, fragile and still adapting with popular sacrifice to the 
liberal markets, had to stretch already very thin resources. Being 
neighbouring states, a substantial number of ethnic Romanians lived on 
Yugoslav territory. There was obvious concern for their welfare due both to 
the air strikes and to the perceived betrayal of Serbia by its long-time 
Romanian friend and partner.  
 
Furthermore, on the domestic public opinion front, things looked 
equally difficult to manage. The dominant views portrayed the Serbian 
population as victims of Slobodan Milošević’s totalitarian regime, innocents 
who should not be punished for the crimes of a dictator. Throughout the 
Kosovo crisis, Romanians remained ‘critical of Western action’ and their 
national leaders’ response to it, with about 78 percent being against the 
military operation.535 NATO also remained vague about what would happen if 
candidate states engaged in the intervention were at risk due to possible 
Serbian retaliation. Secretary General Solana, when asked about the security 
of states neighbouring Yugoslavia during a press conference on 13 October 
1998, declared the following: 
‘[w]ell, we are very grateful, logically, for the solidarity and support of partners, which 
is another example of how the security of partners and that of the Alliance are difficult 
to separate, impossible to separate as a matter of fact. Any threat to the security of 
partners will be viewed with the utmost seriousness and will be met with an 
appropriate response’.536 
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The lack of any concrete reassurances or promises from NATO reinforced the 
idea that NATO would not make any formal commitment to defend or help 
partner states (including Romania) in case of Serbian aggression. Even so, if 
the pragmatic goal was to obtain NATO membership, then all these aspects 
could be necessary costs to achieve the ultimate benefit. Interestingly, 
Romania settled for a more nuanced answer in October 1998 which did not 
go against NATO and thus potentially jeopardised the main interest of 
integration, yet at the same time it appeased the tensions inherent in the 
state’s national identity – whether to act as a ‘European’ liberal democracy or 
choose the traditional Balkan affinity. The dominant views during the CSAT 
meeting were that, while Romania must side with NATO and adhere to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1199537, it ‘could not take part in fighting 
operations on the Yugoslav territory’.538 In order to maintain a ‘consistent 
stance’, neither could the Romanian state put its airports at NATO’s disposal 
for use as bases of attack. Both General Degeratu and Foreign Affairs 
Minister Pleşu had argued that giving access to airspace or land essentially 
amounted to the ‘same thing – it’s still called direct involvement’; 
Constantinescu agreed with that assessment.539  
 
The CSAT decided to write a memorandum, in the name of the Foreign 
Affairs and National Defence Ministries, which basically reiterated the main 
points of Resolution 1199: immediate ceasefire, resuming diplomatic dialogue 
between Yugoslav authorities and Albanian leaders in Kosovo, humanitarian 
relief efforts. The memorandum also ‘heavily underlined the necessity to 
preserve Serbia’s territorial integrity, with a large autonomy for Kosovo’.540 
Coming back to the parliamentary debates regarding the motion to grant 
access to national airspace, they produced radically different opinions. In the 
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1996-2000 legislature there were nine parliamentary parties and groups – the 
governing coalition (PNŢCD, USD, PNL, UDMR), the opposition (PDSR, PRM, 
PUNR), the groups of other national minorities different from the Hungarians 
and the independents or members without party affiliation. Sorin Lepşa, 
speaking on behalf of PNŢCD, emphasised that two questions needed to be 
answered in the context of the Kosovo crisis: ‘1) [d]o political forces in this 
Parliament wish for Romania to be considered a serious partner of NATO?; 2) 
[d]o we want to prove that Romania has the expected reactions of a member 
state in the Alliance?’ He also made reference to a position piece presented by 
state officials during the first round of individual dialogue on NATO 
enlargement (29 March 1996), in which Romania committed itself, depending 
on the Alliance’s preferred option and the concrete developments in the 
European security area, ‘to offer allied forces the infrastructure facilities 
necessary to conduct operations’.541 Representing the main opposition party 
(PDSR), Ion Iliescu argued for continued efforts towards finding a peaceful 
solution to the Kosovo issues which preserved Serbian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, also reminding that Romania had always maintained 
neutrality and non-involvement in the Yugoslav conflicts.542 Valeriu Tabără 
(PUNR) discussed NATO’s hypocritical conduct towards Kosovo, when in so 
many other disastrous humanitarian cases it decided to not interfere; he 
warned against the problematic implications of such an unprecedented 
military intervention.543 Here the first MPs conveyed the tensions inherent in 
Romania’s national identity, which reflected the two contrasting foreign policy 
choices. On the one hand, the ‘security provider’ self-image and its ‘reliable 
partner’ articulation meant full support for NATO. On the other hand, 
Romanian traditional good relations and affinity with the Balkans suggested 
that a neutral stance on Kosovo was more suitable. 
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Moreover, Bogdan Niculescu-Duvăz (USD) stressed the ‘wisdom of 
having a clear attitude of political support’, specifying that the object of 
debate was not even about helping logistically; rather it essentially 
constituted ‘humanitarian assistance’.544 This position indicates that some 
idea of humanitarian intervention for Kosovars was already present in the 
mindset of certain Romanian elites, which aligned with the ‘European’ or 
liberal democratic self-image. When asked to give further clarifications on 
how the state was supposed to contribute towards NATO operations, Defence 
Minister Babiuc said: 
‘[t]here is a great difference between entering a country’s air space without any 
restrictions and giving permission to enter it with the specification “in case of 
emergency or unexpected occurrences”, and the respective notions are neither vague 
nor unknown’.545 
Babiuc continued his argument by making reference to the Chicago 
Convention (1944), where aircraft emergency or distress situations had been 
defined in connection with airplane and pilot problems such as technical 
difficulties, urgent need for re-fuelling and injury. To explain the concrete 
meanings of ‘unexpected occurrences’, he invoked the standard operating 
procedures used during the joint activities of NATO with partner states, which 
highlighted two issues: changing the plane’s direction due to objective 
reasons like insurmountable meteorological conditions and search and rescue 
operations.546 Adrian Năstase cautioned that: 
‘[i]n international law the only body able to approve military operations like those 
discussed until now is the UN Security Council. Resolution 1199 (...) says a multitude 
of things yet does not mention or mandate such a [NATO] operation (...) Romania 
should be wary of giving up the umbrella of international law’.547 
In the end, the members of Parliament voted with 244 in favour, 160 against 
and 82 absences to grant the Alliance access to the state’s airspace in ‘case of 
emergency and unexpected situations’.548 This was a nuanced foreign policy 
stance that accommodated the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national 
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identity, where the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-
images competed with Balkan ties for precedence. 
 
The five months between the cancelled air strikes against Yugoslavia 
(October 1998) and NATO initiating Operation Allied Force (23 March 1999) 
showed signs that President Constantinescu was re-defining his position on 
the Kosovo crisis. In a speech dedicated to the Day of National Solidarity 
against Dictatorship, made official around November 1998, Constantinescu 
voiced such thoughts:  
‘the evil which we had removed from our lives along with the fall of dictatorship 
cannot be forgotten, cannot be minimised. Democracy is like health – you realise its 
significance only when it’s gone. Memory is the most effective medicine to this kind of 
danger (...) Solidarity against dictatorship should not be symbolic. It has practical 
value as long as those old dictatorships have left deep scars in and among us’.549 
Remembering the painful communist past and the wounds inflicted by 
Ceauşescu’s autarchy appeared to be the key towards a brighter democratic 
future, also rendering Romanians much more sympathetic towards other 
peoples suffering from the same or comparable plight. Kosovo had some 
respite from violence between October 1998 and early January 1999. 
Unfortunately, that brief relief ended on 15 January 1999, when Serbian 
armed forces devastated the village of Račak in southern Kosovo, leaving 
behind a large number of dead and mutilated victims. US Ambassador 
William Walker witnessed the aftermath and described it as ‘an unspeakable 
atrocity’ that represented ‘a crime against humanity’; he said that he would 
not ‘hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility’.550 
Račak became a turning point for NATO allies and the international 
community as a whole. On 28 January, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had 
a meeting with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, which he ended with a 
highly symbolic message:  
‘[w]e must (...) further refine the combination of force and diplomacy that is the key to 
peace in the Balkans, as everywhere (...) The bloody wars of the last decade have left 
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us with no illusions about the difficulty of halting internal conflicts - by reason or by 
force - particularly against the wishes of the government of a sovereign state. But nor 
have they left us with any illusions about the need to use force, when all other means 
have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia’.551 
 
Some scholars have argued that Annan ‘implicitly provided his blessing 
to threatening and even using force against a sovereign state’, although ‘such 
action was never explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council given the 
certainty of a Russian veto’.552 Within hours of Annan’s statement, NATO 
Secretary General Solana emerged from a North Atlantic Council meeting and 
affirmed more strongly NATO’s readiness to act militarily - 
‘[t]he appropriate authorities in Belgrade and representatives of the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership must agree to the proposals to be issued by the Contact Group for 
completing an interim political settlement (...) NATO stands ready to act and rules out 
no option to ensure full respect by both sides of the demands of the international 
community, and in particular observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions 
(...) the North Atlantic Council has decided to increase its military preparedness to 
ensure that the demands of the international community are met. The North Atlantic 
Council will follow developments closely and will decide on further measures in the 
light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements 
and their response to the Contact Group's demands’.553 
The most influential European allies started endorsing a similar rhetoric. 
Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, declared that: ‘I am not a 
friend of using force, but sometimes it is a necessary means of last resort. So 
I am ready to use it if there is no other way. If people are being massacred, 
you cannot mutter about having no mandate. You must act’.554 The following 
day, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac 
issued a joint statement saying that they were ‘willing to consider all forms of 
military action, including the dispatch of ground forces, necessary to 
accompany the implementation of a negotiated agreement. If an early political 
agreement proves impossible, the two leaders believe that all options will need 
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to be considered’.555 The US did not want to place troops on the ground, 
which left the option of air strikes. The North Atlantic Council reinforced this 
discourse on 30 January, when it stated that ‘NATO is ready to take whatever 
measures are necessary in the light of both parties’ compliance with 
international commitments and requirements, including in particular 
assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands, to avert a 
humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the demands of the 
international community and the achievement of a political settlement’.556 To 
ensure NATO’s responsiveness to the evolving situation, ‘[t]he Council has (...) 
agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes 
against targets on FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s] territory’.557 
 
At the end of this intricate series of statements, the preferred strategy 
for dealing with the Kosovo conflict was clear. One way or another, there 
would be a resolution of the conflict shortly. Even so, Chirac argued for ‘one 
more attempt to negotiate a political solution’ and that ‘Europeans must take 
responsibility for Europe’.558 Blair also agreed with a final attempt at 
negotiations: ‘[t]he consequence of these threats was so serious in terms of 
the military action, for goodness sake let’s give it another try with the political 
process, let’s stick all the people together, get all the pressure we can on both 
sides to come round the table and sort it out’.559 Thus came the decision to 
bring the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians together at the fourteenth century 
château of Rambouillet, about 44 kilometres southwest of Paris, to try to 
reach a settlement. Before the opening of the Rambouillet talks, on 4 
February 1999, US Secretary Albright warned all parties involved in the 
process that: 
‘three outcomes are possible. If President Milosevic refuses to accept the Contact 
Group proposals, or has allowed repression in Kosovo to continue, he can expect 
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NATO air strikes. If the Kosovo Albanians obstruct progress at Rambouillet or on the 
ground, they cannot expect the NATO and the international community to bail them 
out. Decisions on air strikes and international support will be affected, and we will 
find additional ways of bringing pressure to bear. If the two sides do reach agreement, 
we will need to concentrate our efforts on making sure that it is successfully 
implemented’.560 
The negotiations at Rambouillet (6 – 23 February 1999) failed as no 
agreement was reached between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.  
 
Nevertheless, what happened at Rambouillet remains a controversial 
topic. Michael Mandelbaum summarised the peace conference as follows: 
‘[NATO] summoned the Serbs and the KLA to the French chateau of Rambouillet, 
presented them with a detailed plan for political autonomy in Kosovo under NATO 
auspices, demanded that both agree to it, and threatened military reprisals if either 
refused. Both did refuse. The Americans thereupon negotiated with the KLA, acquired 
its assent to the Rambouillet plan, and, when the Serbs persisted in their refusal, 
waited for the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors and then began to bomb’.561 
Some claim that impossible demands were placed on the Serbian side and the 
talks were designed to fail; unsuccessful negotiations provided a good pretext 
for the Alliance to intervene in Kosovo.562 Two major obstacles prevented the 
Serbs from accepting the Rambouillet agreement. First, the document 
stipulated ‘the transitional occupation of Kosovo by NATO-led forces’, which 
‘included the free use of all of Yugoslav territory and resources’.563 Second, 
the text ‘intimated a future independence referendum as the resolution 
mechanism’ for Kosovo.564 The Serbs could not willingly renounce the 
province, since they had been fighting against Kosovo independence to begin 
with. Whether or not NATO had already decided on an air operation against 
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rump Yugoslavia and was simply looking for a pretext, the Rambouillet 
conference is ‘a textbook example of how not to practice diplomacy’.565  
 
The allied states were generally more inclined towards a humanitarian 
intervention due to the shifting international discourses. As the Kosovo 
situation deteriorated, the international ideational context about 
humanitarian intervention changed as well. Discursive support for an 
intervention in Kosovo was orchestrated through rhetorical means such as 
the negative consequences of appeasing totalitarianism and analogies with 
the Holocaust. For example, in a Washington Post article on 25 March 1999, 
the US republican senator Jesse Helms criticised the Clinton administration 
for its foreign policy of appeasement towards Balkan dictators: 
‘Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic has for the past year waged a brutal 
campaign of genocide against the Albanian population of Kosovo (...) All this is merely 
the latest in Milosevic’s reign of terror in the Balkans. In his proxy war against 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, he killed hundreds of thousands, opened the first concentration 
camps since the Holocaust, and almost single-handedly restored “genocide” to the 
European vocabulary (...) This must stop. And the only way it will stop – ever – is if we 
address the underlying cause of the problem in the Balkans: Slobodan Milosevic’s 
continued rule’.566 
The British Prime Minister also proved to be an emphatic anti-appeaser of 
dictatorship. Speaking to the House of Commons in March 1999, Blair 
reminded that ‘[w]e know from bitter experience throughout this century, 
most recently in Bosnia, that instability and civil war in one part of the 
Balkans inevitably spills over into the whole of it, and affects the rest of 
Europe too’.567 Kosovo ‘represented Blair’s “awakening”’ to humanitarian 
interventionism, because he ‘saw the former Yugoslavia, and the 
machinations of the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, in moral terms’.568 
Alexandra Gheciu explains that, as the inter-ethnic violence was escalating in 
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Kosovo, Western states and NATO gradually developed a specific reading of 
the conflict: 
‘[a]ccording to [NATO’s] interpretation, the crisis involved a conflict between the 
progressive, modern values of liberal democracy and the barbarity embodied in the 
Milosevic regime. As the institutional embodiment of the Euro-Atlantic community, 
NATO was acting in a civilized (“surgical”) manner to protect Kosovar civilians against 
the authoritarian, undemocratic government of Slobodan Milosevic’.569 
 
The changing international context and discourses about Kosovo were 
bound to impact on Romania’s foreign policy. The state needed to re-consider 
its external attitude of October 1998 towards NATO actions in Kosovo, when 
the Alliance’s military intervention became imminent in March 1999. On 21 
March 1999, President Constantinescu made a public statement to the 
domestic population and, in the end, it constituted a fairly clear Romanian 
foreign policy position: 
‘[f]rom the beginning Romania has contributed to the OSCE, NATO and EU efforts of 
solving the Kosovo crisis through discussions. Our own political experience has 
proved that there always is a way towards dialogue if both parties show good faith and 
the will to avoid conflicts (...) Unfortunately, all these efforts still face major difficulties 
resulting in the tragic loss of lives, the brutal dislocation of refugees and escalation of 
tensions in the entire region (...) States do bear the responsibility to manage internal 
conflicts. Yet, when this management does not calm but rather amplifies a conflict 
endangering regional and even European security, the international community must 
put a stop to it (...) If peace negotiations fail, Romania considers a NATO intervention 
to be necessary and legitimate and reiterates its decision to support the re-
establishment of peace and humanitarian operations’.570 
Constantinescu was ‘acutely aware that the two words remembered from the 
whole speech’ would be ‘those justifying NATO’s actions – legitimate and 
necessary’; yet he thought ‘the time for half measures’ had passed and 
Romania needed to ‘unequivocally side with the democratic countries’, hoping 
‘friends in Yugoslavia’ would understand that Romanians were joining ‘the 
fight against Milosevic and not Serbia’.571  
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The initial stance of October 1998 was re-defined under the combined 
influence of three factors: national identity, rational interest and shifting 
international context. There is an undeniable rational component to 
Romania’s quest for Euro-Atlantic integration, but that is only part of its 
evolving foreign policy on Kosovo. The state could have maintained the 
comfortable middle ground of supporting NATO missions only in case of 
emergency and unexpected occurrences. However, the five months from 
October 1998 to March 1999 had drastically altered the international context. 
The escalating violence (in particular the Račak massacre) in Kosovo had 
great emotional impact and constrained both NATO and the international 
community to be firmer and more decisive in using the last resort of force. 
The UN Secretary General, the US, France, Germany and the other Alliance 
members reinforced the discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention. The 
normative expectations of saving Kosovo were so high that any self-respecting 
liberal democracy had to adopt the same views in order to receive external 
validation. Under this changing ideational background, Romania’s national 
identity underwent a process of hierarchy, where the ‘European’/‘liberal 
democratic’ self-image and the ‘security provider’ one became more relevant 
than traditional ties and affinity with the Balkans. Once the tensions within 
Romanian identity were settled, the appropriate international choice was to 
fully support Operation ‘Allied Force’. President Constantinescu 
communicated the state’s new position two days prior to the Secretary 
General’s announcement that NATO would begin air strikes against 
Yugoslavia: 
‘[l]et me be clear: NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia (...) We must halt the 
violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo 
(...) We must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in Europe at the 
end of the 20th century. We have a moral duty to do so’.572  
 
On 24 March 1999, in his statement concerning Operation ‘Allied 
Force’, Constantinescu advanced further clarifications - 
‘[a]s previously declared, our position is firm: we unconditionally support the efforts 
for the settlement of the crisis through political dialogue, as well as NATO’s efforts 
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  P a g e  | 176 
towards an immediate resolution of the conflict (...) I express as clearly as possible 
that Romania will not take part in fighting actions on the territory of the Yugoslav 
Republic. Romania did not offer combatant forces’.573    
At that time the ‘unconditional support’ for the allied intervention was purely 
rhetorical, since the state continued to refuse any military contribution. In 
late April 1999, the Romanian government received NATO’s second request to 
be granted unrestricted access to the state’s airspace, for the purpose of 
carrying out bombings on targets in Yugoslavia; on this occasion, 
Constantinescu asked the Parliament to approve it ad litteram.574 Compared 
to October 1998, accepting such a request implied Romania’s unequivocal 
aggression towards a long-time partner, which caused great controversy 
among political elites and public opinion. Even if the President was in favour 
of unrestricted airspace access, it was possible that the majority of 
Parliament could disagree with his request. Looking at the parliamentary 
discourses, a joint meeting of the two Chambers was quickly arranged on 22 
April 1999 and the heated government-opposition debate began. Ioan M. 
Paşcu, representing the main opposition party (PDSR), presented a cautious 
point of view: 
‘[b]eing against the use of force in any adverse matter, PDSR felt responsible to warn 
NATO that military means would negatively impact on the crisis and its effects (...) As 
a direct consequence of the Alliance’s military intervention, the [Kosovo] situation 
today is far worse and shows no sign of improvement (...) Basically, we are asked to 
adopt the obligations of a NATO member state, without benefiting from any rights and 
security guarantees’.575 
He concluded that the best solution would be to maintain the decision of 
October 1998, only allowing access in case of emergencies or humanitarian 
reasons. Teodor Meleşcanu, speaking for a large number of independents, 
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stressed that either approving or rejecting the allied request would have long-
term implications for Romania.576  
 
Though simply alluded to during the deliberations, the bilateral treaty 
signed with rump Yugoslavia (basically Serbia) in 1996 had a very clear 
article 7 – ‘[n]one of the contracting parties will permit its territory to be used 
by a third state to conduct an act of aggression towards the other (...) and will 
not give any help to such a third state’.577 This was another reason why 
Romania could have chosen not to side with NATO and re-state the response 
of October 1998. What an examination of the transcript highlighted were the 
competing ideas associated with the national interest. One member of the 
government coalition argued that the national interest demanded Romania to 
‘unconditionally support’ NATO’s stance on Kosovo, in order to be recognised 
as a reliable ally.578 The main opposition party reinforced the state’s Euro-
Atlantic commitments, yet at the same time reminded that it was in 
Romania’s national interest to consider all the consequences of its foreign 
policy. The smaller right-wing party (PRM) pointed out that Romania should 
be wary of supporting the Kosovo intervention, which could set a dangerous 
precedent for potential secessionist movements within Transilvania. 
Consequently, the ultimate national interest should be safeguarding the 
state’s territorial integrity.579 The different kinds of international interests 
reflect which self-image of Romanian identity different MPs focused on – 
‘security provider’ (whether in the external or domestic realm) or more 
reserved Balkan endorsement which did not see military force to be a long-
standing solution for Kosovo. The speeches that generated widespread 
agreement and eventually shifted the balance belonged to representatives of 
the government coalition. Both explained how Romania should respond to 
Kosovo in terms of national identity and democratic values. Călin Popescu 
Tăriceanu (PNL) said the following: 
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‘[t]oday Romania must adopt its responsibilities as a European and civilised country 
(...) We have the moral obligation to participate in the international community’s 
refusal to accept such totalitarian practices (…) Romania should not support NATO 
actions because of political opportunism, but to reaffirm our own democratic 
choices’.580  
Similarly, Petre Roman (USD) emphasised that the final vote would 
demonstrate the consistency of the national commitment to democracy and to 
being part of the ‘civilised and democratic world’.581 Even those who 
questioned the approval of NATO’s unrestricted access felt the need to 
reassert their attachment to liberal democratic ideas and values. To quote 
another member of Parliament: ‘the decision we make today is essentially our 
choice for a type of civilisation’.582  
 
So the parliamentary debates clustered around the same tensions 
within Romanian identity, although the two camps were more vocal now. 
Compared to the session in October 1998, the Friendship Treaty with rump 
Yugoslavia was alluded to yet no one actually framed it as a reasonable 
argument against support for NATO. This suggests that even members of the 
opposition had interpreted like President Constantinescu the hierarchy of 
self-images within national identity. The reason why the notion of liberal 
values and acting like a recognised democracy was so widely appealing refers 
back to the changing international context, which endorsed humanitarian 
relief at the cost of using force. In April 1999, Blair summarised this aspect in 
a memorable speech, where he qualified the military intervention in Kosovo as 
a ‘just war’ due to its humanitarian concerns - 
‘[n]o one in the West who has seen what is happening in Kosovo can doubt that 
NATO's military action is justified. Bismarck famously said the Balkans were not 
worth the bones of one Pomeranian Grenadier. Anyone who has seen the tear stained 
faces of the hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming across the border, heard 
their heart-rending tales of cruelty or contemplated the unknown fates of those left 
behind, knows that Bismarck was wrong (…) This is a just war, based not on any 
territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. 
We must not rest until it is reversed. We have learned twice before in this century that 
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appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have 
to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later’.583 
The Romanian Parliament’s final resolution contained three articles, each 
with a mixed proportion of votes. Article 1 granted NATO ‘unrestricted access 
to Romania’s airspace during the air operations’ in Yugoslavia; it had 214 
votes in favour, 37 against and 97 abstentions (PDSR delegates mostly).584 At 
article 2, Parliament asked the Romanian government to continue its efforts 
with regards to: a) ensuring ‘some security guarantees and the state’s 
territorial integrity erga omnes’ (towards all); b) providing ‘the technical 
infrastructure’ for NATO aircrafts; c) ‘obtaining assistance in eliminating the 
negative effects of the regional crisis’.585 It enjoyed a large majority of votes in 
favour, 20 against and 12 abstentions. Article 3 included the ongoing wish for 
‘a political solution to the conflict’ and re-affirming the willingness to 
contribute to such a goal; it only had 4 votes against and 5 abstentions.586 
These amendments were added to the presidential request which featured 
just the first article, indicating Parliament’s more active role in shaping this 
foreign policy resolution. After the difficult stage of the Kosovo war had ended, 
on 11 June 1999, President Constantinescu concluded that: 
‘Romania has to remain a pillar of stability and equilibrium in the region and must 
participate as such in the process of reconstruction (...) In this critical period, we 
successfully passed a test. A test of being firm and consistent about the alliances we 
choose and the principles we wish to defend. We proved that we were capable of both 
words and actions’.587 
Romania demonstrated that the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its national 
identity and international conduct surpassed any other traditional friendly 
ties, including those with the Balkans. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, the years 1996-1999 brought forward a few significant 
re-definitions of national identity and foreign policy. The discursive themes 
crystallised between 1990 and 1996 were consolidated by the new centre-
right political administration, although with some re-articulations. President 
Constantinescu and the CDR-led Government reconfirmed Romania’s Euro-
Atlantic orientation, while also configuring an ideational shift towards the role 
of democracy in the state’s past and future. The Romanian foreign policy 
discourses showed a preoccupation with the ‘essential good’ of liberal 
democracy. These understandings were closely related to Romania’s 
‘European’ self-image, which had shaped the state’s relations with Hungary 
and ‘Europe’ in 1990-1996. They were actually variations on the same 
European identity theme, whose broad meaning referred to being 
internationally recognised as a Western European liberal democracy that 
upheld two key principles – regular democratic elections and the protection of 
human rights and freedoms. Post-1996 elites mentioned the ‘liberal 
democratic’ self-image of Romanian identity more frequently than the 
‘European’ one, yet they were facets of the same articulation. Another re-
defined self-image was that of ‘security provider’, being more explicitly 
reiterated in the post-1996 foreign policy imaginary. This was often 
associated with the Balkans, the area where Romania could validate its 
representations of ‘security provider’ and ‘source of stability’. After choosing 
the European direction and discursively negotiating what that option entailed 
for its foreign policy between 1990 and 1996, the period 1996-1999 focussed 
on the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity. State officials had to 
decide what would be the right ‘European’ course of action, when confronted 
with a humanitarian crisis in the Balkan region. Romania’s loyalties were 
divided since it was an aspiring liberal democracy with a security provider 
role, which had a friendly rapport and affinity with the Balkans as well. The 
state’s reactions to Kosovo came soon after Romania was left out of the first 
NATO enlargement wave at Madrid in 1997. Romanian candidacy had 
obtained the firm support of France and Germany, but the US remained 
opposed to it. There had been slim chances for Romania to be included in the 
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1997 round of Alliance expansion, due to a combination of factors: the slow 
pace of national reforms, the failure to acknowledge the state’s complicity in 
the Holocaust and the fact that US domestic politics did not favour issuing 
more than three NATO invitations (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary). 
NATO rejection was nonetheless a quite bitter pill to swallow and could have 
rendered Romania even more reluctant to endorse the Alliance’s military 
intervention in Kosovo. 
 
The Kosovo case study is particularly relevant because it constitutes a 
key ‘formative moment’ of Romanian national identity and international 
responses. Romania exhibited an evolving foreign policy stance on Kosovo, 
which began with partial support for NATO (October 1998) and later changed 
to unconditional assistance for the Alliance’s military campaign in March-
April 1999. The initial position of October 1998 was a nuanced and relatively 
comfortable middle ground with a dual purpose. First, partial support - 
airspace access in emergencies – did not specifically oppose NATO or 
undermine Romania’s self-declared Euro-Atlantic national identity. Second, 
partial assistance for the Alliance operations accommodated the inherent 
dilemmas of Romanian identity – whether to act as a ‘European’ liberal 
democracy and ‘security provider’ or opt for the traditional Balkan ties. This 
foreign policy decision was re-defined under the impact of three elements: 
national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. 
Romanian elites anticipated that NATO air strikes on Yugoslav territory would 
lead to very high economic costs. Figures from the Danube Commission - an 
organisation monitoring the maintenance and improvement of navigation 
conditions along the Danube – estimated that ‘replacing all eight bombed 
bridges over the vital river’ would amount to ‘at least £80 million, up to ten 
times more than the cost of destroying them’.588 The oil embargo caused its 
share of ‘severe losses’ too, resulting in ‘increased prices for Romanian goods 
domestically and abroad’.589 Romanian political leaders were also aware of the 
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potential drastic decline in their popularity, as internal public opinion was 
overwhelmingly against intervening militarily in Kosovo. According to 
rationalism, these were necessary sacrifices for the ultimate objective of NATO 
membership. Rational interests were part of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic choice 
and contributed to its stance on Kosovo, yet they cannot explain why the 
state did not fully support Alliance actions from the beginning.  
 
Here national identity comes in to supplement the analysis and identify 
the tensions between the two self-images - ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and 
‘security provider’ – and Balkan affinity, which influenced Romanian foreign 
policy. Critical events like the Kosovo crisis enable the re-articulation of 
international discourses. In early 1999, the Euro-Atlantic ideational context 
was shifting towards endorsing an urgent humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo. The Serbian attack on the village of Račak in southern Kosovo 
seemed to be the turning point for NATO states and the international 
community as a whole. Allied members were prepared to use force without a 
UN mandate. Prominent Euro-Atlantic voices rhetorically promoted the 
negative consequences of appeasing dictators and a certain reading of Kosovo 
as a conflict between the progressive values of liberal democracy and the 
barbaric regime of Milošević. The normative pressure increased so much that 
established democracies or those seeking external recognition had to act 
without delay. This changed ideational context facilitated the emergence of a 
hierarchy within Romanian identity. The ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and 
‘security provider’ self-images became more meaningful than traditional 
relations and affinity with the Balkans. Once the dilemmas of national 
identity were settled in March-April 1999, Romania unconditionally 
supported NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo by granting unrestricted airspace 
access without combatant forces. The Romanian presidential and 
parliamentary discourses resonated with the notion of their state behaving 
like a veritable liberal democracy. President Constantinescu had been aware 
that expressing full backing for Operation ‘Allied Force’ in March 1999 would 
come at a high cost. Popular trust in him plummeted by about 20% and never 
recovered. In Constantinescu’s words, Romanians ‘could not forgive their 
president for using the adjectives “necessary and legitimate”’ to describe the 
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military intervention in Kosovo.590 After deciding to act like a credible 
‘European’ liberal democracy and security provider, Romania’s trajectory of 
national identity and foreign policy moves on to another key question – 
whether or not to be an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy and align with the US on 
the Iraq war. 
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Chapter V: To Be or Not to Be an ‘Atlantic’  
Liberal Democracy? (2000-2004) 
 
 
 
The initial post-communist decade of Romania’s national identity 
journey focused on having its ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image 
externally recognised, as well as on what this self-image meant in terms of 
appropriate foreign policy actions. The period 2000-2004 was no exception 
since Romania had to decide whether it should be a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ 
liberal democracy. This chapter aims to explore how a series of ‘formative 
moments’ for Romanian identity and foreign policy culminated in the 
fundamental re-definition of national identity during the 2003 Iraq war. 
Romania’s identity was re-articulated in the escalating Kosovo conflict of early 
1999, when international discourses intensely advocated the democratic duty 
of humanitarian intervention. This changing ideational context shaped 
Romania’s ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image, which was re-defined as 
a pro-active liberal democracy that tried to save the people suffering in 
totalitarian regimes. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was another critical event that 
facilitated important re-definitions of Romanian identity and foreign policy 
attitudes. French-German and American opinions on how to disarm Iraq 
persistently differed, which placed Central-Eastern European states in an 
uncomfortable situation because they did not want to choose between 
‘Europe’ and the US. Romanian identity underwent a crisis within its ‘liberal 
democratic’ self-image and the state had to opt whether to act as a ‘European’ 
or ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. The tensions in national identity were settled 
by invoking certain collective memory-myths and Romania chose to become 
an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. Romanian elites and public opinion felt an 
emotional solidarity with the US, even at the expense of France who had been 
Romania’s traditional ally. These sentiments were rooted in Cold War 
experiences and memory-myths that had impacted on national identity.  
 
With respect to structure, this chapter starts with a general overview of 
the Romanian foreign policy imaginary under a new political administration. 
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Then the discussion looks at the Bilateral Immunity Agreement which 
Romania signed with the US in August 2002. It constitutes a controversial 
episode that prefigured Romania’s reflexive Atlantic rather than European 
international orientation. A lot of attention has been given to Romania’s 
evolving position on the Iraq war, as it was a time of key re-articulations. At 
first, Romania attempted to maintain a neutral stance on Iraq, but in the end 
Romanian elites across the political spectrum configured a vocal Atlantic 
response and full military involvement in the US-led coalition against Iraq. 
 
 
The Romanian Context and Foreign Policy Imaginary 
 
By late 2000, under the mandate of President Emil Constantinescu, the 
heterogeneous governing coalition had proved its inconsistent nature and 
inability to handle serious national macroeconomic issues. The coalition was 
made up of political parties with different ideological affiliations: the 
Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR – centre-right), the Social 
Democratic Union (USD – centre-left) and the ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR 
– centre-right). CDR in turn included two prominent parties - the National 
Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNŢCD) and the National Liberal 
Party (PNL). All these parties could not decide on a coherent approach to 
Romania’s socio-economic reforms, which caused substantial losses of 
popular support and limited progress including in the areas of EU and NATO 
accession criteria.591 Constantinescu had been supported by CDR in the 
previous presidential elections. However, CDR’s unsuccessful management of 
the governmental coalition prompted Constantinescu not to run for a second 
term. Opinion polls also indicated that the Social Democratic Party of 
Romania (PDSR) and the Great Romania Party (PRM) clearly surpassed CDR 
in terms of popularity. CDR was disbanded and its two parties – PNŢCD and 
PNL – competed separately in the general elections. In November 2000, 
Romania’s parliamentary elections removed the mostly centre-right 
administration, replacing it with a centre-left government led by PDSR which 
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gained almost an absolute majority of seats (44.93%).592 PRM ranked second 
with 24.35% of seats, followed by the Democrat Party (PD) with 8.99%, PNL 
with 8.7%, UDMR with 7.83% and the other ethnic minorities were allocated 
5.22%.593 PNŢCD had been perceived by the Romanian population as the 
unofficial leader of CDR and the 1996 governing coalition. But in November 
2000 PNŢCD did not have enough votes to pass the electoral threshold; hence 
it had no members in the Romanian Parliament. This massive collapse for 
PNŢCD was a result of the public opinion’s dissatisfaction with the pace of 
domestic reforms, high corruption levels within the governmental coalition 
and the still unachieved goals of NATO and EU membership.594  
 
On 26 November, Ion Iliescu (the former President of Romania and 
PDSR leader) won the first round of presidential elections with 36.35% of 
votes.595 His next competitor had 28.34% and was Corneliu V. Tudor, PRM 
leader and controversial figure whose discourse had contained xenophobic 
and anti-Semitic elements. The 2000 elections suggested a polarisation of 
Romanian politics. The nationalist and populist PRM quadrupled its previous 
electoral results (from 5.59% to 24.35%), while the historic pre-communist 
PNŢCD was not admitted into Parliament. This increased popularity of PRM 
and Tudor was the product of unique circumstances, such as the 
accumulated disappointment of certain Romanians towards three consecutive 
political administrations (1990-1992; 1992-1996 and 1996-2000). It was a 
singular success for PRM and Tudor, as their popularity would significantly 
decrease after 2004. Even though Tudor ranked second in the initial round of 
presidential elections, his electoral performance would not be confirmed in 
December 2000. It was an important episode for Romanian democracy. 
Society as a whole needed to demonstrate its alignment with Western or 
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liberal democratic values. Neither of the two remaining presidential 
candidates was a good option. Tudor’s rhetoric of the early 1990s was prolific 
in xenophobic and anti-Semitic connotations. He was a central promoter of 
Marshal Ion Antonescu’s rehabilitation and refused to acknowledge 
Romania’s complicity in the Holocaust, even going so far as to deny the very 
existence of the Holocaust in Europe. As for Iliescu, he was not at all an 
inspiring candidate or former President. His political background had several 
problematic issues: Iliescu’s communist past, how he and the National 
Salvation Front negatively marked Romania’s transition to democratic rule, 
how they exhibited undemocratic attitudes towards opposition groups, 
Iliescu’s role in bringing the Jiu Valley miners to Bucharest and their 
subsequent violent actions (June 1990). These aspects and the Romanian 
turbulent post-revolutionary context were discussed in chapter I. Iliescu had 
a much more stable mandate and configured a clear Euro-Atlantic direction 
for the state in 1992-1996; but the events of 1990 and 1991, including his 
endorsement of the controversial Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, were 
not easy to forget. So the new President of Romania would either have 
questionable democratic credentials or lack them entirely. Who fitted better a 
state aspiring to be accepted as a Euro-Atlantic democracy? Romanians 
overwhelmingly chose the lesser of two evils, when two thirds of the electorate 
voted against Tudor becoming the next President in the second round of 
elections – Iliescu 66.83% and Tudor 33.17%.596 Liberal democratic values, or 
at least the hope for a Euro-Atlantic future, influenced the outcome of 
December 2000. 
 
Considering the rather poor records of Iliescu and PDSR on necessary 
domestic reforms in 1990-1996, some observers feared that Romania would 
not adequately meet its obligations for NATO and EU integration, which 
would make the state lag even further behind most of the other post-
communist candidates.597 PDSR appointed Adrian Năstase as the new Prime 
Minister and formed a legislative majority with the help of UDMR. President 
                                       
596 Ibid. 
597 Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, Romania and the European Union: From 
Marginalisation to Membership (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 48. 
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Iliescu’s electoral programme defined Euro-Atlantic accession as a ‘major 
priority’ and indicated that Romanian foreign policy would play ‘an essential 
role in promoting the new European destiny of our country, in affirming our 
identity in the context of accelerated European integration, in consolidating 
relations with neighbours, as well as other states’.598 On 31 March 2001, 
Prime Minister Năstase reinforced that Romania’s Euro-Atlantic orientation 
was ‘firm and irreversible’.599 At the end of May 2001, he also stated quite 
confidently that:  
‘[f]rom our point of view, Romania will fulfil all [Alliance] accession criteria in 2002. 
Romania’s importance in the region, the relations built with NATO countries over the 
years represent a guarantee that Romania will continue to be an island of stability in 
this agitated area of Europe’.600 
After the shocking terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Romania gradually 
shifted its arguments for NATO membership to stress the ability of 
contributing to the ‘War on Terror’, which also incorporated the state’s self–
images and related articulations of national identity (‘European’, ‘liberal 
democratic’ and ‘security provider’).  
 
During its first post-communist decade, the fluid nature of Romanian 
identity displayed a series of key re-definitions. The years 1990-1996 
configured a foreign policy imaginary that contained three main self-images: 
‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. As discussed in chapter II, 
these self-images can be seen as identities in their own right, yet they also 
subsume hierarchically to a larger identity. All three self-images feed into 
Romania’s overarching ‘Euro-Atlantic’ national identity. Romania’s ‘European’ 
identity basically meant becoming a consolidated liberal democracy and being 
recognised as such in the international realm, including in the context of 
NATO and EU requirements. That is why the ‘European’ and ‘liberal 
                                       
598 Ion Iliescu – President of Romania (December 2000 – December 2004), ‘Close to People, 
Together with Them’ – Electoral Campaign Programme (December 2000) in Renaşterea 
speranţei/ The Re-birth of Hope (Bucharest: Mondo Media, 2001), p. 17 and p. 24. 
599 Adrian Năstase – Prime Minister of Romania (December 2000 – December 2004), ‘Speech 
at the NATO Forum’ (Snagov, 31 March 2001) in The Archives of Romania’s Government; 
available at http://www.gov.ro/interventie__l1a5374.html (February 2013).  
600 Adrian Năstase, ‘Speech at the Meeting with Foreign Press Representatives’ (Bucharest, 29 
May 2001) in The Archives of Romania’s Government; available at 
http://www.gov.ro/discurs__l1a5755.html (February 2013). 
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democratic’ self-image referred to the same representation. If the period 1990-
1996 was about choosing the ‘European’ course and what ‘European’ identity 
entailed in terms of foreign policy, post-1996 the liberal democratic facet 
began to appear more frequently than the ‘European’ one in the domestic 
discourse. Romania’s evolving reactions to the Kosovo crisis encapsulated the 
inherent dilemmas of acting as a ‘European’ liberal democracy. The two self-
images (‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’) and Balkan 
affinity competed for precedence in the collective mindset of state officials. 
Critical events like the Kosovo conflict facilitated the re-articulation of 
international discourses. In early 1999, the international ideational context 
changed towards the endorsement of urgent humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo. Normative Euro-Atlantic expectations demanded that any self-
respecting liberal democracy would act to save Kosovo from a totalitarian 
regime. Such an ideational shift enabled a hierarchy inside Romanian 
national identity, where the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security 
provider’ self-images prevailed over Balkan ties. This point was very 
significant in the trajectory of Romanian identity and foreign policy, 
influencing the state’s stance on the Iraq war in particular and its external 
conduct in general after 2000. Here national identity underwent two 
fundamental re-definitions. First, as the international discourses advocated 
the notion of humanitarian and democratic intervention in 1999, Romania’s 
‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image moved towards representing the 
state as a pro-active liberal democracy that should help those suffering under 
dictatorships. Romania’s painful communist past made it understand too well 
the difficulties of people going through similar totalitarian plights. Until now, 
the ‘European’ and ‘liberal democratic’ facets constituted the same self-image. 
From this point, the Romanian ‘liberal democratic’ self-image was discursively 
separated from ‘European’ identity. Second, after the national identity 
tensions were settled regarding the Kosovo case, the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image 
gradually disappeared from the foreign policy imaginary; the ‘European’, 
‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images became the dominant 
ones. Consequently, two fundamental re-definitions of Romanian national 
identity occurred between 1990 and 2000: the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image faded 
away and Romania was articulated as a pro-active liberal democracy that 
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could have a primary ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ vocation. These elements will be 
particularly relevant when analysing Romania’s position on the Iraq war. 
 
The post-2000 internal discourse highlighted variations on the ‘security 
provider’ and liberal democratic themes, the kinds of meanings which would 
appeal to Euro-Atlantic audiences. This was visible in the Romanian 
Parliament’s decision adopted on 19 September 2001, with only one 
abstention - 
‘Romania, as strategic partner of the United States of America and member of the 
Partnership for Peace, will take part as a de facto NATO ally (…) in the fight against 
international terrorism through all means, including military’.601 
The resolution offered the use of ‘facilities on Romanian air, land and 
maritime territory’ to support ‘potential counter-terrorist operations’ at 
NATO’s request.602 In December 2001, the political administration published 
the new National Security Strategy, a document which reflected the state’s 
perspective on the changing international realm in the aftermath of 9/11. 
Although unconventional threats or risks featured quite prominently in 
almost all sections of the text, it was interesting to note that they were not 
discursively associated with the state’s interests. Romanian national interests 
were defined around building a democratic and stable country and were listed 
as follows:  
‘the maintenance of the integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of the 
Romanian state; the guarantee of fundamental democratic freedoms, and ensuring 
the welfare, security and safety of Romania’s citizens; the economic and social 
development of the country, in accordance with the world’s contemporary 
development (...); meeting the conditions for Romania’s integration as a NATO and EU 
member (...); asserting the national identity and pursuing it as a democratic value, 
making best use of and developing the national cultural heritage and the creative 
abilities of the Romanian people; protection of the environment, natural resources, the 
quality of the environmental factors at international standards’.603 
                                       
601 The Parliament of Romania, ‘Decision number 21 on 19 September 2001 concerning 
Romania’s Participation, together with NATO Member States, to Actions against International 
Terrorism’, Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania, number 589, 20 
September 2001.  
602 Ibid. 
603 The Parliament of Romania, ‘Romania’s National Security Strategy. Guaranteeing 
Democracy and Fundamental Liberties, Sustained and Lasting Economic and Social 
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While it has been argued that the document was primarily based on an 
underlying neo-realist logic604, both the national interests and security 
objectives were mostly inward-looking and focused on ‘the modernisation of 
Romanian society’.605 At different points in the text’s content, Romania was 
articulated as a state embracing liberal democratic values, ‘pillar of stability 
in the area’, ‘defender of democracy’, ‘important provider of regional and 
international security’.606 Despite adapting the 2001 National Security 
Strategy to the post-9/11 context, the Romanian narrative did not modify the 
two main self-images of national identity – ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘security 
provider’. What did change was the higher profile of Romanian participation 
in multinational peace-keeping and stabilisation efforts (Bosnia and Kosovo), 
as well as the later involvement in Afghanistan operations (October 2001). As 
part of the missions conducted within Enduring Freedom (joint American-
British-Afghan) and International Security Assistance Force (NATO), Romania 
aimed to prove that it possessed the military capability – personnel, transport 
and logistic support - to act as a NATO allied state.607 The Defence Minister, 
Ioan Paşcu, framed these foreign policy initiatives as a way of ‘substantiating 
the security provider role’ and counteracting some accusations that Romania 
was contributing too little in this sense.608 The last part of the Romanian road 
to NATO membership was paved with a rash decision in August 2002, which 
to some extent prefigured the state’s reflexive pro-American or Atlantic 
vocation of foreign policy on Iraq. 
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608 Ioan M. Paşcu – Minister of National Defence (December 2000 – December 2004), NATO 
Enlargement: The Case of Romania. Personal Report (2007), p. 117; available at 
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Romania and the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement 
 
Romania’s most controversial foreign policy action in 2002 was signing 
a Bilateral Immunity (or ‘Article 98’) Agreement with the US, which related to 
the recently founded International Criminal Court (ICC). In 1998 an 
international criminal justice system was established through the Rome 
conference and Statute. The ICC was the first permanent international legal 
body created to bring individuals to trial for accusations of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. American hostility towards the Rome 
Statute and ICC focused on the fear of Court politicisation; hence it noted 
that ‘in addition to exposing members of the Armed Forces of the United 
States to the risk of international criminal prosecution, the Rome Statute 
creates a risk that the President and other senior elected and appointed 
officials of the United States Government may be prosecuted by the 
International Criminal Court’.609 Despite American concerns about the ICC, 
President William Clinton suggested that the US intended to become a state 
party to the Rome Statute by signing it in 2000.610 Nevertheless, on 1 July 
2002, his successor - George W. Bush - notified the UN of his 
administration’s intention to basically ‘unsign’ the treaty. In doing so, the US 
announced the removal from any further obligations stipulated in the Rome 
Statute and that there was no intention of ratifying it. The invoked reason 
was that the ICC ‘undermined the role of the UN Security Council in 
maintaining international peace and security, it created a prosecutorial 
system that is an unchecked power, it purports to assert jurisdiction over 
nationals of states that have not ratified the treaty, and it is therefore built on 
a “flawed foundation”’.611 Consequently, the Americans launched a campaign 
to withdraw their citizens from ICC jurisdiction via bilateral treaties with 
other states, which were based on article 98.1 of the Rome Statute: 
                                       
609 United States Department of State, Title II: American Service-Members’ Protection Act 
(August 2002); http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/23425.htm (June 2014).  
610 William Clinton, Statement on the Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty 
(Camp David, 31 December 2000); http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1095580.stm (June 2014).  
611 ‘US Notification of Intent not to Become a Party to the Rome Statute’ in American Journal 
of International Law, volume 96(3), 2002, p. 724.  
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‘[t]he Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that 
third State for the waiver of the immunity’.612 
 
On 1 August 2002, Romania was the first to sign this type of treaty 
with the US and among the very few European states to do so. To mark the 
occasion, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Secretary of State said the following - 
‘[w]e express our hope that, after considering the conclusions of this Agreement, the 
opening of a new perspective will be encouraged regarding a larger cooperation with 
the International Criminal Court, which would contribute to its increased efficiency 
and prestige and consolidate its representative nature (...) Romania has adhered to its 
obligations towards the International Criminal Court and promoted a conduct in 
accordance with the European Union’s common foreign and security policy’.613 
The quote above seemed very odd as such a Bilateral Immunity Agreement 
(BIA) was interpreted as both obstructing the ICC and contradicting the EU 
stance. Firstly, the document was problematic because it prevented Romania 
from transferring or extraditing American ‘persons’ to the ICC without US 
consent; these ‘persons’ were defined as ‘current or former Government 
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or other 
nationals of the United States of America’.614 BIAs caused much controversy 
within the international community, since they were not only blocking the 
ICC jurisdiction over any American national, but also undermining the Court 
and architecture of ideals behind it. Secondly, the EU did not have a clear 
attitude towards BIAs in August 2002, but EU officials were generally 
disappointed by Romanian actions. As the European Commission’s 
spokesperson put it, ‘we regret this decision of Romania (...) and we deplore 
                                       
612 Article 98 – ‘Cooperation with Respect to Waiver of Immunity and Consent to Surrender’ in 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1 July 2002), p. 69; http://www.icc-
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613 Cristian Diaconescu – Secretary of State in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, ‘Speech after 
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(Bucharest, 1 August 2002) in The Archives of Romania’s Government; 
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that a candidate country has not waited until the European Union 
established its position’.615 In September 2002, Prime Minister Năstase tried 
to downplay the situation and somewhat excuse Romania’s overzealous 
foreign policy move: 
‘[i]n some respects, the ICC issue connected to our relationship with the European 
Union pertains to the past. It is clear that we need to have better consultations and a 
more efficient system of communication so as to avoid such tensions. Yet there is 
obviously the pending matter which will be discussed between the European Union 
and the United States, and in my opinion, the document signed by Romania will be 
incorporated within their agreed solution’.616 
 
Interestingly, Năstase still did not find the BIA implications 
controversial and did not seem to regret signing it. He only blamed the faulty 
Romanian communication with the EU and left things to be arranged in the 
American-EU diplomacy. The Prime Minister also mentioned that the bilateral 
treaty had not been ratified yet by the Romanian Parliament.617 To a certain 
degree, Romania signing the BIA and not sending it for legislative ratification 
brings to mind another controversial document - the 1991 Romanian-Soviet 
‘Friendship Treaty’, which had never been finalised either. On 30 September 
2002, the European Council reached its conclusions on the ICC and BIAs 
signed with the US: 
‘[t]he Rome Statute provides all necessary safeguards against the use of the Court for 
politically motivated purposes. It should be recalled that the jurisdiction of the Court 
is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions and is limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’.618 
The Council also gave guidelines to member and candidate states about only 
entering BIAs that relate to immunity for diplomats, military personnel and 
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extradited persons, excluding other categories of American nationals.619 In 
that respect, the Commission’s subsequent report specified as follows – 
‘Romania has ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. 
In August 2002 Romania signed a bilateral agreement with the USA on the non-
surrender of each others’ nationals to the International Criminal Court. Regrettably, 
this decision was taken without adequate prior consultation with the EU. It does not 
comply with the guiding principles laid down by the Council’.620 
In the end, the American BIA was not submitted to the Romanian 
Parliament’s agenda and thus not ratified, due to its incompatibility with the 
EU viewpoints. 
 
This episode of Romanian foreign policy shows that various elements 
were impacting on the state’s international responses. Rationalism would say 
that Romania was trying to please the US - the most powerful Alliance 
member, in order to obtain support for NATO accession. But, similarly to the 
1991 Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, Romanian elites did not make the BIA official 
and legally binding in Parliament because of the opposing ‘European’/EU 
position regarding the ICC. So the possible rational motive of currying favour 
with the US was not finalised. The American BIA indicated Romania’s 
uncomfortable position between ‘Europe’ and the US, which would be 
intensified in the case of Iraq. Here Romania backtracked on its pro-American 
attitude and eventually aligned with ‘Europe’ in October 2002. Even so, the 
BIA was a sign that Romania could prefer an ‘Atlantic’ rather than ‘European’ 
orientation on Iraq, depending on what ideational factors shaped its foreign 
policy. The American BIA also proved not to play a great role in issuing 
Romania’s invitation to become a NATO member. Unlike the Madrid summit 
in 1997, the US as a key decision-maker of NATO agreed with the other 
European allies that Romania should be admitted into the Alliance. 
 
Romania was invited to join NATO at the Prague summit on 21 
November 2002. President Iliescu described it as ‘a historical moment which 
                                       
619 Ibid, p. 10.  
620 The European Commission, Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession 
(Brussels, 9 October 2002), p. 120; available at 
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symbolises the total and radical separation from the [communist] past, as 
well as Romania’s permanent inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic area’.621 After the 
Alliance summit, President Bush visited Bucharest where he addressed a 
large and enthusiastic crowd on 23 November: 
‘[y]our effort has been recognized by an offer to NATO membership. We welcome 
Romania into NATO (...) The promises of our alliance are sacred and we will keep our 
pledges to all the nations that join us. Should any danger threaten Romania, should 
any nation threaten Romania, the United States of America and NATO will be by your 
side. As a NATO ally, you can have this confidence - no one will be able to take away 
the freedom of your country (...) For centuries Romania’s geography was a source of 
dangers. Now you can help our alliance to extend the hand of cooperation across the 
Black Sea’.622  
The American President’s speech suggested the representation of Romania as 
already being a NATO member or allied state. This articulation was also 
adopted by Iliescu, who remembered that day as a ‘celebration of Romania’s 
accession into NATO’.623 Bush’s words were interpreted by the Defence 
Minister to be an ‘unambiguous security guarantee’ which fulfilled ‘the dream 
of generation after generation of Romanians to live securely in peace and 
prosperity’.624 The idea was reinforced by Foreign Affairs Minister Mircea 
Geoană – ‘a security guarantee unique in the history of Romania’.625 
Throughout the rest of 2002, President Iliescu continued to depict his state as 
an Alliance member - ‘[o]ur accession into NATO is the most concrete 
evidence for the radical changes we started during the Revolution of 
December 1989’.626 He further stressed that: 
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‘[a]s a central-southern European country, as NATO member and future member of 
the European Union, Romania must undertake more commitments in its geographical 
area, to honour its role as stabilising factor and security provider’.627 
The natural enthusiasm of the occasion could have led national foreign policy 
decision-makers to temporarily forget a key aspect. Romania’s NATO 
membership was not completely guaranteed. The individual Alliance members 
were still supposed to ratify the Romanian accession protocol. Only then 
would the state finalise one of the major goals of its post-communist foreign 
policy. This point will be significant when examining the complex context 
surrounding Romania’s decision to take part and specific involvement in the 
coalition against Iraq. 
 
 
Romania and the Iraq War 
 
A crucial ‘formative moment’ that encapsulated the fundamental re-
definitions of Romanian identity and foreign policy was the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. There were two contrasting approaches to disarming Iraq – France and 
Germany preferred peaceful methods, whereas the US wanted to use armed 
force. Romania initially refused to choose between the two sides, yet in the 
end national elites across the political spectrum settled on a vocal Atlantic 
position and full military involvement in the coalition against Iraq. The 
international context was complicated and Romania could have had external 
costs either by aligning with ‘Europe’ (France and Germany) or with the US. 
Rationalism would affirm that Romania sided with the Americans to gain 
their help in finalising the NATO integration process. But France was very 
displeased with Romania’s pro-American attitude and indirectly threatened 
the state’s EU candidacy. Romanian accession into the EU was much more 
problematic than NATO membership, since the state had already been invited 
to join NATO in November 2002. France and Germany were key EU members 
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and would each have a decisive say on Romania eventually entering the EU. 
Military participation in the Iraq war was not an advantageous option for 
Romania in the wider rational equation. That is why national identity comes 
in to shed light on the Romanian international orientation. The state became 
fully involved in the coalition against Iraq because this decision was 
consistent with both the fundamentally re-defined national identity (‘pro-
active liberal democracy’) and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its foreign 
policy. After intervening in Kosovo for humanitarian and democratic reasons, 
Romania as a liberal democracy seeking external acceptance could not have 
double standards and decline to support the US in the Iraq war. 
 
a. The International Context and Romania’s Neutral Views on Iraq 
 
The year 2003 brought the culmination of growing tensions between 
prominent NATO members over the issue of whether to invade Iraq. The US 
argued for an Alliance mission in Iraq, while France and Germany were 
against it.628 On 29 January 2002, President Bush used his State of the 
Union address to announce a fundamental shift in American foreign policy: 
‘Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi 
regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a 
decade (...) States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world (...) I will not wait on events, while dangers 
gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of 
America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the 
world’s most destructive weapons’.629 
Apart from demonising the Iraqi dictatorship and constructing it as the most 
dangerous ‘other’, this speech prefigured the American willingness to take 
unilateral action against those it perceived as a threat. The Bush doctrine of 
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pre-emption was formalised in the new National Security Strategy, which 
mentioned the following in September 2002 – 
‘[w]hile the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the 
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise 
our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent 
them from doing harm against our people and our country’.630 
The American foreign policy stance indicated that Iraq would be the first 
theatre where such a pre-emptive strike would be operationalised. This led to 
persistent international disagreements – on the one hand, between the US 
and France and Germany and on the other hand, within Europe itself. 
 
On 22 January 2003, the French President Jacques Chirac and 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder issued a common anti-war declaration 
after the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, which celebrated their 
historical reconciliation:  
‘[o]bviously thinking about Iraq, Germany and France have an identical judgement 
about the crisis. Only the United Nations Security Council can make a legitimate 
decision (...) for us, war is always an acknowledgment of defeat and the worst 
solution, and therefore, everything must be done to prevent it’.631 
Compared to the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the French-German position 
regarded war or the use of military force as the worst and final option. While 
the US considered a UN mandate to be desirable but ultimately optional for 
Iraq, France and Germany insisted on obtaining the approval of the UN 
Security Council. The American reply came swiftly on the same day during 
the press conference held by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who 
introduced and defined the dichotomy of ‘old’ versus ‘new’ Europe -  
‘[n]ow, you’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old 
Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting 
to the east (…) And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those 
who have been invited in recently (…) Germany has been a problem, and France has 
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been a problem (…) But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. 
They're not with France and Germany (...) they're with the United States’.632 
Rumsfeld’s comments underlined the fact that the European allies of NATO 
were divided on how to deal with the Iraq situation. 
 
On 27 January 2003, the EU gave a neutral statement which 
essentially reinforced the UN prerogative of authorising military actions: 
‘[t]he Council underlines the fundamental importance of preventing the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the relevant international 
instruments. The Security Council has a key role to play in these endeavours (...) The 
responsibility of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security must be 
respected’.633 
However, only three days later, eight European NATO members (the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic) nuanced their stance and signed an open letter of support towards 
efforts of disarming Iraq - 
‘[t]he real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share: 
democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law (...) Today more 
than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee of our freedom. We in Europe have a 
relationship with the United States which has stood the test of time (...) The 
transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime’s 
persistent attempts to threaten world security. In today’s world, more than ever 
before, it is vital that we preserve that unity and cohesion (...) The Iraqi regime and its 
weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security (...) Resolution 
1441 is Saddam Hussein’s last chance to disarm using peaceful means. The 
opportunity to avoid greater confrontation rests with him’.634  
Resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council had been adopted on 8 November 
2002. This resolution stated that ‘Iraq has been and remains in material 
breach of its obligations’ and granted the state ‘a final opportunity to comply 
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with its disarmament obligations’.635 The letter of the eight European NATO 
allies came at a sensitive time in the French-German and American dispute 
on Iraq. It highlighted UN authority, while adding that ‘Resolution 1441 is 
Saddam Hussein’s last chance to disarm using peaceful means’. As the 
permanent members of the Security Council were divided over Iraq, 
Resolution 1441 did not explicitly mention that it was the final opportunity 
for Iraq to disarm peacefully. The letter of the eight was also an opportunity to 
make a stand for a certain kind of Europe. The signatory states used the text 
to express their own Atlantic vision of Europe vis-à-vis the one put forward by 
Paris and Berlin on 22 January 2003.636 The eight European members of 
NATO subtly conveyed that they would be willing to back the US, if Iraq did 
not quickly comply with Resolution 1441. 
 
Throughout January 2003, Romania maintained a neutral view on the 
possibility of an Iraq intervention, refusing to choose between the ‘European’ 
and ‘Atlantic’ dimensions of its national identity. Romanian foreign policy 
elites denied the notion of a Euro-Atlantic rift, which translated into the need 
to opt for either the Europeans or the Americans. Instead, Romania insisted 
on the common values which had bound the allied states together for such a 
long time. These shared ideas and principles made it impossible or, at least, 
very difficult for Romania to select one side over the other. President Iliescu 
summarised this dilemma of national identity –  
‘[h]ow could we make such distinctions between being European and non-European, 
pro-American and anti-American? (...) We have always underlined our preoccupation 
to act in the spirit of both European and Euro-Atlantic unity’.637 
When answering a question about Rumsfeld and the US reliance on ‘new’ 
Europe, Prime Minister Năstase declared the following in January 2003: 
‘[i]t is difficult for me to judge US relations with other countries in Europe (...) For us, 
for Romania, it is important to maintain complementary relationships with both NATO 
and the European Union. Naturally, it is important for us to have close ties with all 
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European states as well as the US. We are unable to separate the two and do not wish 
to do so’.638 
Năstase had conveyed a similar message to that of the pro-Atlantic letter of 
the eight, even before the document was made public. On 28 January 2003 in 
Paris, he cautioned against letting the ‘heated debates on the best course of 
action in Iraq’ lead to ‘a rift between EU and NATO allies’; otherwise, this 
would play into ‘Saddam Hussein’s real agenda – the division of the West’.639  
 
In a Washington speech on 4 February 2003, Foreign Affairs Minister 
Geoană emphasised that the Euro-Atlantic link needed to be stronger than 
the controversial topics that strained it: 
‘[t]he Trans-Atlantic relationship cannot be reduced to the differences that exist even 
within the happiest of families. Whether we are talking about Kyoto, or the 
International Criminal Court, international trade or policy toward Iraq, these 
differences are much more about approach and tactics than about substance and 
strategic vision (...) We all agree on the essentials. What we need to work harder is on 
managing, not magnifying, bridging, not broadening our differences. From Seattle to 
Brest to Constanţa on the Black Sea shore of Romania, we belong to the same 
community of shared values and ideas’.640 
Since the three significant actors (the US, France and Germany) had already 
made clear their contrasting opinions on an Iraq invasion, Romania’s 
reluctance to acknowledge the emerging state of affairs and insistence on the 
Euro-Atlantic bond or ‘united front’ could appear out of sync with reality. Yet 
this attitude in the face of Euro-Atlantic divergences should be seen as trying 
to avoid an identity crisis within Romania’s liberal democratic self-image. 
National leaders had to answer a key existential question: should Romania 
act as a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy? According to Stephen 
Larrabee, Central-Eastern European states did ‘not want to be forced to 
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choose between the United States and western Europe’; they were 
‘uncomfortable’ with the Bush administration’s attempt ‘to differentiate 
between “old” and “new” Europe’.641  
 
Throughout a range of interviews given to the French press in late 
January 2003, Prime Minister Năstase was required to elaborate almost 
exclusively upon Romania’s international responses to the opposing American 
and French-German stances on Iraq. From the beginning, he rejected 
Rumsfeld’s distinction by saying that Romania was ‘without a doubt part of 
“old” Europe’ due to its long history and Latin ancestry.642 Năstase voiced his 
disbelief in such a ‘Manichean device’ of ‘good versus bad’ because ultimately 
Europe and the US held the same values.643 The Foreign Affairs Minister 
echoed similar meanings in Washington:  
‘[s]peaking for Romanians, we have always considered ourselves part of the traditions, 
culture and history of “old Europe”. After overcoming half a century of forced exile 
under communism, we are now a proud part of “new Europe”. A strong Europe, a 
vibrant NATO, a credible West. This is our vision, this is our drive’.644 
When asked quite frankly if Romania was attempting ‘to seduce’ the US in 
order to ‘get closer’ to NATO membership, at the same time distancing itself 
from Europe, the Prime Minister framed his answer in the following terms - 
‘[i]t is a false perception (...) We are a country that owes a great deal to its French and 
European friends in general, but also to the Americans, particularly concerning the 
formation of the unified Romanian state after the First World War. So we are deeply 
indebted to our friends and, consequently, cannot encourage a rift between them’.645 
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It was a diplomatic reply that did not give any indication how Romania would 
react when forced to handle its identity dilemma, whether the state would 
eventually adopt a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ foreign policy.  
 
b. Romania as a Pro-active Liberal Democracy with an Atlantic Vocation 
 
On 5 February 2003, Romania shifted its balanced Euro-Atlantic 
position towards a clearer solidarity with the US view, by signing the 
statement of the Vilnius 10. The latter was a group formed of already invited 
NATO entrants and some aspirants. Their statement tried to use a neutral 
language, which stressed the importance of a collective approach to counter-
act threats against democratic principles: 
‘[o]ur countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special 
responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic 
community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by 
the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction’. 646 
Two elements in the text clearly suggested alignment with the American 
stance. First, the Vilnius 10 group agreed that the US ‘presented compelling 
evidence’ to the UN Security Council ‘detailing Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction programs, its active efforts to deceive UN inspectors, and its links 
to international terrorism’.647 Second, they drew the same main conclusion as 
the Americans and declared that ‘it has now become clear that Iraq is in 
material breach of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, including U.N. 
Resolution 1441’.648 The Vilnius 10 were therefore ‘prepared to contribute to 
an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of 
Iraq’.649 The statement ended on a more conciliatory tone and insisted on the 
necessity of a democratic united front under UN authority: 
‘[t]he clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime requires a united 
response from the community of democracies. We call upon the U.N. Security Council 
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to take the necessary and appropriate action in response to Iraq’s continuing threat to 
international peace and security’.650 
This strongly worded but somewhat moderate content of the Vilnius 10 letter 
still referred to a UN approved Iraqi operation. 
 
In the Romanian case, the Vilnius 10 document became irrelevant only 
a week later, when domestic elites ‘provided facilities for US troops in the Iraq 
crisis and committed forces to the post-conflict stabilization effort’.651 On 12 
February 2003, Romania adopted an unequivocal pro-American orientation 
when Parliament approved the state’s non-combatant contribution to a 
coalition against Iraq, if military actions were initiated. At US request, the 
Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) led by President Iliescu initially 
analysed the situation and then decided to actively take part in a possible 
Iraqi mission.652 Iliescu sent an official letter in which he asked Parliament to 
sanction Romania offering ‘4 major state officers in the coalition command 
central, an NBC [joint nuclear-biological-chemical] regiment for defence 
purposes formed of 70 soldiers, a military police platoon formed of 25 
soldiers, a medical unit of 30 agents and 149 bomb disposal experts’, along 
with ‘re-confirming access to airspace and necessary infrastructure’.653 The 
President hoped for a favourable vote from the legislative body because it 
would ‘constitute Romania’s commitment to promoting and defending 
democratic values’.654 Considering the state’s previously balanced or neutral 
position on Iraq which refused to choose between the US and ‘Europe’ (most 
powerful EU members – France and Germany), why did Romanian national 
identity and foreign policy suddenly change towards overt Atlanticism?  
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From a wider analytical perspective, the shift was not actually sudden 
as Romania signing the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement in 2002 
prefigured the state’s emerging Atlantic vocation. The most accessible 
explanation for Romanian behaviour is the usual rational calculation, whose 
aim was to irrevocably secure NATO membership. Realists have also invoked 
the ‘bandwagoning’ and ‘balancing’ phenomena which basically say that 
Central-Eastern Europe in general655 and Romania in particular656 sided with 
the most powerful entity (the US) to solve their various security dilemmas. 
However, there is much more to the story of Romanian foreign policy and it 
derives from the influence of national identity on how elites interpreted the 
Iraq episode. A re-definition of national identity started during the Kosovo 
conflict, when international discourses intensely promoted the notion of 
humanitarian intervention. This impacted on Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ 
self-image, which was gradually constituted as a more pro-active liberal 
democracy that should help to defend those suffering under totalitarian 
regimes. Similarly to Kosovo, the Iraq war was a ‘formative moment’ which 
favoured significant re-articulations of both identity and foreign policy. The 
fact that French-German and US views were persistently divided on Iraq 
forced Central-Eastern European states to make a firm choice. Against such a 
background, Romania’s national identity underwent a crisis within its liberal 
democratic self-image and had to decide whether to be ‘European’ or become 
an ‘Atlantic’ democracy. 
 
The CSAT meeting on 10 February 2003 established the main 
guidelines of Romanian involvement in the coalition against Iraq.657 The 
related motion was sent to Parliament, where the normal expectation was for 
it to be passed by the legislative majority. Unlike the Kosovo conflict, the topic 
                                       
655 Alexandru Grigorescu, ‘East and Central European Countries and the Iraq War: The 
Choice between “Soft Balancing” and “Soft Bandwagoning”’, Communist and Post-communist 
Studies, volume 41(3), 2008, pp. 281-299.  
656 Ruxandra Ivan, La politique étrangère roumaine (1990-2006)/ Romanian Foreign Policy 
(1990-2006) (Brussels: Editions L’Université de Bruxelles, 2009), p. 167. 
657 The Presidency of Romania, ‘Press Release for the Meeting of the Supreme Council of 
National Defence’ (Bucharest, 10 February 2003) in The Archives of Romania’s Presidency; 
http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=3559&_PRID=arh (June 
2014).  
  P a g e  | 207 
of Iraq was met with widespread agreement across the political spectrum. 
Only the Great Romania Party (PRM) voiced dissent towards the project. Its 
representative, Senator Ilie Ilaşcu, reminded his audience about Romania’s 
close ties to Western Europe and advanced the following argument: 
‘[t]he duplicitous attitude of Romanian authorities in the Iraqi crisis will have great 
negative impact on the population (...) the political sphere will be affected by Western 
European countries with whom we have close relations (...) I ask myself: why has the 
situation come to such a point that the government is ready to unforgivably defy the 
rules of global democracy, UN authorities, in exchange for an unclear military 
coalition with the United States of America, a country that has openly and firmly 
declared that it will attack Iraq with or without the consent of the UN Security 
Council?’658 
He concluded by saying that PRM would abstain from the vote and remain 
opposed to any military action against Iraq in general and Romanian 
participation in particular, unless legally approved by the UN Security 
Council.659 The above quote indirectly appeals to the state’s liberal democratic 
self-image which identified with ‘Western Europe’ and should have shaped a 
foreign policy aligned with that of close friends like France. Taking the 
argument further, a consolidated liberal democracy should not act outside 
the boundaries of international law (lack of UN mandate), or at least not 
engage in a unilateral American mission that has not been agreed upon 
within the authoritative Euro-Atlantic club (NATO). So how should a partially 
recognised liberal democracy such as Romania respond, when the previously 
united dimensions of its Euro-Atlantic national identity pull it in opposing 
directions? Should it act as a ‘European’ liberal democracy or become an 
‘Atlantic’-oriented one? 
 
Another representative from the parliamentary opposition, Deputy 
Gheorghe Negoiţă, spoke on behalf of the Democrat Party - PD and described 
Romania’s contribution to a coalition against Iraq as the ‘natural continuity of 
a coherent foreign policy conducted by our country since removing 
                                       
658 Ilie Ilaşcu – PRM Senator, ‘The Debate and Adoption of Parliament’s Decision regarding 
Romania’s Participation in the Coalition against Iraq’ in Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates 
– Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies (Bucharest, 12 February 2003); 
available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5382&idm=5&idl=1 (June 
2014).  
659 Ibid. 
  P a g e  | 208 
Ceauşescu’s dictatorship’.660 He stressed that such an endeavour was part of 
the state’s duty and responsibility as a NATO member: 
‘Romania must respect its international commitments to the defence of democracy 
and the fundamental values of humanity. We wanted our country to be part of NATO. 
We wanted this integration as the only alternative capable of confirming our 
democratic future. That is why Romania now needs to undertake both the benefits 
and the obligations of its status as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance (...) The 
Democrat Party has insisted and insists for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq. But 
when the political and diplomatic arguments have been exhausted, a dictatorial 
regime has to be disarmed through a military intervention (...) The Democrat Party 
has supported NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and other areas where 
democracy was endangered (...) Now in 2003 Saddam Hussein is just as democratic as 
Slobodan Milosevic was in 1999’.661 
In the Kosovo case, two self-images of Romanian identity (‘European’/‘liberal 
democratic’ and ‘security provider’) eventually prevailed over the state’s 
Balkan affinity. Iraq brought about national identity tensions concerning the 
kind of liberal democracy Romania aspired to be. Kosovo had already set a 
precedent for democratic intervention, which prompted the question – how 
should Romania distinguish between dictators and decide to stand or not 
against them? Is a ‘European’ liberal democracy only preoccupied with the 
near abroad (former Yugoslavia)? That is a very selective understanding on 
how an established liberal democracy would be expected to act. If the 
authoritative Euro-Atlantic community advocates respect for human rights, 
geographical proximity should not be a deciding factor in humanitarian and 
democratic intervention. 
 
The third opposition speaker, Deputy Ovidiu Drăgănescu, expressed a 
slight variation on the same themes of championing democracy and not 
appeasing totalitarianism - 
‘[t]he National Liberal Party agrees with Romania joining the countries who wish to 
support the United States in Iraq’s disarmament. Our party cannot ignore the solid 
arguments in favour of such an action – here I refer especially to the 18 UN 
resolutions which Iraq did not obey. Moreover, we take into account the strong 
support conveyed by the Romanian public opinion with regards to a potential military 
intervention in Iraq (...) Looking back with pride to the 1989 Revolution, we, 
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Romanians, paid the highest price to conquer our freedom and democracy, we paid 
with the blood of our young people killed in the streets of Timişoara, Bucureşti, Cluj 
(...) So today, after seeing what dictatorship and totalitarianism mean, we, 
Romanians, can only stand with those who love, cherish and defend freedom and 
democracy’.662 
The quote suggests more explicitly how Romanian national identity has 
drawn from the collective memory-myths of its totalitarian past, which 
partially accounts for why the state felt responsible to promote and protect 
democratic values. This argument will be analysed later in the chapter, as 
part of the wider ideational underpinnings of Romanian national identity and 
foreign policy. The different parliamentary opinions show that ‘democracy’ 
and ‘democratic values’ have become profoundly contested terms. The two 
concepts can be used either to support US actions despite the lack of a UN 
mandate, or to insist on not participating in military interventions without UN 
approval. 
 
Drăgănescu also inquired why the government had not properly 
explained Romania’s position to its EU partners, ‘particularly those who have 
reservations about the American policy’.663 In this respect, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Geoană gave reassurances that the Romanian diplomacy had 
consulted with French, German and EU officials. Geoană also remarked upon 
the state’s ‘balance in international action’, wishing to see ‘a European Union 
with a coherent voice, a North-Atlantic Alliance with the same cohesion and 
security guarantees which work for the newly joined like Romania, and 
equally a United Nations and Security Council that preserve their full 
relevance’.664 During the final parliamentary discussions, Defence Minister 
Paşcu gave an interesting reply to Teodor Meleşcanu’s (PNL member and 
former Foreign Affairs Minister) public recommendation to support the 
coalition against Iraq without sending troops. Paşcu had a more pragmatic 
vocal opinion on the possibility of a balanced foreign policy – ‘solidarity with 
the USA, while taking Europe into account; I agree, it’s perfect, just let us 
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know how to put it in practice this time’.665 He was the only one who explicitly 
acknowledged that the time for a middle ground had passed. Romania could 
no longer simultaneously appease both dimensions of its Euro-Atlantic 
national identity and opted for an Atlantic vocation. In the end, the decision 
to grant infrastructure and airspace access and prepare forces for potential 
post-conflict stabilisation was adopted with 351 votes in favour, 2 against and 
74 abstentions.666 
 
Therefore, the parliamentary debates on whether or not Romania had to 
be involved in the US military operations against Iraq encapsulated an 
evocative snapshot for the re-definition of Romanian national identity – 
preferably Euro-Atlantic yet, when forced to choose between the two 
dimensions, almost unhesitatingly Atlantic. The discourse indicated that both 
PD (opposition party) and Minister Geoană already considered their state to 
have achieved NATO accession – e.g. use of past tense in terms of seeking 
membership (‘wanted’), ‘its status as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance’, 
‘newly joined like Romania’. Government and opposition alike framed the 
contribution in Iraq as the responsibility of a state that had painfully 
experienced life under dictatorship and ‘paid the highest price for freedom’. 
As the Foreign Affairs Minister said elsewhere, 
‘[w]e in Romania have first-hand experience of living under dictatorship, without 
freedom, without choice, waiting for the opportunity to rejoin the West. We know that 
life lived in these circumstances is not life. It is merely survival (...) The Iraqi people, 
like the Germans under Hitler, the Baltics under Stalin and the Romanians under 
Ceauşescu deserve the opportunity for freedom’.667 
The Defence Minister highlighted that, ‘having lived a similar experience, 
Romania was able and wanted to directly support the domestic stabilisation 
effort and institutional consolidation of post-Saddam Iraq’.668 On 20 March 
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2003, President Iliescu issued the following statement covering Romanian 
participation in the Iraq war: 
‘Romania hopes that the military intervention will not take long and civilian casualties 
will be as low as possible. The Iraqi people have suffered enough and have the right to 
live in a peaceful democracy from now on. Romania is acting in a responsible manner, 
respecting its commitments and obligations in the international scene. Its position 
benefits from a large popular support, since Romanian citizens have lived the horrors 
of a totalitarian regime and are aware of the price for freedom. Depending on the 
available means, our country will contribute to the post-conflict operations, to help 
the civilian population and the political, economic and social reconstruction of 
Iraq’.669 
 
During the parliamentary debate, PD mentioned the ‘Western European 
partners’ but just in terms of informing them about Romania’s Atlantic 
orientation, not questioning if perhaps the state should further deliberate its 
stance. Ironically, the only contestation about legality and acting against the 
French-German side came from PRM – a nationalistic party with extremist 
tendencies and regarded as undemocratic.670 Although the Foreign Affairs 
Minister continued to rhetorically emphasise the balanced nature of 
Romanian foreign policy, officially approving in Parliament the use of airspace 
and other required infrastructure by the anti-Iraq coalition was undoubtedly 
a pro-Atlantic move. This was very problematic as it placed Romania in 
opposition to the French, who had been a historical long-standing ally and 
friend. After all, France through its President Chirac had been Romania’s 
most firm advocate for NATO accession at the 1997 summit in Madrid, while 
the US had refused to include it in that enlargement wave.671 So it is 
important to note that foreign policy is not determined by either material 
interests or memory; rather different collective memory-myths or 
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interpretations of history can be selected by elites from the foreign policy 
imaginary to support various views. 
 
The diplomatic tensions with France arose very soon after the 
Romanian Parliament adopted the motion to support a potential coalition 
against Iraq, under the American flag. On 17 February 2003, the European 
Council held a special meeting that aimed to produce a common EU view on 
Iraq. Yet the result did not contain a substantially different message from 
previous ones - 
‘[w]e are committed to the United Nations remaining at the centre of the international 
order. We recognise that the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament 
lies with the Security Council (...) The Union’s objective for Iraq remains full and 
effective disarmament in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions (...) We want 
to achieve this peacefully.  It is clear that this is what the people of Europe want. War 
is not inevitable. Force should be used only as a last resort.  It is for the Iraqi regime 
to end this crisis by complying with the demands of the Security Council’.672 
This statement did not address the underlying disagreement among the 
European and EU allied partners of NATO. France and Germany continued to 
oppose a military operation in Iraq, while eight other members (the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic) were willing to help an American initiative to disarm Iraq, possibly 
without UN approval. The more interesting development happened after the 
European Council’s meeting, when President Chirac held a press conference 
where he admonished, criticised and arguably threatened the EU applicants 
who supported the US: 
‘[c]oncerning the candidate states (...) to be honest, I believe they have acted a bit 
superficially. Because accession to the European Union essentially involves a 
minimum of consideration for the other [members], a minimum of policy consultation. 
If, upon the first difficult subject, one gives a point of view independently from any 
discussion with the group which one actually wants to join, then that is not 
responsible behaviour (...) Therefore, I think they missed a good opportunity to keep 
silent. Beyond the somewhat amusing or childish aspects of the matter, it is a 
dangerous course of action (...) All it takes is one country not to ratify by referendum 
for [EU] enlargement not to move forward. So, frankly, I would say that these 
                                       
672 Council of the European Union, Conclusions (Brussels, 17 February 2003), p. 1; 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/74554.pdf (June 
2014).   
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countries have been both not very well brought up and rather careless about the 
dangers that too quick an alignment with the American position could have for 
them’.673  
He also purposefully singled out Romania from a reporter’s general question, 
underlining that Romania and Bulgaria ‘were particularly superficial’ 
considering ‘their already delicate position with regards to Europe’; if the two 
states ‘wanted to diminish their chances for European membership, they 
could not find a better way to do so’.674 The French President gave the 
impression of speaking for the Union as a whole, when in fact that was not 
the case. The EU officials had mixed reactions to Chirac’s remarks. Romano 
Prodi (President of the European Commission) was disappointed by the 
candidates’ conduct, since they failed to understand that the EU was not just 
about an economic union but also about shared political values and 
consensus.675 Chris Patten, the Commissioner for External Relations, insisted 
the EU was not the Warsaw Pact and added that – ‘[a]ll of us have our 
different ways of expressing ourselves, but the European Union is a club for 
equals, and everybody has got to be listened to’.676 Pat Cox (President of the 
European Parliament) ‘blamed France for creating divisions in Europe by 
issuing unilateral foreign policy declarations’.677 
 
Moreover, Romanian foreign policy decision-makers (who were present 
in Brussels) had to immediately formulate a response. Prime Minister Năstase 
opted for a more diplomatic approach, stressing the state’s uncomfortable 
international stance:  
‘[i]t is very odd for us (...) to feel that were pushed to choose between Europe and the 
United States, instead of having to choose between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the 
Euro-Atlantic countries (...) In my opinion, some issues need to be settled within an 
EU-US dialogue (...) However, it is difficult for us to accept being placed in an area of 
                                       
673 Jacques Chirac, Press Conference after the Extraordinary Informal Meeting of the European 
Council (Brussels, 17 February 2003); French version at http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/cahier/europe/conf-chirac (June 2014). 
674 Ibid. 
675 Romano Prodi cited in ‘Chirac Lashes out at “New Europe”’, CNN World (18 February 
2003); http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/ (June 2014).  
676 Chris Patten cited in ‘Candidates Sign up to EU Position on Iraq, Hit Back at Chirac’, 
EurActiv (19 February 2003); http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/candidates-sign-eu-
position-iraq-hit-back-chirac/article-114605 (June 2014). 
677 Pat Cox in ibid. 
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supplementary conditionality and (...) to understand why [EU] candidates like 
Romania have more obligations than member states and fewer rights. It would be a 
paradoxical situation’.678 
President Iliescu went for a more direct phrasing and declared that the 
French President should regret his choice of words, concluding with – 
‘I find inappropriate such a way of framing things, as if some are more equal than 
others, some have fewer rights than others and, therefore, should be more prudent 
about what they think and say. I believe we are entering a democratic community in 
which mutual respect must govern everyone’.679 
When tempers calmed down, Năstase introduced a firmer note to his 
discourse, which suggested some resentment towards a paternalistic France: 
‘France was disappointed by certain developments of the Iraqi crisis. I do not wish to 
comment on the language used, we must understand the French position because of 
our past (...) Yet I continue to believe that Romania, just like any other European 
country, has the right to decide its foreign policy actions and we do not appreciate 
someone else telling us what to do’.680 
Among the Romanian public opinion, France’s negative attitude caused 
concern that it would render the state’s course for EU integration much more 
difficult or even impossible to achieve. Gϋnter Verheugen (the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement) offered reassurances that EU gates were still 
open for Romania and it would not be subject to supplementary criteria 
compared to other applicants: 
‘[t]he political trajectory defined at Copenhagen, aiming towards Romania’s integration 
in 2007 is the principle underlying our [the Commission’s] activity. I would like to 
point out that this process of EU enlargement will not end until Romania has become 
a member and we will apply the same set of EU accession conditions to Romania as 
with all the other candidate states. That is why achieving the membership objective in 
2007 depends on Romania’s ability to fulfil the accession criteria’.681 
 
                                       
678 Adrian Năstase, ‘Press Statement after the Informal Meeting of the European Council with 
EU Candidate States’ (Brussels, 17 February 2003) in The Archives of Romania’s Government; 
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679 Ion Iliescu, ‘Interview for BBC’ (Brussels, 18 February 2003) in The Archives of Romania’s 
Presidency;http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=3593&_PRID
=arh (June 2014).  
680 Adrian Năstase, ‘Joint Press Statements with EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter 
Verheugen’ (Bucharest, 20 February 2003) in The Archives of Romania’s Government; 
http://www.gov.ro/declaratii-de-presa__l1a16867.html (February 2013).  
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The crucial question of this story is why Romania had a pro-active 
foreign policy on Iraq when it could have got away with a limited or neutral 
viewpoint on the invasion. Much of the literature on Central-Eastern 
European participation in the Iraq war gravitates around the neo-realist 
assumptions about ‘small state’ conduct. Though most works concede that 
these states had many reasons to side with the US, they tend to underline 
causal factors like power and material interests. Yet the logic of rationalism 
does not fully explain why Romania became wholeheartedly involved in the 
‘coalition of the willing’. In this respect, the notion of rational decision-making 
must be examined further. Romania’s situation in the process of NATO 
integration was complicated. In November 2002, it had received the invitation 
to join the Alliance and was scheduled to be granted official membership in 
2004. The still pending issue was the fact that NATO allies had to individually 
ratify the accession protocol. Neither the US nor France had ratified it by the 
time of the Iraqi intervention. The US approved the accession protocol on 8 
May 2003, while France was the last member to ratify it at the end of January 
2004.682 So the rational interest of pleasing the Americans to finalise NATO 
integration can account for why Romanian leaders backed the Bush 
administration, although the context is not clear-cut. France is not the most 
powerful Alliance member, but it has a veto at its disposal and is certainly a 
highly influential member in the EU, where Romania’s accession was much 
more problematic. In the European arena, the more or less threatening 
remarks from Paris, Brussels and Berlin conveyed the worrying message that 
the upcoming EU integration could be jeopardised. EU Enlargement 
Commissioner Verheugen was convinced that Central-Eastern Europe would 
learn their lessons from Iraq because they ‘know only too well where their 
markets are and where their money’s coming from’.683 According to a purely 
rational calculation, a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq could potentially bring 
political and economic losses that would outweigh the ultimate benefit. 
Pragmatically speaking, Romania was already with one foot inside NATO and 
                                       
682 The Government of Slovenia, NATO Ratifications; available at 
http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/ratification/ratifications/ (June 2014).  
683 Gϋnter Verheugen cited in ‘New Europe Gets a Shock Lesson in Realpolitik’, The Guardian 
(28 April 2003); http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/28/eu.politics (June 2014). 
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a limited form of support (airspace access without military troops) would have 
probably appeased the Americans, without antagonising the French and 
Germans. This foreign policy scenario would have brought Romania a 
maximum gain with the least amount of costs.  
 
Whichever way one looks at the rational equation, the narrative of 
Romania’s position on Iraq would be incomplete without the influence of 
national identity. The divergent European (French-German) and Atlantic 
conceptions on how to approach the disarming of Iraq facilitated an identity 
crisis within Romania’s liberal democratic self-image. The tensions in national 
identity were settled by drawing from collective memory-myths and Romania 
opted to act like an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. Specific collective memory-
myths or interpretations of history were particularly relevant at this point, 
since a certain set of conditions had been met. Thus, after the Kosovo 
conflict, Romanian national identity went through two fundamental re-
definitions. First, the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image faded away from the foreign 
policy imaginary. The second fundamental re-definition of national identity 
was essential to the emergence of Romanian solidarity with the US on Iraq. As 
the international ideational context of 1999 advocated the notion of 
humanitarian and democratic intervention, the ‘European’/‘liberal 
democratic’ self-image was re-articulated to depict Romania as a pro-active 
liberal democracy that assisted the victims of totalitarian regimes. Memories 
of their painful communist dictatorship rendered Romanians keenly aware of 
how invaluable democracy was. From 1990 to mid-1999, the ‘European’ and 
‘liberal democratic’ self-images referred to the same representation. The 
Kosovo ‘formative moment’ enabled Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image 
to be differentiated from ‘European’ identity. Romania was re-defined as a 
pro-active liberal democracy that could have a primary ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ 
vocation. This shift helped to clarify Romania’s choice between the ‘European’ 
and ‘Atlantic’ dimensions of its national identity. A pro-active liberal 
democracy that wants to gain external validation for its self-image cannot be 
selective about where to promote democratic values. How should Romania 
distinguish between totalitarian regimes and decide to stand or not against 
them? The state decided to participate in the coalition against Iraq because 
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this foreign policy option was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined 
national identity of 1999 – a pro-active liberal democracy. At the same time, 
Romanian identity resonated with the American interventionist vision of 
liberal democracy. As all these factors combined, certain Cold War collective 
memory-myths became meaningful since they reinforced both Romania’s re-
articulation as a pro-active liberal democracy and the emerging Atlantic 
vocation of its foreign policy. 
 
Romanian foreign policy decision-makers felt an emotional solidarity 
with the American initiative, because the US had been discursively 
constructed as ‘the liberator’, ‘the rescuer’, ‘the guarantor of freedom and 
democracy’ since the end of World War II and especially during the 
communist dictatorship. This theme was reflected in the elite discourse before 
and after the Iraq invasion. On 8 January 2003, when asked if the state 
would be part of a potential American intervention in Iraq, the Prime Minister 
avoided a yes or no answer but did provide an idea of how priorities ranked in 
his thinking: ‘Romania must do its duty as ally of the United States of 
America, as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance’.684 In the event of a 
unilateral US action against Iraq, President Iliescu declared in early February 
2003 – ‘[w]e have a special relationship and strategic partnership with the 
USA. So, from this point of view, we have the moral obligation to stand by 
them until the end’.685 Talking in 2004 about Romania and the Iraqi crisis, 
the Defence Minister advanced the following arguments: 
‘[s]ome have openly questioned the reasons for our support of the United States. The 
answer is simple. If, today, we are free and democratic once again, it is due to the 
huge effort undertaken by the West under American leadership, which defeated 
dictatorship in this part of the world and eliminated the rigid division between the 
spheres of influence of the Cold War’.686 
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This quote explained that Romanians felt an emotional solidarity with the US, 
even at the expense of Europe and France.  
 
Romania and Central-Eastern Europe’s Atlantic predispositions are 
culturally and historically motivated. Ronald Asmus and Alexandr Vondra 
think that such reactions ‘spring from a very specific set of historical 
experiences these countries have had with the United States over the past 
century, the Central and East European encounter with both Nazi and 
communist totalitarian regimes, a recognition of the leading role the US 
played in toppling communism and in facilitating the integration of these 
countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions’.687 They also argue that the US is 
the only great Western power that ‘has never constituted a threat’ in the 
region, a largely positive record that contrasts sharply to the ‘disappointing 
historical experiences with other leading Western powers’ like France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom.688 In Marcin Zaborowski’s opinion, the 
origins of this ‘reflexive Atlanticism’ date back to the traumatic ‘legacy of the 
Second World War and the post-war division of Europe’; at the time Central 
and Eastern European countries were abandoned by France and the United 
Kingdom to their fate of Nazi and later Soviet invasions, engendering an acute 
sense of betrayal.689 The historical collective memory-myths of these states 
shaped their perspective on European appeasement and pacifism, the policies 
for which they had been sacrificed by Western brothers in the past.690 
Interestingly, although the US had an equal role in leaving Central-Eastern 
Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence, it continued to be regarded as a 
mostly ‘benign albeit at times inconsistent and somewhat naive’ power.691 
Consenting to the post-1945 separation of Europe could not outweigh the fact 
                                       
687 Ronald D. Asmus and Alexandr Vondra, ‘The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and 
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that American idealism made possible the independence and even existence 
of many Central-Eastern states.692 For example, the vision promoted by 
President Woodrow Wilson after the end of World War I contributed to the 
Great Unification of Romania (1918), when the majority of elites in 
Transilvania, Basarabia and Bucovina individually declared their 
independence from various ruling empires and chose to join the Romanian 
Kingdom. 
  
Furthermore, in communist dictatorships, the domestic populations 
saw the US as an idealised alternative to the autocratic USSR and as the only 
possible source of help for their plight.693 As Andrei Markovits notes, Central-
Eastern Europeans’ ‘overwhelmingly positive views of America stem largely 
from their having perceived the United States as their sole ally against the 
much-despised Soviet Union’.694 Jacques Rupnik agrees that American moral 
support offered to communist states during the Cold War has impacted on 
their present solidarity with US causes. Western European states like France 
may interpret the American hyper-power as a potential threat or imbalance in 
global security. Yet Central-Eastern Europe predominantly embraces US 
unilateralism as a necessary factor for maintaining international security and 
not allowing Russia (in its various incarnations) to become as powerful as it 
used to be pre-1990: 
‘[t]he two Europes are out of sync in their attitudes toward the implications of the end 
of the Cold War. In West European eyes, the Eastern Americanophilia is, at best, an 
anachronism. In East-Central Europe, Franco-German challenge to American 
leadership is seen as a reckless undermining of their security. They closely associate 
their security with NATO and the U.S. presence on the continent. The French may be 
concerned about a unipolar world; the East Europeans have no nostalgia for a bipolar 
one’.695 
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Stephen Brooks reinforces that post-communist Europe’s Atlanticism is 
rooted in Cold War perceptions; at the same time, he adds that pro-American 
feelings in Central-Eastern Europe are ‘fueled by skepticism and mistrust of 
the European Union, which most of [these] countries have joined in recent 
years, or at least by a certain idea of the EU that critics associate with 
domination by France and Germany’.696 
 
In the Romanian collective imaginary, the US was articulated during 
the Cold War as ‘the liberator’, ‘the rescuer’, ‘the guarantor of freedom and 
democracy’. This process and symbolic presence was perhaps best 
encapsulated by a famous Romanian phrase – ‘the Americans are coming!’ – 
very influential in the 1940s-1950s and repeated until the present.697 The 
historian Florin Constantinescu defined it as: 
‘[a] strange phenomenon of collective psychology (...) the strong and enduring belief 
that the West and above all the USA would pull Romania from beneath the Soviet 
boot. “The Americans are coming!” was an expression that summarised a political 
attitude but also a state of mind. These resisted all proof of disinterest in Western 
capitals towards the countries left behind the “Iron Curtain”’.698 
Mircea Cărtărescu depicts the Romanians’ fervent waiting for their rescuer, in 
the face of communist brutality and violence – 
‘[m]y grand-father used to tell me how in that atrocious period, when forced 
collectivisation was introduced, when all the peasants’ horses were taken away and 
shot by the communist activists, each peasant used to look at the sky at least once a 
day. They were not looking for signs of rain or good weather, but rather madly and 
desperately hoping for a historical miracle: the appearance of American airplanes 
which would deliver us from the Russians and finally bring us freedom’.699 
Even if the US had also agreed to the ‘Yalta order and betrayal’, or at least 
tacitly approved it, their symbolic presence in Romania and Central-Eastern 
Europe during the Cold War kept the hope for democratic freedom alive. Such 
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an imaginary was primarily configured through a network of radio stations 
(Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America), which broadcast in the 
different native languages of Europeans under communist regimes. They 
promoted the US agenda, widely spreading the conviction that Central-
Eastern European countries had not been completely abandoned by the 
Americans.700  
 
In February 2003, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement translated 
this feeling into contemporary terms: 
‘[t]he new candidate states have an emotional connection to the USA (...) Because if 
you ask a middle-aged Romanian citizen who contributed to the USSR’s dissolution, 
he will not answer the EU but rather Reagan (...) basically the Americans. 
Consequently, we see a feeling of gratitude and solidarity for the role which the 
Americans played in the past. We should not criticise it, on the contrary, we should 
understand it since [that feeling] could be a basis for the new Euro-Atlantic 
relations’.701 
After the initial operations in Iraq had been declared accomplished, the Prime 
Minister was asked why Romania had so decisively supported the US, taking 
into account that no weapons of mass destruction had been found there. 
Năstase replied to German-speaking audiences that the endeavour was meant 
to ‘affirm a set of values’ which ‘represented the expression of past 
frustrations’ lived under Ceauşescu’s communism.702 During a BBC interview 
in July 2003, he reinforced the same idea - 
‘Saddam Hussein’s regime was, for Romanians, the most important factor when they 
formed a moral judgement about supporting an intervention there (...) Romanians, 
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due to their own painful experience, the difficult road towards democracy, understood 
better than others that we should help improve the Iraqi people’s situation’.703 
Ultimately, Romania’s full support and contribution to the ‘coalition of the 
willing’ was a way of seeking acceptance for the state’s ‘liberal democratic’ 
self-image.  
 
For the rest of 2003 and most of 2004, government officials from the 
foreign affairs and defence departments worked on contouring the ‘strategic 
profile of Romania inside the Alliance’.704 On 9 December 2003, in a lengthy 
speech on this very topic, the Prime Minister defined the state’s foreign policy 
trajectory in the context of NATO membership. He discussed five 
interconnected themes: ‘1) promoting security and stability in the Western 
Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region, Caucasus and Central Asia; 
2) contributing to NATO’s new role and missions; 3) strengthening the 
transatlantic link; 4) building a stronger Europe; 5) consolidating the United 
Nations’ role in maintaining international security’.705 Moreover, on 26 
February 2004, Năstase said the following in the Romanian Parliament - 
‘[t]o fulfil its obligations as an Alliance member state and contribute to [NATO’s] 
transformation in the new security environment, Romania will continue to consolidate 
its strategic profile (...) by broadening our relations with neighbours, Western Balkan 
states, the EU’s Eastern vicinity and the Extended Middle East. We will remain active 
in the fight against terrorism, including thorough a substantial contribution to the 
stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan’.706 
By February 2004, all the NATO allies had ratified the accession protocol and 
in a month’s time the state would officially gain NATO membership. The 
Prime Minister still offering ‘a substantial contribution’ to Iraq and 
Afghanistan suggests that there was indeed more than mere rational interest 
at stake in Romanian reactions throughout 2003. Under Năstase’s 
governmental coordination, Romania significantly increased and diversified 
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its involvement abroad. The state also apparently wanted to continue being 
active both in NATO and other international missions. As another Romanian 
official noted in January 2004, 
‘Romania is prepared to contribute to Allied land, air and maritime forces. Some of 
these capabilities have already been used in multinational operations, together with 
troops belonging to NATO nations. We provide 116 troops for KFOR, 119 troops for 
SFOR, one infantry battalion as a SFOR/KFOR reserve, 49 military personnel and one 
transport aircraft C-130 B for ISAF, one infantry battalion (405 military personnel) for 
the operation Enduring Freedom, 804 military personnel to the Operational 
International Force in Iraq (one infantry battalion one engineer detachment one 
military police company one NBC company one special detachment). We will also 
continue to provide military observers and monitors for UN or OSCE missions’.707 
 
On 29 March 2004, Romania and six other states formally became 
members of NATO. The Foreign Affairs Minister’s speech on 2 April marked 
the occasion while expressing a statement of intent: 
‘[a]s a NATO member, Romania has both the moral obligation and a strategic interest 
in the continuation of Europe’s reunification process - in the Western Balkans and 
across the Black Sea, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as to the East, to the 
Republic of Moldova, to Ukraine and indeed Belarus (...) Romania is a European 
country with a Trans-Atlantic vocation. We believe in a solid and effective NATO, a 
strong EU with enhanced and complementary military and security roles, and in a 
dynamic and robust Trans-Atlantic partnership. We believe these goals are 
complementary not contradictory, and we pledge our support to all three. We look 
forward to our journey with NATO, to promote and protect our shared values of 
security, freedom and democracy to the frontiers of Europe -- and beyond’.708 
The message conveyed was that Romania aimed for an active regional role, 
which included democratising the Black Sea area. Geoană also introduced a 
re-defined articulation of national identity (‘European country with a Trans-
Atlantic vocation’). For the first time the two dimensions of Romania’s Euro-
Atlantic identity were rhetorically separated. On 13 May 2004, the Secretary 
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General of NATO validated these emerging understandings related to 
Romanian national identity and foreign policy: 
‘Romania has an important role to play. Before you entered NATO you were among 
our most active Partners. Now that you are in NATO, countries all around you 
continue to long for a greater sense of security – a closer connection to the Europe in 
which you are now making your way. Whether it is Moldova or Ukraine, the countries 
of the Western Balkans or those of the South Caucasus – Romania can be an example 
to them, an invaluable source of inspiration and practical assistance’.709 
The state’s NATO accession in 2004 accomplished one of the two major 
objectives of Romanian post-communist foreign policy. This event prefigured 
the beginning of another formative period of national identity and foreign 
policy, as Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity was internationally recognised by 
one of the authoritative selves – NATO. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, the years 2000-2004 represented the culmination of a 
series of ‘formative moments’ for Romanian identity and foreign policy. The 
first post-communist decade brought a rich palette of re-articulated 
meanings. The overarching ‘Euro-Atlantic’ national identity of Romania 
included three main self-images: ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’, ‘non-Balkan’ 
and ‘security provider’. These self-images and key themes of the foreign policy 
imaginary were configured in 1990-1996, forming an ideational foundation 
that impacted on Romanian international relations until 2007. Romania’s 
‘European’ identity meant that the state was an aspiring liberal democracy 
that needed to be recognised as such by external audiences, especially by the 
authoritative Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and EU states). Otherwise, the 
self-images internally constructed by Romania would not be accepted in the 
international realm. The post-1996 national discourses circulated the ‘liberal 
democratic’ self-image more often than the ‘European’ one. Regarding the 
Kosovo crisis, Romania’s evolving responses exhibited the inherent dilemmas 
                                       
709 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – NATO Secretary General (2004 - 2009), Supporting an Active 
Romania in an Active Alliance (Bucharest, 13 May 2004); available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040513b.htm (June 2014).  
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of acting as a ‘European’ liberal democracy with a ‘security provider’ role that 
also retains Balkan ties. The ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security 
provider’ self-images competed with Balkan affinity for prevalence on 
Romanian foreign policy. But the critical nature of the Kosovo conflict enabled 
the re-articulation of international discourses. In early 1999, the international 
context shifted towards the idea of urgent humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo. This ideational change facilitated a hierarchical process within 
Romanian identity, in which the two self-images (‘European’/‘liberal 
democratic’ and ‘security provider’) preceded the traditional relationship with 
the Balkans. At this crucial point in 1999, the fluid nature of national identity 
made it subject to two fundamental re-definitions. First, the ‘non-Balkan’ self-
image began to gradually disappear from the foreign policy imaginary, leaving 
the other self-images to be dominant. Second, the ‘European’/‘liberal 
democratic’ self-image was substantially re-articulated. Until 1999, the 
‘European’ and ‘liberal democratic’ self-images constituted the same 
representation. The Kosovo ‘formative moment’ enabled Romania’s ‘liberal 
democratic’ self-image to be separated from its ‘European’ identity. As the 
international narratives of 1999 advocated the concepts of humanitarian and 
democratic intervention, Romania was re-defined as a pro-active liberal 
democracy that helped to spread democratic values; being a liberal democracy 
was not necessarily associated with ‘Europe’. This shift in national identity 
was central in clarifying Romania’s foreign policy on Iraq, whether it should 
opt for a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ orientation. To some extent, the emerging 
Atlantic vocation of national identity and international conduct was 
prefigured by Romania signing the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement in 
August 2002. Romania was uncomfortable between the opposing views of the 
US and EU on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The 
Romanian state eventually adopted the ‘European’ (EU) viewpoint and did not 
ratify the document signed with the US. Yet the American Bilateral Immunity 
Agreement signalled that Romania could prefer an Atlantic orientation on 
Iraq, depending on the ideas shaping its external reactions. 
 
The year 2003 forced Romania to choose between two contrasting 
approaches to disarming Iraq. France and Germany wanted to continue using 
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peaceful means, whereas the US was firmly in favour of invading Iraq and 
removing Saddam Hussein’s regime through military force. At first, Romania 
attempted to maintain a neutral stance, but in the end decided to support the 
US and participate in the coalition against Iraq. The state was again placed in 
an uncomfortable situation and could have incurred losses either way. 
Rationalism would argue that Romania was simply trying to please the 
powerful US, in order to finalise the NATO integration process. However, the 
context was much more complicated than that. France had very harshly 
reprimanded Romanian solidarity with the Americans and indirectly 
threatened that such a position could jeopardise the state’s EU candidacy. 
Romania had already been invited to join NATO in November 2002, yet its 
possible EU accession was much more problematic. According to a rational 
calculation, Romania was halfway in NATO and could lose much more by 
antagonising France and Germany, who were both key EU decision-makers. 
Romania could have formulated a type of limited backing for the US (e.g. 
airspace access), a middle ground that minimised potential costs and did not 
include sending armed forces. Instead, Romanian elites across the political 
spectrum agreed on a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq and full military 
involvement. Here national identity comes in to explain the state’s foreign 
policy on Iraq. The opposing European (French-German) and Atlantic views 
on Iraq prompted an identity crisis within Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-
image. An aspiring pro-active liberal democracy that seeks to be recognised in 
the international arena cannot have double standards about the promotion of 
democratic values. The state’s painful communist past made Romanians 
more aware of how invaluable democracy was. How was Romania supposed to 
differentiate between dictatorships? It intervened in Kosovo for humanitarian 
and democratic reasons, and then could not decline to do so in Iraq due to 
material considerations.  
 
Romania became fully involved in the coalition against Iraq because 
this action was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined national identity 
(‘pro-active liberal democracy’) and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its 
foreign policy. Romanian identity was more compatible with the US and UK 
interventionist vision of liberal democracy. As all these elements combined, 
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specific Cold War collective memory-myths were particularly relevant for 
national elites since they reinforced Romania’s re-articulation as a pro-active 
liberal democracy and its Atlantic-oriented foreign policy. Romania felt an 
emotional solidarity with American causes, because the US was constructed 
as ‘the liberator’ and ‘the guarantor of freedom and democracy’ during the 
communist dictatorship. The pro-American attitudes of Romania and Central-
Eastern European states originate in certain interpretations about the Cold 
War, which convey the essential contribution of the US in defeating 
communism. Although Western Europe and the US had an equal role in the 
post-1945 settlement and leaving Central-Eastern Europe to Soviet 
domination, post-communist states mostly blame Western Europe for the 
‘Yalta order and betrayal’. The symbolic presence of the US in the Cold War 
imaginary of Central-Eastern Europe kept the hope for democratic freedom 
alive, especially through a network of radio stations that broadcast in the 
native languages of Europeans under communist regimes. The US had not 
completely abandoned Central-Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1989, and 
many post-communist states including Romania felt a moral duty to support 
the American democratic ideal on Iraq in 2003, even through force and at the 
expense of Western European appeasement and pacifism. After having re-
defined Romanian identity as a pro-active liberal democracy with an Atlantic 
vocation, the state’s story of national identity and foreign policy moves on to 
the last formative period of 2004-2007 and its intensified Atlanticism. 
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Chapter VI: Acting as an ‘Atlantic’ Liberal Democracy and  
Security Provider (2004-2007) 
 
 
 
As the final formative time frame of Romania’s post-communist national 
identity and foreign policy, the years 2004-2007 brought the consolidation 
and intensification of the state’s Atlantic vocation. This chapter aims to show 
how the post-2004 foreign policy imaginary was re-defined and internally 
contested, as well as how the re-articulated Romanian identity shaped the 
state’s international actions towards the ‘East’. After 2005, the new President 
systematically extended his de facto prerogatives in the foreign policy domain, 
hence reducing the Government and Parliament’s decision-making input. The 
presidential administration also promoted an intensified Atlanticism of 
Romanian national identity and international behaviour. Although Romania 
was already part of NATO and was expected to finalise the EU accession 
process, the self-images of ‘security provider’ and ‘pro-active liberal 
democracy’ continued to be particularly meaningful for its foreign policy. The 
state intended to have an active involvement abroad, in more distant theatres 
of operation (Iraq and Afghanistan) and in the neighbouring region of the 
Black Sea. The Presidency’s international vision shifted the Romanian outlook 
from the ‘West’ to the ‘East’, where the state could play an important role in 
democratising and stabilising the Euro-Atlantic community’s vicinity. Still, 
these meanings were not accepted by all Romanian leaders, especially the 
Prime Minister who tried to re-balance the ‘European’ self-image and Atlantic 
vocation of national identity, which in turn would affect the state’s 
international affairs. In June 2006, the debates around Romania’s potential 
military withdrawal from Iraq were an interesting case of contestation among 
domestic elites, where the Premier and President had contrasting views and 
competed for legitimacy over foreign policy. The Prime Minister attempted to 
infuse a more balanced ‘European’ dimension to Romanian international 
stances, but was unsuccessful in front of the Atlantic-minded President. 
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The intensified Atlanticism of national identity, along with the self-
images of ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’, impacted on Romania’s 
Eastern foreign policy and Black Sea projects. The latter illustrated the 
manner in which international goals were undermined from within. Any Black 
Sea cooperation arrangement needs a good working dialogue with Russia who 
remains a key actor in the area. The Romanian President’s antagonistic 
rhetoric towards Russia was not rational, but rather consistent with the 
representations advocated by the re-defined foreign policy imaginary which 
depicted a confrontational relationship between the Euro-Atlantic community 
and its non-Euro-Atlantic others. The quite hostile Romanian discourses 
offended Russia who ignored or sabotaged Romania’s Black Sea initiatives. 
Another component of Romania’s Eastern foreign policy was building good 
relations with the Republic of Moldova and bringing it closer to the EU. The 
Romanian-Moldovan rapport was marked by an initial tentative progress that 
eventually transformed into a diplomatic crisis. With regards to structure, 
this chapter begins with a section on Romania’s re-defined foreign policy 
imaginary, followed by the debates on maintaining Romanian military 
presence in Iraq and the state’s post-2005 Eastern foreign policy. 
 
 
Romania’s Re-defined Foreign Policy Imaginary 
 
The legislative elections of late November 2004 did not produce a clear 
majority in Parliament, since the two main political forces obtained very 
similar shares of the vote: the centre-left coalition between the Social 
Democrats (PSD) and the Humanist Party (PUR) won 36.8%, the centre-right 
‘Justice and Truth’ – DA alliance between the Democrat Party (PD) and the 
National Liberal Party (PNL) had 31.49%, the right-wing Great Romania Party 
(PRM) 12.99% and the ethnic Hungarian party UDMR 6.2%.710 The nature of 
the major two coalitions differed in that the DA alliance had the juridical 
                                       
710 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘Annex – Election Results’ 
in Romania Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 28 November and 12 December (Warsaw, 
February 2005), p. 34; http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/romania/41455?download=true 
(July 2014).   
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status of ‘political alliance’, while the National Union PSD+PUR was only an 
‘electoral alliance’.711 This semantic distinction turned into a significant 
argument when interpreting the parliamentary results. Among the political 
parties, PSD emerged as the uncontested winner with a total of 159 seats or 
mandates. But, in terms of registered political unions, the DA alliance (PD 
and PNL) had the upper hand with 161 mandates.712 The situation became so 
volatile that, within a month, Romania went through three coalitions in 
Parliament which all competed for the right to form the Government.713 
During the second ballot of presidential elections held on 12 December 2004, 
voters favoured the PD-PNL candidate Traian Băsescu (51.23%) over the 
former Premier and PSD leader Adrian Năstase (48.77%).714 Băsescu’s ‘top 
priority’ as the new President was to establish a stable majority in Parliament, 
explicitly inviting UDMR and PUR to consider governing alongside the DA 
alliance.715 Although PSD+PUR had obtained a higher number of 
parliamentary seats, one of Băsescu’s first decisions was to appoint Călin 
Popescu-Tăriceanu716 (PNL co-leader of the DA alliance) as Prime Minister. 
 
On the 15 December 2004, President Băsescu increased the pressure 
over the entire political spectrum by declaring that: 
‘I will appoint Călin Popescu Tăriceanu as Prime Minister. If I cannot fulfil the 
mandate I was given by the people, I will return to the people (…) If the Government of 
the [DA] Alliance does not pass, we will certainly go back to early elections. I think 
that the President, who is elected by direct vote, has a right to decide the party he 
                                       
711 Sean Müller, ‘The Conflict between Băsescu and Tăriceanu. A Governmental System 
Viewpoint’, Sfera Politicii, issue 126-127, 2007; http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/126-
127/art06-muller.html (July 2014). 
712 OSCE, ‘Annex – Election Results’, p. 34. 
713 Daniel Barbu, ‘Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy? The Intended Consequences of the 
2004 Romanian Elections’, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, volume 5(1), 
2005, p. 12. 
714 OSCE, ‘Annex – Election Results’, p. 35. 
715 Traian Băsescu cited in ‘Aliaţii PSD, PUR şi UDMR, sunt gata să întoarcă armele’/ ‘PSD’s 
Allies, PUR and UDMR, Are Ready to Change Sides’, HotNews.ro (14 December 2004); 
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1247821-aliatii-psd-pur-udmr-sunt-gata-intoarca-
armele.htm (July 2014). 
716 Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu – Prime Minister of Romania (December 2004 – December 2008). 
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wants to work with, so that his own programme promoted during the election 
campaign will become reality’.717 
To support this unprecedented action, he invoked article 103.1 in the 
Romanian Constitution which said that - ‘[t]he President of Romania 
designates a candidate for the prime minister position, after consultations 
with the party holding a clear majority in Parliament or, if such a majority 
does not exist, after [consulting] the parties represented in Parliament’.718 The 
Prime Minister would then have ten days to decide on a cabinet, outline the 
governmental plan and gain the legislators’ vote of confidence. Until 2004, the 
normal expectation was for the President to appoint a Prime Minister 
proposed by the party or coalition that had the largest number of seats, 
whether or not the party or coalition in question had a parliamentary majority 
as well. That winning party or coalition had the informal right of being the 
first to form a cabinet and try to find a stable majority. This happened in 
1992 with the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR now PSD), in 1996 
with the governing coalition led by the Democratic Convention of Romania 
(CDR) and in 2000 again with PDSR. Both CDR in 1996 and PDSR in 2000 
had the greatest number of parliamentary mandates; they proposed a Premier 
during consultations with the President, but still had to co-opt other parties 
to create a legislative majority for the new Prime Minister and cabinet. 
Following the 2004 elections, the National Union PSD+PUR would have 
normally proposed a Premier who would then be designated by President 
Băsescu.  
 
These arrangements, and especially which party or coalition was given 
the first chance to configure the Government, were an informal rule of the 
Romanian political system. Article 103.1 of the Constitution was vague and 
did not explicitly say that the President needed to appoint a Prime Minister 
from the party or coalition with the most seats in Parliament. Băsescu 
interpreted article 103.1 to mean that, without a self-evident parliamentary 
majority, the President had the constitutional prerogative to choose which of 
                                       
717 Traian Băsescu cited in Sean Müller, ‘The Conflict between Băsescu and Tăriceanu. A 
Governmental System Viewpoint’, p. 56. 
718 The Parliament of Romania, The Constitution of Romania; available at 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339 (July 2014).  
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the interested coalitions would eventually form the Government.719 He opted 
for Tăriceanu to be the new Premier from the DA alliance, instead of a 
candidate from PSD. This decision was unusual for Romania and signalled 
that Băsescu would be a President highly involved in domestic politics and 
international relations. The above presidential statement also contained a 
warning or even an indirect threat that Parliament would be dissolved, if it 
rejected the cabinet designated by Băsescu. According to article 89 of the 
Constitution, ‘[t]he President of Romania can dissolve Parliament, if the latter 
has not given a vote of confidence to the Government within 60 days of the 
first request and only after [Parliament] has rejected the Government at least 
twice’.720 In the end, a fragile governing coalition was formed with 51.4% and 
241 seats - ‘a patchwork’ consisting of the DA alliance, PUR and UDMR; PUR 
had unexpectedly abandoned PSD to be part of the governmental coalition 
supporting Premier Tăriceanu and his cabinet.721 As Cristian Preda noted, the 
Romanian multi-party system of late 2004 lacked a dominant political force 
and led to ‘the fabrication’ of a majority.722 
 
From the beginning of his electoral campaign, Băsescu declared that he 
would be a new type of political leader, unlike any presidential predecessor. 
He aimed to be a ‘president-player’, heavily involved in Romanian politics and 
policies, rather than just a detached ‘spectator’ of internal and external 
affairs. His unique view of the Presidency as a state institution was boldly 
mentioned in November 2004: 
‘[t]he power granted by the Constitution to the President is to be an active and 
efficient player in the public life of Romania, not just a well meaning spectator. I have 
never been a person who remains uninvolved. I do not want to be a President-
spectator, who occupies the best seat on the official stage; what I want is to be a 
                                       
719 Lavinia Stan, ‘The Opposition Takes Charge: The Romanian General Elections of 2004’, 
Problems of Post-Communism, volume 52(3), May-June 2005, p. 12.  
720 The Parliament of Romania, The Constitution of Romania. 
721 Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismăneanu, ‘The End of Postcommunism in Romania’, Journal 
of Democracy, volume 16(2), April 2005, p. 151.  
722 Cristian Preda, Partide şi alegeri în România postcomunistă (1989-2004)/ Political Parties 
and Elections in Post-communist Romania (1898-2004) (Bucharest: Nemira, 2005), p. 100. 
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President-player, who works shoulder to shoulder with the other responsible agencies 
and the whole society’.723 
This was another personalised interpretation of article 80.2 in the 
Constitution, which described a more neutral role for the President -  
‘[t]he President safeguards the respect for the Constitution and the good functioning 
of public authorities. To this end, the President exercises mediation between state 
powers, as well as between state and society’.724 
As a former Navy commander, Băsescu never concealed the fact that he liked 
to be the ultimate decision-maker and was used to being obeyed.725 The 
general context of Băsescu’s rhetoric and actions during the presidential 
campaign and immediately after his election indicated an emerging 
personalisation of Romanian politics. The new President expertly manipulated 
a Parliament with no obvious majority and was apparently willing to go to 
extreme lengths (even dissolving the legislative body), in order to ensure that 
his preferred DA alliance would form the next Government of Romania. True 
to his word, Băsescu was a determined and quite forceful ‘president-player’, 
very different from his predecessors. The situation was bound to turn at least 
somewhat problematic in the foreign policy arena, because the Romanian 
semi-presidential system featured dual authority and democratic legitimacy 
with two prominent leaders of the executive branch. Băsescu had been 
elected as President of Romania via direct vote, while the designated Prime 
Minister Tăriceanu and his cabinet succeeded in passing the Parliament’s 
vote of investiture. 
 
Although they were initially considered a good team, the working 
relationship between the two actors gradually deteriorated from tensions to 
public disputes and even conflict. By 2006, the Romanian Presidency and 
                                       
723 Traian Băsescu cited in The ‘Ovidiu Şincai’ Social-Democrat Institute, Raport - Traian 
Băsescu, şase luni de mandat prezidenţial: rezultate şi perspective/ Report - Traian Băsescu, 
Six Months of Presidential Mandate: Results and Prospects (Bucharest, July 2005), p. 5; 
http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport-Basescu-6%20luni_Final.pdf (July 2014).  
724 The Parliament of Romania, The Constitution of Romania. 
725 Traian Băsescu – President of Romania (December 2004 – November 2014), ‘Biography’, 
The Presidency of Romania; http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=htm&id=165&exp2=ro (July 
2014). 
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Premiership were facing an uneasy cohabitation.726 The intra-executive 
divergences also appeared in the area of foreign policy decision-making, 
where the President as head of state and the Prime Minister as head of the 
Government had unclear and potentially overlapping prerogatives. Alina 
Mungiu-Pippidi has underlined the inherent problems of the Romanian 
Constitution, where in practice there is no clear separation of powers between 
and within state institutions. She considers Romania’s semi-presidentialism 
to be ‘overloaded with checks and balances to the point of deadlock’ and 
prone to institutional conflict in areas of joint responsibility.727 In the case of 
foreign policy, the Romanian President’s constitutional prerogatives were 
substantially limited and depended on the counter-signature and approval of 
either the Government or Parliament or both of them.728 So the Constitution 
ensured that, at least formally, decisions had to be agreed by the President 
and Prime Minister and sometimes ratified by Parliament. Romanian semi-
presidentialism lacks a clear delineation between the powers of the 
Presidency and Government, which makes it very difficult to identify who is 
the primary authority with respect to the state’s international stances.  
 
Early on in his mandate, Băsescu did everything possible within 
constitutional limits and sometimes beyond them to grasp full control over 
Romania’s international affairs. He started to systematically extend the 
President’s conventional role in the foreign policy domain, hence diminishing 
the influence of Parliament and that of the Government.729 The ambiguous 
semi-presidential system, combined with a rather weak Prime Minister and 
                                       
726 Cosmin Dima, ‘Conflictul intraexecutiv în regimul semiprezidenţial românesc. Primul-
Ministru Călin Popescu Tăriceanu versus Preşedintele Traian Băsescu’/ ‘The Intra-executive 
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President Traian Băsescu’, Sfera Politicii, issue 139, 2009; 
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cabinet, led to the Government being compelled to accept foreign affairs as 
Băsescu’s sole de facto prerogative.730 Premier Tăriceanu’s cabinet had a 
fragile majority in Parliament (51.4%), which was also undermined from 
within the governing coalition by PD - the party loyal to its former leader, 
Traian Băsescu. Thus, from having joint power over Romania’s external 
relations, the Government was reduced to simply implementing the 
President’s directives. Taking these aspects into account, President Băsescu 
was the main foreign policy decision-maker and had the greatest impact on 
the national imaginary between 2005 and 2008. Nevertheless, while other 
domestic agents were not as influential as the presidential administration, 
they did at times offer discursive contestation and competed for dominance in 
directing Romania’s international affairs. 
 
With regard to the reconfiguration of the foreign policy imaginary, the 
2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) was an essential expression of the new 
administration’s vision for Romanian international and security relations. Its 
initial drafted form had been revealed in February 2006. Compared to 
previous similar papers, this document was the most controversial among 
internal audiences because it prefigured an intensified Atlantic vocation for 
the state to the point of neglecting everything else. The ‘liberal democratic’ 
self-image of Romanian national identity had already been re-defined as pro-
active and Atlantic-oriented during the Iraq invasion. The ‘European’ self-
image had always been a key component of Romanian identity, but in the 
2006 NSS it was marginalised or subordinated to the other two self-images: 
‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’. Public opinion was particularly 
interested since it was the first NSS draft published by Romania’s Presidency 
prior to Parliament deliberations and final vote. The text confirmed the foreign 
policy meanings that were re-articulated in 2003, moving from Romania’s 
traditional defensive position towards a more pro-active one; counteracting or 
responding to dangers shifted to preventing and even pre-empting threats. 
Throughout its proposed material, the 2006 NSS was permeated by the 
                                       
730 Ruxandra Ivan, La Politique Étrangère Roumaine (1990-2006)/ Romanian Foreign Policy 
(1990-2006) (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009), p. 109. 
  P a g e  | 236 
‘global war on terror’, which went substantially beyond depicting terrorism as 
a major risk: 
‘[t]he active commitment to achieving security by promoting democracy, fighting 
international terrorism and countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is 
a must for Romania’s security policy. It is the fundamental condition for us to enjoy 
the benefits of globalization, seize the opportunities offered by the international 
environment and effectively counter major risks and threats’.731   
 
National security strategies and other relevant papers were often 
shaped by the international discourse on terrorism, which emerged and 
gained influence post-9/11. The Romanian NSS had some distinctive traits 
because the war on terrorism was ‘insinuated into the document’s narrative’, 
from the usual ‘security environment and identification of threats’ to the 
‘formulation of policy directions that obviously pre-date 9/11’.732 For 
example, principles and policies that had been characteristic of ‘Europe’ were 
‘affected by the superimposition of the global dynamic and security logic’ of 
the global war on terrorism.733 Everything seemed to be discursively 
subordinated to the ‘War on Terror’. Previous foreign policy concerns 
remained valid: deepening NATO and EU integration, developing closer 
relations with Western states, strengthening the strategic partnership with 
the US, continuing the reform and modernisation of the army in order to 
create interoperability with NATO forces. Issues like Euro-Atlantic identity 
and integration were re-defined according to the logic of the war on terrorism, 
even though Romania had already obtained NATO membership in March 
2004 and would officially accede into the EU in January 2007. Rationally 
speaking, the state was not required any more to prove its ‘security provider’ 
self-image or necessarily fulfil the perceived duties of a partially accepted 
liberal democracy. NATO was the first crucial Euro-Atlantic audience or 
authoritative self to irrevocably legitimate Romanian national identity and 
                                       
731 The President of Romania, ‘The National Security Strategy of Romania. European 
Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: For a Better Life in a Democratic, Safer and more 
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self-images, while the EU was expected to do the same soon. Yet identity has 
a fluid nature and the story of Romanian national identity continued even 
after its international recognition. 
 
As suggested by its prominent place in the title of the NSS, Romania’s 
‘European and Euro-Atlantic identity’ became a key element for the Băsescu 
administration’s foreign policy perspective. Romania was finally included in 
the ‘Euro-Atlantic community’, which had been depicted to be ‘a security 
domain based on common values, interests and goals’.734 Having already 
achieved one of its major post-1990 foreign policy goals (NATO membership) 
and being close to the second one (EU entrance), Romania was in search of a 
new international purpose. The NSS represented this purpose as a new 
geostrategic profile: 
‘Romania’s integration in NATO and EU triggers substantial changes in its status and 
strategic identity. From this viewpoint, the dynamics of the development of Romania’s 
European and Euro-Atlantic identity, as well as that pertaining to the shaping of a 
profile matching its geostrategic potential, will be structurally re-designed and 
promoted at a high pace. Membership involves the gradual configuration of a specific 
and active role for Romania within the two organizations and providing the necessary 
resources to fulfil it’.735 
Felix Ciuta pointed out that the ‘strategic hybridity’ of Romania’s identity was 
present together with ‘the tension between its being and becoming European’, 
which had dominated the discourse of the return to Europe.736 The Romanian 
‘specific and active role’ focused on the familiar assumption that democracy 
was the most effective shield and weapon against terrorism. The Romanian 
state pledged to ‘actively’ participate via political, diplomatic, economic, 
intelligence and military means in spreading democratic values, security and 
prosperity to countries ‘neighbouring Romania and other areas of strategic 
interest’.737 The insistent repetition of variations on the ‘being pro-active’ 
theme attempted to describe a more ‘dynamic strategic profile’, while also 
conveying the veiled critique that previous Romanian administrations had 
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opted for a more passive approach to regional and international affairs.738 
Such pro-active endeavours would be carried out through institutionalised 
channels, as responsibilities deriving from NATO and EU commitments. They 
would also be part of collective efforts alongside allied, partner and friendly 
states, according to the decisions adopted by the international community.739  
 
The 2006 NSS portrayed a very pessimistic and conflictual imaginary. It 
featured proliferating conflicts at global level (‘clashing world’), in which ‘the 
main battle’ was ‘waged between fundamentally different values’ – ‘democracy 
and totalitarianism’.740 In the context of Romania’s foreign policy, President 
Băsescu often indirectly dismissed a ‘unifying logic’ based on European 
integration and advocated ‘a logic of exclusion and confrontation’ – where the 
good Euro-Atlantic self fights to defeat the evil non-Euro-Atlantic other.741 So 
it was not surprising that the 2006 NSS was built on similar identity 
premises. Moreover, the document tried to coherently combine the European 
and Atlantic dimensions of Romania’s national identity by differentiating 
between two sets of goals. On the one hand, the Atlantic dimension would 
endeavour to ensure security via democracy promotion, the war on 
international terrorism, eliminating illegal trafficking. On the other hand, the 
European dimension would deal with prosperity through solidarity and 
development, Eastern enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
stability via the encouragement of democratic values.742 This tidy 
compartmentalisation failed to be convincing since the NSS title and content 
articulated two distinct identities – ‘European’ and ‘Euro-Atlantic’. They were 
also not constructed to exert equal impact over the state’s foreign policy. 
Unlike previous strategies, the relationship was explicitly hierarchical with 
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the Atlantic dimension dominating the European one in terms of ideological 
influence. President Băsescu declared early on in his mandate an overt 
Atlantic orientation, when arguing for a special relationship or privileged 
partnership between the US, UK and Romania. More than ideological 
preference, the 2006 Strategy indicated both an alignment with the US 
position and a re-definition of Romania’s identity. While the threat of 
terrorism could not be denied in an international security environment, 
Romania did not have a history of such dangers and had been fortunately 
overlooked as a target, even after its involvement in the conflicts of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet the Romanian NSS transferred from the American 
one the US ‘missionary vocation’, where the latter adopted this role globally 
and Romania was constructed as a civilising state in the Black Sea region.743 
This re-conceptualisation of national identity affected directly Romania’s 
‘European’ self-image, given that the 2006 Strategy configured American 
priorities to be more important than European ones.744 Significant EU foreign 
policy topics were marginalised or secondary at best. For instance, Romania 
wanted to participate in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, but 
only ‘to develop and consolidate trans-Atlantic cooperation’.745 The European 
Neighbourhood Policy was mostly a means to ‘boost’ Romania’s ‘contribution 
to promoting democracy, peace and security’ in the Black Sea region.746 
 
Apart from the underlying discursive influence of the ‘War on Terror’, 
the text confirmed that Romania’s ‘non-Balkan’ self-image had faded from the 
foreign policy imaginary. Romania had been traditionally preoccupied with 
the democratic stability of the Balkans, but the matter was only briefly 
discussed in the 2006 NSS. Romania supported the democratisation efforts, 
economic development and European integration of the Balkan states. It 
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would also continue to act as a ‘security provider’ in the Balkans.747 Another 
representation often circulated by the NSS was that of Romania having a 
special role and responsibility in ‘non-Western’ Europe, especially in the 
extended Black Sea region. The document contained a chapter specifically 
dedicated to the Black Sea, where Romania portrayed itself as a ‘dynamic 
vector of democratic security and stability, as well as economic prosperity’.748 
As part of a more general interest, the text explicitly mentioned the Romanian 
objective of ensuring a European and Euro-Atlantic engagement in the area. 
The Strategy described the extended Black Sea region as the place of 
intersection for two strategic flows: one connecting the ‘energy producer’ (Near 
East, Caucasus and Caspian Sea) with its ‘energy consumer’ (the West); the 
other symbolising a link between the ‘security provider’ (Euro-Atlantic 
community) and its ‘security consumer’ (Near East, Caucasus).749 From such 
a perspective, Romania was associated with meanings like European frontier 
or periphery, a state bordering or bridging the gap between the ‘the West and 
the Rest’.750 As shown in chapter III, starting with the period 1990-1996, 
Romania’s foreign policy discourse persistently shaped a ‘Central European’ 
subjectivity to differentiate the state from two negative representations: 
‘Eastern European’ with its Cold War connotations and ‘Balkan’ with an 
image of instability. Post-2004 the articulation of national identity abandoned 
the ‘Central European’ subjectivity and insistently re-defined Romania as a 
‘border state’.  
 
More so, dissociating the state from a ‘Central European’ image was 
counter-productive, if one paid attention to the regional context where 
Ukraine advocated in a quite credible manner its bonded role as both a Pontic 
(Black Sea) and Central European state.751 Unlike Ukraine’s approach, the 
Romanian foreign policy discourse (generated by the presidential 
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administration) operated with exclusive meanings when referring to the two 
areas, pushing to promote one at the expense of the other. Since Romania 
obtained NATO membership and was close to finalising EU accession, the 
presidential administration as a key foreign policy decision-maker saw the 
state like a bridge to the outside. Romania’s post-2005 international purpose 
would be to act as a ‘border state’, connecting the Euro-Atlantic community 
with its non-Euro-Atlantic others. The ‘Central European’ subjectivity had 
expressed Romania’s inextricable link to Western Europe. Having gained 
international validation for the main themes of its post-communist national 
identity, Romania was looking from the West to the East. An internationally 
accepted pro-active liberal democracy with a security provider role could exert 
a meaningful influence by democratising and stabilising the neighbouring 
non-Euro-Atlantic states, as well as by participating in other more 
geographically distant military operations. Yet these Romanian foreign policy 
articulations were not endorsed by all domestic elites. June 2006 brought an 
episode of internal contestation and debates regarding the withdrawal of 
Romanian soldiers from Iraq. It was part of a wider attempt to re-define 
Romanian identity and foreign policy, by re-balancing the state’s ‘European’ 
self-image and Atlantic vocation. 
 
 
Debating Romania’s Military Presence in Iraq 
 
From August 2003 until their final withdrawal in June 2009, more than 
5,200 Romanian troops were deployed to support the US-led multi-national 
mission ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. Their responsibilities included intelligence 
gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance, providing rapid response forces, 
conducting training and monitoring of local army units.752 Being one of the 
newest NATO members, Romania’s continued contribution to American 
efforts in Iraq brought a series of challenges. Unlike the case of Afghanistan, 
the Alliance did not eventually take over operations and Iraq remained a 
purely US-driven endeavour, opposed by several NATO and EU partners. 
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Romania maintaining its military presence in Iraq post-2004 entailed not only 
costs like risking soldiers’ lives, but also further antagonised France and 
Germany by closely aligning with the American stance.753 Throughout his 
electoral campaign and subsequent mandate, President Băsescu clearly 
favoured an Atlantic orientation for Romanian foreign policy. He envisioned 
an extended ‘special relationship’ between the US, UK and Romania, which 
was articulated through a somewhat uninspired phrase - ‘the Washington-
London-Bucharest Axis’. On 13 December 2004, shortly after his election, 
Băsescu declared that: 
‘[b]eyond our NATO membership, the strategic relation with the US and Great Britain 
will remain of utmost importance for the state’s foreign policy. The Washington-
London-Bucharest Axis will be a strategic axis for the President of Romania’.754 
This Atlantic construction appeared to be a one-sided initiative, considering 
that neither the Americans nor the British publicly recognised it.755 After 
Băsescu’s official visit to the US in March 2005, President Bush was asked 
about a potential ‘special partnership’ between Washington, London and 
Bucharest. He avoided giving any concrete confirmation and depicted 
Romania as a ‘special ally’ among many other special liberal democratic 
partners: 
‘I view Romania as a special ally because Romania shares the same values that we 
share (...) we all long for peace, and we understand the world will be more peaceful as 
freedom spreads (...) And so this is a special relationship because of the shared 
values, and I am honored to call the President my friend, and I’m honored to call 
Romania a strong ally’.756 
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As in the case of Iraq’s invasion, France was much more opinionated 
about Romania’s continued Atlantic-oriented external agenda. The French 
Foreign Affairs Minister - Michel Barnier - visited Bucharest in February 
2005. He candidly admitted to having ‘some difficulty in understanding the 
significance of this rather unusual axis’757, then went on to add: 
‘Romania’s need for security is the same as that of France, Germany and Greece who 
isn’t far away and is already in the European Union (...) So, I think that the right 
reflex when you want to join the European Union, the legitimate, necessary reflex is a 
European one. And that doesn’t stop one being friends with America or others’.758 
France had not changed its viewpoint from January 2003, when President 
Jacques Chirac admonished, criticised and somewhat threatened the EU 
candidates (especially Romania) who sided with the US on invading Iraq. 
Despite the more diplomatic language of Minister Barnier in 2005, France 
persisted in politically pressurising Romania who, as an EU applicant state, 
was expected to instinctively embrace a ‘European’ (preferably French) foreign 
policy perspective. Regardless of the international audience, President 
Băsescu’s message on Romania’s Atlantic vocation and involvement in Iraq 
was consistent. During an interview for ‘Le Monde’ in March 2005, the 
question of whether Romania risked being caught once again between the US 
and EU arose. The President’s reply was firm and very clear: 
‘I am not sure if the word “axis” is the most appropriate, but we will consolidate our 
partnership with the United States and Great Britain (...) Romania is willing to host 
American bases on its territory (...) We are an ally of the United States and Great 
Britain in Iraq and will remain a partner in this coalition (...) I will not admit any 
ambiguity on this topic’.759 
Băsescu’s vehement stance was surprising and quite insular, as domestic 
public opinion in both the US and many European states tended to exercise 
pressure towards gradual yet accelerated military withdrawal from Iraq. His 
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attitude prompted ‘Le Monde’ to describe Romania as ‘America’s Trojan horse 
in Europe’760, a representation that had been first associated with Poland.  
 
By contrast, the DA alliance PNL-PD as leader of the Romanian 
governing coalition seemed to prefer a more neutral external position for the 
state. The electoral programme of the DA alliance contained a chapter on 
national security, which combined the views regarding foreign policy and 
national defence. A lot of attention was given to deepening internal reforms 
for Alliance interoperability and future EU accession.761 Under EU and NATO 
flags, Romania would help to ensure stability in the Balkan and Black Sea 
areas; an equally brief mention was devoted to how the state would take part 
in the European Security and Defence Policy and the battle against 
terrorism.762 Interestingly, according to the DA alliance, one of the main 
Romanian foreign policy objectives was to ‘actively participate in the 
institutional and cultural construction of Great Europe’.763 The DA alliance 
transferred the above principles of its electoral campaign to the Government 
Programme for 2005-2008, issued in late December 2004.764 Concerning the 
state’s external relations, the electoral and Government programmes 
suggested that Prime Minister Tăriceanu and his cabinet would focus first on 
achieving EU integration, followed by other commitments deriving from NATO 
membership. Fighting international terrorism and contributing to the EU 
Foreign and Security Policy were portrayed as equally important to the 
Government of Romania.765 The presidential administration’s emphasis on 
building an intensified Atlantic vocation and being involved in the global war 
on terrorism, which had been underlined by the 2006 National Security 
Strategy, were notably absent. This is a significant point because it indicates 
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that the Government had different priorities from the President, where the EU 
and Romania’s ‘European’ self-image featured much more prominently or, at 
the very least, was not secondary to the Atlantic vocation of national identity.  
 
The specific topic of Romanian withdrawal from Iraq triggered mixed 
reactions inside the government and parliamentary majority, being 
intrinsically linked to the state’s intensified Atlanticism. In late April 2005, 
the first to request Iraq withdrawal was PUR (re-named as the Conservative 
Party – PC), a small parliamentary group which had tipped the governmental 
majority scale in favour of the Tăriceanu cabinet after the 2004 elections.766 A 
month later, Deputy Eugen Nicolaescu (spokesperson for PNL) said that ‘the 
removal of our Iraqi troops should be debated within the governing coalition’; 
as a personal point of view, he argued against continuing any military 
presence in Iraq since ‘Romania could use those expenses to modernise the 
army and make it more compatible with NATO’.767 On 24 May 2005, Prime 
Minister Tăriceanu was reluctant to express a clear position, declaring that 
Iraq withdrawal ‘could have serious implications on Romania’s assumed 
commitments and credibility as a NATO state and future member of the 
European Union’.768 Almost a year later (April 2006), he appeared to support 
maintaining Romanian forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, both theatres being 
associated with the responsibilities of NATO membership: 
‘I do not think withdrawing our troops is a relevant issue right now. On the contrary, 
Romania has stated at an official level that it is determined to continue participating 
with military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as long as those countries require it. The 
recently begun process of democratising Iraq needs to be consolidated (…) Of course 
this entails extremely costly efforts, in terms of human resources and the very painful 
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loss of lives, as well as financially. Still, I do believe Romania should prove itself 
capable of being a reliable partner for NATO’.769 
 
The end of June 2006 highlighted a sudden but intense contestation in 
the national discourse, which showed divergent perspectives on Romania’s 
national identity and the consequences of long-term military involvement in 
Iraq. The question of whether to withdraw or not the forces deployed there 
escalated into an open conflict between the two heads of the executive - the 
Prime Minister wanted a timetable of withdrawal and the President was firmly 
against such a prospect. Tăriceanu’s opinion of April 2006 changed under the 
impact of a shifting international context, rationalism and the ‘European’ self-
image of national identity. These aspects will be analysed in detail later on in 
this section, after discussing the debates that surrounded Romanian military 
withdrawal from Iraq. The initial announcement was made by Premier 
Tăriceanu and his Defence Minister Teodor Atanasiu, who advanced together 
the PNL idea of removing approximately 890 Romanian soldiers from Iraq 
starting with 1 January 2007. The proposal was meant to be next presented 
to the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT), which needed to analyse 
the state’s military planning for the following year. The two government 
members invoked a range of reasons to substantiate their party’s view. 
Tăriceanu began with the human dimension (past casualties and high risk of 
losing more lives), moving on to the widespread behaviour manifested by EU 
member states – 
‘[w]e have taken into account the [human] impact of incidents in Iraq (...) France and 
Germany never participated, Spain has resolved for quite some time to withdraw, the 
same with Bulgaria and Italy. This decision subscribes to a clear tendency at the EU 
level. Right now the only two countries with [military] involvement are Poland and 
Romania’.770 
Arguably, what affected Romanian forces the most was the imminent 
complete withdrawal of Italy. They operated together with the Garibaldi 
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brigade in Nassyria and the latter’s absence would leave Romania’s troops 
without logistical support by the end of 2006.771 Stressing Italy’s revised 
viewpoint on Iraq was not coincidental and it played an important role in the 
context surrounding Prime Minister Tăriceanu and PNL’s proposal.  
 
In March 2005, the Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi had made public 
that the country intended a ‘progressive reduction’ of its Iraq soldiers, due to 
the growing opposition from domestic public opinion.772 Italy was an EU state 
that had long displayed a predominantly Atlantic external orientation, which 
translated into aligning with the US intervention in Iraq and offering a 
substantial military force.773 If a devoted Atlantic state had already 
implemented gradual withdrawal, Romania deciding on a similar course for a 
smaller contribution would hopefully not be regarded as a betrayal of its 
Atlantic affiliation. According to Defence Minister Atanasiu on 29 June 2006, 
‘[t]here is no country present in Iraq that does not have a timetable of 
withdrawal, especially considering that the Iraqi army has become much 
better trained and capable of taking over the missions we have been 
developing in this theatre of operations’.774 He further mentioned that annual 
expenses for Iraq had risen to 200 million US dollars, which amounted to 
11.8% of the defence budget.775 Tăriceanu concluded his party’s proposal by 
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saying that Romania would maintain the military obligations which stemmed 
from its NATO, EU and UN membership.776 
 
Following this rather unexpected announcement, the governing 
coalition was torn between mild support and strong opposition. The UDMR 
representatives favoured the general ‘European’ way of doing things: 
‘[i]t is a PNL decision and we support it. This does not mean that tomorrow the 
soldiers deployed there start packing and are coming home. Time is necessary to 
prepare a calendar, as all the European countries have done. I assume the Prime 
Minister has consulted with our international partners before making the 
announcement’.777 
PC was glad to see PNL agreeing with an opinion it had already advanced in 
mid-2005.778 The PD leader Emil Boc described the PNL statements to be a 
‘serious political mistake’ that lacked responsibility and ‘could affect 
Romania’s international credibility’.779 The most critical response came from 
the presidential administration, which characterised as ‘unacceptable’ the 
unilateral position expressed by the Premier and Defence Minister on Iraq 
withdrawal, bypassing prior consultations with other internal institutions and 
external partners.780 During the evening of 29 June 2006, President Băsescu 
made his stance perfectly clear: 
‘I am not a partisan of sending troops abroad; nevertheless, I do support respecting 
our commitments. Romania has a partnership with the United States and Great 
Britain (...) It must have a credible and predictable foreign policy behaviour’.781 
If Romanian elites suggested that they were divided on continuing a military 
presence in Iraq, those mixed signals confused both the American and British 
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sides. After being informed of Prime Minister Tăriceanu’s initiative, the US 
ambassador Nicholas Taubman opted for a cautious reaction at first – ‘[m]y 
impression is that not all relevant parties inside Romania or outside of it have 
been consulted before making this announcement’.782 Then he put some 
diplomatic pressure on Romanian authorities: 
‘Romania is one of the United States’ most highly appreciated and trustworthy allies. 
We believe that Romania will continue to work together with us on common issues, 
including Iraq and the global war on terrorism’.783 
The UK embassy conveyed its gratitude for the Romanian state’s help in 
southern Iraq, but ambassador Robin Barnett ended his statement on a more 
cutting note - ‘[w]e have not been notified about the proposal advanced today 
by the Defence Minister and await urgent clarifications about future plans’.784 
 
Looking at the story thus far, it could be argued that the divergences 
between Premier Tăriceanu and President Băsescu were about whether to 
prioritise human and material aspects or to persevere with Romania’s role as 
a credible international partner despite the burdens. In this respect, two sets 
of contrasting values could have been competing for dominance: efficiency 
versus loyalty, adjustment versus predictability, benefits versus solidarity.785 
However, the potential withdrawal from Iraq is part of a larger attempt to re-
define national identity, by re-introducing the ‘European’ self-image as an 
equally important element to the Atlantic vocation of Romanian foreign policy. 
The President’s foreign policy attitude was consistent with two self-images of 
Romanian national identity - ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security 
provider’. Until 2004, the ‘European’ self-image was a key theme of the 
Romanian foreign policy imaginary. After an episode of internal contestation 
among political elites in 1991, ‘Europe’ emerged as Romania’s international 
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direction. Having opted for ‘Europe’, the ‘European’ self-image was 
particularly relevant between 1990 and 1996; it shaped Romanian relations 
with Hungary, which rendered both states to be active agents in defining 
what ‘European’ identity meant in terms of minority rights. Romania’s 
‘European’ self-image was also meaningful in 1996-2000, especially when 
formulating the state’s evolving international responses to the Kosovo crisis. 
Throughout the first post-communist decade, Romania’s ‘European’ identity 
was a constant feature of its external affairs. During the Iraq invasion of 
2003, Romania was fundamentally re-articulated as a pro-active liberal 
democracy with an Atlantic vocation and chose to be part of the US-led 
coalition against Iraq. Post-2004 the ‘liberal democratic’ self-image was re-
defined, since the Băsescu administration continued to intensify the Atlantic 
vocation of national identity and foreign policy.  
 
This intensified Atlanticism and marginalisation of the ‘European’ 
dimension were perplexing from a rational point of view. Romania became an 
official NATO member in 2004, but maintained its military forces in Iraq and 
other theatres of operations. In contrast to these aspects, the context of EU 
integration was more problematic. In February 2005, the French Foreign 
Affairs Minister reminded that the Romanian state should be wearier of 
promoting a ‘Washington-London-Bucharest Axis’ instead of supporting the 
‘European’ (EU) stance. The still pending situation of Romania’s EU accession 
was implied in the subtext. Romania signed the EU accession protocol on 25 
April 2005, yet membership would not be guaranteed until all EU member 
states ratified the protocol via referendum.786 As President Chirac told 
Romania in 2003, ‘[a]ll it takes is one country not to ratify by referendum for 
[EU] enlargement not to move forward’.787 Against such an international 
background, Romania led by President Băsescu did not exhibit a rational 
conduct. The state not only consolidated the Atlantic vocation of its national 
                                       
786 The European Union, Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania (Luxembourg, 25 April 
2005);http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/ne
gotiations/eu10_bulgaria_romania/treaty_2005_en.htm (July 2014).  
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identity and foreign policy, but also intensified it and further displeased 
France. The timeline indicated that the Prime Minister modified his 
perspective around May-June 2006. His declaration in April the same year 
literally subordinated human and other costs to Romania being perceived as 
a reliable ally internationally; hence a standpoint similarly shaped by the 
‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images, which prevailed over 
the ‘European’ one since 2003. While certainly a topic worthy of public 
debate, the idea of Iraq withdrawal was simply launched by Tăriceanu 
without notifying any other implicated parties. There were slim to no chances 
for the steadfastly Atlantic-minded Băsescu to agree, yet the American and 
British sides - who commanded Romanian soldiers in Iraq - should have been 
given some warning. Tăriceanu’s impulsive gesture undermined what was 
otherwise a legitimate national concern. Due to his change of opinion, the 
Premier was accused of carelessly antagonising the President and moving 
their domestic institutional struggle to the sensitive arena of external affairs. 
Using the words of the PSD (largest opposition party) leader and former 
Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană, 
‘[a] foreign policy issue like the presence of Romanian troops in Iraq cannot become 
the object of political games (…) it is something which needs to be negotiated 
beforehand. We are not dealing with individual ambitions, what lies at stake is 
Romania’s credibility’.788 
 
However, Tăriceanu’s agenda went beyond material interests or 
occasionally winning the upper hand over Băsescu. A combination of factors 
explains his shift in views on Romanian military presence in Iraq – a changing 
international context, rationalism and the ‘European’ self-image of national 
identity. First, the international context was substantially different in June 
2006 than mid-2005. Other European states were withdrawing from Iraq or 
had already done so, including Italy who had displayed a long-term Atlantic 
affiliation in terms of foreign relations. In such circumstances, it was hoped 
that Romania would not be perceived as betraying its Atlantic vocation. More 
significantly, Romania signed the EU accession protocol in April 2005. But 
                                       
788 Mircea Geoană (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in Cristian Oprea et al, ‘Retragerea din 
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the ratification process of Romania’s future EU membership was going slowly 
in the individual member states. At the end of March 2006, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu expressed his disappointment that certain 
EU states had not adopted a ‘speedier pace’ for ratifying the Romanian 
accession treaty and gave the example of France.789 Premier Tăriceanu’s reply 
of April 2006 was a reflexive reference to Romania’s self-image of ‘security 
provider’ and reliable NATO partner. His answer also began with the idea that 
Iraq withdrawal was not a relevant topic ‘right now’ (April 2006). Tăriceanu 
needed more time to internalise the shifting international context and the 
potential implications of key EU members like France delaying the ratification 
of Romania’s EU accession. His change of stance from April to June 2006 
suggests that the Prime Minister aimed to quickly re-balance the ‘European’ 
and ‘Atlantic’ dimensions of national identity and foreign policy. This re-
balancing shift had been prefigured by the official Government Programme for 
2005-2008 issued in December 2004, where the EU and Romania’s 
‘European’ self-image featured quite prominently and were not secondary to 
the Atlantic vocation of national identity. So June 2006 was a favourable time 
for domestic elites to re-consider the Iraq situation and even attempt to 
modify the state’s approach.  
 
Second, rational interests also played a role here because Tăriceanu did 
not change his mind at random in two months. He saw the opportunity to 
stand out compared to a highly visible Băsescu (the ‘president-player’) and 
pursued a series of possible advantages. The Premier’s motivations included 
an increase in the Government’s national popularity, allocating Iraq resources 
elsewhere and, most of all, showing that he had the ability to offer a 
‘European’ alternative to the Presidency’s long-standing views. This is where 
the impact of national identity comes in as a third element. Tăriceanu and 
some cabinet members wanted a more nuanced Romanian foreign policy that 
would be equally influenced by the ‘European’ and ‘Atlantic’ dimensions of 
national identity. The prevalent ‘European’ (understood as EU) model of 
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conduct regarding Iraq was the main ideational basis of Tăriceanu’s rhetoric. 
He contested Băsescu’s de facto exclusive prerogative to decide Romania’s 
actions on Iraq, by invoking democratic arguments. Opinion polls at the time 
suggested that Romanians’ attitudes towards their state’s military presence in 
Iraq had shifted from the 2003 intervention: 50-52% did not support it and 
only 40-42% were in favour of it.790 The Prime Minister and President were 
ultimately competing for legitimacy over foreign policy decision-making, which 
would feed into the hierarchy of self-images inside national identity. 
 
In the end, the Prime Minister’s initiative was submitted to 
deliberations within the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) on 30 
June 2006. It resulted in a majority of votes against withdrawing Romanian 
forces deployed in Iraq (10 versus 2).791 Surprisingly, only the Premier and 
Defence Minister voted for it. The other two PNL representatives – Foreign 
Affairs Minister Ungureanu and Finance Minister Sebastian Vlădescu792 - 
chose to align with the presidential position.793 The remaining members of 
CSAT were expected to support the Presidency, because they were either 
cabinet members from PD (Băsescu’s former political party), officials 
previously appointed by the President or his institutional advisers. It is clear 
evidence that the Government itself was torn between the two heads of the 
executive branch. Party allegiance, which tends to be very strong in 
Romanian politics, did not affect the Foreign Affairs and Finance Ministers’ 
option to a decisive degree. Both went against their cabinet and PNL leader, 
which jeopardised their respective situations in the Government and political 
party. Two votes would not have changed the final CSAT resolution. Even so, 
the fact that they agreed with Romania maintaining the same contribution to 
Iraq, and thus sided with Băsescu’s Atlantic priorities, indicates that the 
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‘security provider’ and ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ self-images of national 
identity were influential among the main foreign policy decision-makers. The 
Presidency issued an ample press release, in which Băsescu heavily criticised 
and dismissed re-thinking a timetable of withdrawal for Iraq: 
‘[s]ince a mandate for negotiating the reconfiguration of forces had already been in 
place, since the parties involved – Romanian, British, Italian and Australian – jointly 
agreed on the future dimensions of our Iraqi forces [March-June 2006], the proposal 
of withdrawal made by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister is difficult to justify 
and only creates the impression of an incoherent military and foreign policy’.794 
Premier Tăriceanu’s unsuccessful attempt at contestation was described as a 
confusing episode to internal and external audiences. Foreign Affairs Minister 
Ungureanu said that an ‘unfortunate confusion’ occurred between what was 
essentially a political proposal and not a final governmental decision.795 A 
better thought-out and organised action by Prime Minister Tăriceanu could 
have become a more significant challenge to President Băsescu’s Atlantic 
vision for Romanian international relations. With regards to the intensified 
Atlanticism of the presidential administration, the Romanian self-images of 
‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’ were emblematically 
embodied in the state’s post-2005 international focus – Romania’s Eastern 
foreign policy. 
 
 
Romania’s Eastern Foreign Policy  
 
Post-2005 emerged as another formative period suitable for re-defining 
national identity and revising international priorities. As the end of chapter V 
suggested, the re-articulation process was prompted by the formal NATO 
accession in March 2004. At that time, Foreign Affairs Minister Geoană 
outlined in front of the North Atlantic Council the idea of Romania having an 
active regional role whose primary objective was to democratise the Black Sea 
area. The state’s upcoming entrance into the EU did not prefigure a different 
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set of discursive meanings. In December 2004, the newly elected President 
Băsescu enumerated the principles which would govern Romania’s relations 
with the EU - an irreproachable conduct to guarantee successful integration 
and fulfilling the remaining conditions required to gain membership (i.e. 
reform of the judicial system, reducing levels of corruption, increasing 
administrative performance and adjusting the features of internal economic 
competition to fit with EU norms).796 These principles were related strictly to 
domestic affairs and indicated a limited concern regarding how the Romanian 
external agenda would fit within the EU. 
 
At the end of 2004, the status of Romania’s EU candidacy was 
promising but it was still unclear whether or not it would join the 
organisation in 2007. Thus, Băsescu’s hesitancy in configuring an 
international vocation for his state as a future EU member was 
understandable. The negotiations eventually led to Romania being invited to 
sign its EU Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005, which scheduled official 
membership for January 2007. The state’s journey towards EU entrance had 
reached a final stage yet the outcome was not completely guaranteed, 
because the European Council could decide to postpone the accession date 
for another year (1 January 2008), depending on how Romania continued to 
achieve the required progress.797 Romania’s EU membership also needed to 
be approved and ratified by each of the member states through referendum. 
Following the Accession Treaty signing, the President expressed how Romania 
envisaged its ‘European’ self-image and foreign policy after 2007: 
‘[o]ur objective is not to simply be a new member of the European Union (...) We take 
our role in securing a large part of the Union’s eastern border very seriously (…) As a 
priority, we have set to actively contribute towards an Eastern neighbourhood 
characterised by stability and security’.798 
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In a post-ceremony interview, Băsescu clarified his interpretation of 
Romania’s ‘European’ identity and associated it with the other main self-
images of ‘security provider’ and ‘liberal democratic’: 
‘I would like to add that, if it wishes to have a respectable position [within the EU], 
Romania must contribute not only by enlarging the internal market, by providing a 
skilled work force, by offering its unique culture. Romania needs to make an essential 
contribution towards the security of the European Union and NATO (...) We are 
probably the country that has the most extensive border with an area outside the EU. 
There is Ukraine in the North, Moldova with a frozen conflict in Transnistria to the 
East, the countries of former Yugoslavia to the South. In all of these regions Romania 
can contribute to the consolidation of democracies and the creation of a secure 
area.799   
 
The discourse articulated the state’s national identity along the lines of 
an actor who could primarily distinguish itself in the EU context as ‘gate 
keeper’ or ‘bridge’ to the outside. Such a member could not add value just by 
constituting a functional element of the EU whole. By adopting the 
representation of ‘border state’ in an exclusive manner, Romania preferred to 
be less involved in the debates concerning the EU’s internal structure and 
future course. This rather passive attitude could be justified by the fact that 
EU accession would be confirmed and rendered official only on 1 January 
2007. Yet things did not change after that date, even though Romanian elites 
had a series of important instruments at their disposal. As a new member 
state, Romania benefited from both a medium-sized territory and a 
population that ranked in third place among EU members’ voting power. 
Consequently, its number of votes in the EU Council of Ministers was 
surpassed only by the ‘big four’ (Germany, France, Italy and the UK), Spain 
and Poland.800  An analysis of material interests would have expected 
Romania to make use of its voting power and seek to maximise any 
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advantages; or at least to render its presence quite visible within the EU via 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation with fellow members. The year 2007 
had plenty of opportunities for exerting influence, with four issues of great 
significance firmly placed on the EU’s agenda: institutional reform, energy 
policy, security and defence policy. The topics were intensely discussed both 
in the European Parliament’s sessions and at the Council of Ministers’ level. 
Still, the Romanian state and its foreign affairs representatives continued 
showing a rather passive attitude to inside deliberations, looking instead 
towards the outside.801 Romania was mostly preoccupied with the EU 
mechanisms that were meaningful for the other two self-images of national 
identity - ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’. And those 
policies referred to the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and potential future 
enlargement. 
 
Furthermore, according to the words of Foreign Affairs Minister 
Ungureanu in August 2006, Romania would use its ‘European’ self-image to 
connect the ‘West’ (NATO and EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity: 
‘[o]n the international front, post-2007 Romania will be a European state with the 
potential to specialise in specific issues and geographical regions of foreign policy, and 
it can play the part of a link between the West and certain regions located in strategic 
proximity to the Euro-Atlantic area. A European Romania with a selective global 
vocation is the country we have all been dreaming of and one we have the historical 
duty to make a reality’.802 
Taking into account President Băsescu’s naval affinity, Romania was seen as 
‘an ideal transatlantic port to the Black Sea’.803 In November 2006, foreign 
policy elites decided to ‘actively lobby the relevant institutions in Brussels’ to 
place the two neighbours – the Black Sea region and Moldova – on the EU’s 
agenda, especially since the EU lacked a specific policy for the Black Sea 
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region.804 Romania’s potential influence in the Black Sea region resulted from 
controlling the Danube Delta and its channels (4,200 km), as well as 
‘approximately 245 km of the sea shore and the corresponding territorial 
waters’.805 Post-2004 Romania had been trying to promote its own idea of a 
Black Sea initiative, in connection with the goals of NATO and the EU.806 
Cooperation in the Black Sea area had substantially increased for the past 
decades, ranging from the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 
the Process of Stability and Good Neighbourly Relations in South-Eastern 
Europe, the South-East European Cooperation Initiative and the Stability 
Pact for South-East Europe, to military endeavours like BLACK-SEAFOR.807 
Yet the main bodies of regional dialogue in the Black Sea area had all been 
led by major actors like Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In 2007, Romania - 
together with Bulgaria and Greece - advocated that the EU needed to create a 
separate special initiative for the region. This was called the Black Sea 
Synergy and officially launched in February 2008, being integrated into the 
European Neighbourhood Policy.808 The main objective of the Black Sea 
Synergy was ‘the strengthening of cooperation between the riparian states, 
through implementing sectoral partnerships’; the most visible activities of the 
Synergy were ‘environment and civil society development through the 
Romanian initiative of the Black Sea NGO Forum’.809 The notion of a ‘Black 
Sea Forum’ had first been mentioned by President Băsescu in his February 
2005 visit to Moscow. He conceived it to be a ‘political forum’, which had the 
mission of ‘developing a political vision that would solve [Black Sea] 
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problems’.810 The Black Sea Forum was ‘meant to complement existing 
initiatives and forms of organization in the region by providing an informal 
platform for communication’.811 The one and only meeting of the Black Sea 
Forum was held in Bucharest in June 2006 and was not attended by Russia. 
 
Regardless of what projects were undertaken in the extended Black Sea 
area, the Russian Federation remained a key player. The success of President 
Băsescu’s Eastern foreign policy inevitably depended upon establishing some 
sort of communication and working partnership with Russia. There were a 
few persuasive reasons to be considered in this respect. First, Russia was one 
of the states bordering on the Black Sea. Second, Russia’s role could impact 
positively or negatively on the frozen conflicts in the area. Third, the Russian 
state in all its historical incarnations had always held strong views regarding 
the evolution of its immediate and close vicinity, an aspect which had to be 
seriously taken into account.812 Romania’s diplomatic relations with Russia 
had been strained or difficult at best throughout the post-communist period, 
but they had never deteriorated to such an extent as after 2005. The main 
cause derived from the Romanian President’s somewhat aggressive foreign 
policy discourse, which started manifesting itself in the second half of 2005. 
During his first official visit to Russia in February 2005, things appeared 
stable and Băsescu asked for President Vladimir Putin’s involvement in a 
future multi-lateral arrangement of cooperation around the Black Sea – later 
known as the Black Sea Forum.813 This neutral language was short-lived and 
the Romanian presidential discourse soon began to consistently antagonise 
Russia. Although there was a grain of truth in most of Băsescu’s choice of 
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words, the language of international diplomacy had rules that could not be 
ignored without consequences. In a speech delivered at Stanford University, 
President Băsescu declared that the Russian Federation treated ‘the Black 
Sea as a Russian lake’ because it did not want problems in the region to be 
‘internationalised’.814 Consistent with the intensified Atlantic dimension of 
Romania’s national identity, in December 2005 an agreement was ratified 
granting permission to build US military bases on Romanian territory. It 
ensured American presence near the South-Eastern border and led to further 
Russian displeasure. On 25 January 2006, an opportunity to briefly discuss 
this issue arose during an address by President Băsescu in front of the 
Council of Europe. When replying to the Russian representative’s question 
about the American bases in Romania, he ended the answer with a cutting 
remark on the former Soviet military presence - ‘[y]ou stayed for thirty years 
in Romania, and we never asked you why you did so’.815  
 
As a form of retaliation, in June 2006 Russia ostentatiously ignored the 
Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership organised in Bucharest. Late 
October 2006 brought another hostile reference in the context of European 
dependence on Russian gas supplies: ‘the promotion of reforms throughout 
the Black Sea region is burdened by Russia’s energy monopoly’.816 The 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs - Serghei Lavrov - handed a letter to his 
Romanian counterpart after an OSCE meeting, where he expressed Russian 
concern for President Băsescu’s ‘unfriendly statements’; according to the 
language of diplomacy, the word ‘unfriendly’ symbolised a very serious 
deterioration of the states’ bilateral relations.817 Băsescu’s rhetoric vis-à-vis 
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Russia was persistently antagonistic, often with an undiplomatic and hostile 
tone. Rationally speaking, there is no plausible reason for it because his 
attitude clearly undermined any initiative the Romanian Presidency wanted to 
promote in the Black Sea region. Russia remains too powerful an actor to 
ignore or, worse, openly insult and expect it not to sabotage Romanian 
projects. Băsescu’s extremely blunt words, to the point of being offensive, can 
be explained by the kinds of understandings which circulated in the foreign 
policy imaginary post-2004. As reflected by the 2006 National Security 
Strategy, the presidential discourse operated with negative representations of 
the ‘non-Euro-Atlantic’ others. The ‘main battle’ was ‘waged between 
fundamentally different values’ – ‘democracy and totalitarianism’.818 In such a 
global context, the ‘logic of exclusion and confrontation’819 was applied and it 
became particularly relevant in Russia’s case. Romania had a traditionally 
uneasy relationship with Russia and many collective memories of past 
wrongs, especially the National Treasure (given to Tsarist custody during 
World War I and never returned) or the Soviet Union being blamed for 
imposing communism in Central-Eastern Europe. Compared to the Balkans, 
Romania’s foreign policy imaginary had not articulated Russia as a ‘friendly 
other’. President Băsescu also considered Russia to be the root of all 
problems in the Black Sea area, which enabled the ‘logic of exclusion’ to move 
on to that of ‘confrontation’. His intensified Atlantic vocation for the 
Romanian self-images of ‘security provider’ and ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ 
shaped an antagonistic behaviour towards the ‘undemocratic’ Russian other. 
The latter was held responsible for not allowing Romania and the Euro-
Atlantic community to stabilise and democratise the Black Sea states, for 
undermining Băsescu’s Eastern policies and the regional role he envisioned. 
As another key component of the state’s Eastern foreign policy, Romania tried 
to bring the Republic of Moldova (historically known as Basarabia) closer to 
‘Europe’ and EU integration. It was a promising endeavour that produced 
mixed results. 
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Relations with the Republic of Moldova 
 
Among Romania’s neighbours, Moldova is the one state with whom it 
shares the greatest affinity and, to a certain degree, the most complicated 
relationship. Immediately after the Cold War, the dialogue between Romania 
and Moldova was marked by the possible reunification of two states with 
similar historical origins, languages and cultures. Since 1989, the evolution 
of their relations has been characterised by rapprochement interspersed with 
tensions or even periods of conflict. Irina Angelescu has summarised the 
long-standing and complex background of the Moldovan-Romanian historical 
rapport: 
‘[t]he territory of the contemporary independent state of Moldova had been an integral 
part of the Romanian Moldovan Principality, roughly from the fourteenth to the 
nineteenth century. It was conquered by the Russian Empire for five decades in the 
nineteenth century, and then it was an integral part of the Romanian independent 
state (...) until 1944, when it became part of the Soviet Union’.820  
These historical changes contributed to Moldova having a ‘regional’ rather 
than a ‘national’ identity; Moldovan politics was dominated by multiple 
discourses about identity.821 Dan Dungaciu has identified three types of 
domestic discourses that tell different stories about Moldova’s identity – the 
Romanian discourse, the discourse of Soviet Moldovanism and the multi-
ethnic and multicultural discourse.822 The question of identity remains very 
sensitive in Moldova, where people basically disagree on whether they are 
actually Romanians or have a distinct ‘Moldovan’ national identity. This 
divisive debate partly accounts for the ups and downs of Romania’s 
engagement with Moldova since 1991, when Moldova declared itself an 
independent state from the USSR. Although the reunification of Moldova and 
Romania did not occur, the possibility of that outcome ‘made Moldova’s 
national minorities very uncomfortable and led to the “hot” war of 
                                       
820 Irina Angelescu, ‘New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania’s Relations 
with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region’, pp. 130-131.  
821 Oleg Serebrian, ‘Basarabia: identitate, politică şi geopolitică’/ ‘Basarabia: Identity, Politics 
and Geopolitics’ in Vasile Boari, Sergiu Gherghina and Radu Murea (eds.), Regăsirea 
identităţii naţionale/ Recovering National Identity (Iaşi: Polirom, 2010), pp. 218-219.  
822 Dan Dungaciu, ‘The Part that Wants to Become Whole. Identity Discourses in the 
Republic of Moldova’, Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations, 
volume 11(1), 2014, pp. 3-14. 
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Transnistria at the beginning of the 1990s’.823 The resulting ‘frozen conflict’ 
has slim chances of being resolved while local ethnic and nationalist 
sentiments continue to be manipulated. As V.G. Baleanu has noted, ‘the 
Transnistrian leaders expertly play the card of their opposition to Moldova’s 
possible unification with Romania’.824 
 
While presenting his foreign policy coordinates to the ambassadors 
accredited in Bucharest, President Băsescu said in January 2005 that:  
‘[t]he relationship with the Republic of Moldova will be a priority for my mandate as 
president of Romania. The Republic of Moldova’s European future must be a moral 
obligation of the entire Romanian society. Our identical language, culture and 
traditions are historical gifts. Protecting this identity is our duty’.825   
The statement was followed by an official visit to Moldova during the same 
month, whose administration was probably surprised by the sudden change 
of its neighbour’s rhetoric. After all, six years had passed since the last visit of 
a Romanian President to Chisinau. Moldova’s response was initially quite 
welcoming and showed its willingness to use the Romanian experience 
concerning EU accession. The exchanges during the visit were friendly and 
Băsescu offered his guarantee that Romania would be the Republic of 
Moldova’s ‘advocate of progress towards the West and the European 
Union’.826 He also stressed the Romanian commitment to treat Moldova as an 
independent and sovereign state, at the same time mentioning the ‘shared 
history’ and the ‘binding common future within the EU’.827 An interesting 
detail appeared in the joint declaration with President Vladimir Voronin at the 
end of their consultations, where a substantial amount of attention was 
dedicated to regional cooperation in South-East Europe. The text explained 
                                       
823 Irina Angelescu, ‘New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania’s Relations 
with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region’, p. 131. 
824 V.G. Baleanu, In the Shadow of Russia: Romania’s Relations with Moldova and Ukraine 
(Swindon: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2000), p. 14. 
825 Traian Băsescu, ‘Speech’ (Bucharest, 18 January 2005) in The Archives of Romania’s 
Presidency;http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=5914&_PRID=search 
(July 2014). 
826 Traian Băsescu, ‘Press Release’ (Chisinau, 21 January 2005) in The Archives of Romania’s 
Presidency;http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=5923&_PRID=search 
(July 2014).  
827 Ibid. 
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how Romania would support Moldova’s wish to join various economic and 
political organisations in that area, as part of the broader EU accession 
efforts.828  
 
Regarding the matter of Transnistria, on the occasion of his official visit 
to Russia in February 2005, Băsescu had already informed President Putin 
that Romania wanted to become involved in addressing the Transnistrian 
conflict. He proposed ‘to enlarge the format of negotiation’ (Republic of 
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Transnistria and the OSCE) by including the 
Romanian side.829 Băsescu had often called for the withdrawal of Russia’s 
military presence from Transnistria. For instance, he believed the ‘first step to 
a solution requires both withdrawing foreign troops and dissolving the 
military and paramilitary forces of the separatist regime, according to a clear 
timetable and with multilateral guarantees’.830 This international stance 
differed to an important extent from the EU’s approach to the conflict, 
although the supranational institution had assigned a special representative 
for the Transnistrian issue. Ultimately, the EU did not insist on the 
withdrawal of foreign military forces and gave the impression of accepting as 
legitimate Russia’s viewpoint - that its troops had a purely peace-keeping 
purpose.831 Despite saying that it had a concrete plan to solve the ‘frozen 
conflict’, Romania’s proposal to be included in the negotiations on 
Transnistria was met with refusal by most participant states – the Republic of 
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.832 
                                       
828 Traian Băsescu, ‘Joint Statements of Presidents Băsescu and Voronin’ (Chisinau, 21 
January 2005) in The Archives of Romania’s Presidency; available at 
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After July 2006, Romania’s membership in the EU brought to the 
surface another sensitive issue in the relations with Moldova – dual 
citizenship. Romanian elites had a foreign policy initiative that was intended 
to bring Moldovans much closer to ‘Europe’:  
‘Romania’s accession to the EU meant that it had to introduce visas for Moldovan 
citizens – who until then did not even need a passport to travel to the country. To 
make the situation easier for Moldovans, the dual citizenship law made it possible for 
qualified Moldovans to obtain Romanian citizenship, but it also meant that Moldovans 
could now travel visa-free in the Schengen [and EU] space’.833 
Yet the implementation of this foreign policy idea triggered several negative 
interpretations. Some EU members were not pleased by the influx of new and 
indirectly acquired EU citizens that originated from Moldova. The Russian 
speaking media in Chisinau depicted it as ‘the tacit assimilation of Moldova 
by Romania’.834 Throughout the autumn of 2006, President Voronin 
frequently criticised Romania and eventually accused it of trying to ‘push’ his 
state inside the EU.835 Romania’s foreign policy imaginary operated on the 
belief of a shared European identity with the Republic of Moldova. That would 
be the reason why it assumed ‘European’ (EU) integration to constitute the 
natural Moldovan future course. The Romanian administration was still 
mindful not to insist on NATO membership, which remained problematic due 
to Moldova’s ties with Russia. Instead, President Băsescu wanted to bring the 
neighbouring state closer to the EU’s influence and eventually facilitate its 
accession. Nevertheless, it would seem that Bucharest and Chisinau did not 
have a sufficiently similar identity; or at least the latter had not yet 
internalised a ‘European’ self-image. Although the Moldovan administration 
welcomed at first its neighbour’s foreign policy efforts, Romania’s eager 
persistence was negatively perceived by President Voronin as paternalistic 
and aiming to destabilise the state’s regime. The situation degenerated into a 
                                       
833 Irina Angelescu, ‘New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania’s Relations 
with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region’, p. 132.  
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full-blown political and diplomatic crisis throughout 2006 and 2007, whose 
severity was atypical for democracies.836 Therefore, the relationship with 
Moldova as an essential component of Romania’s Eastern foreign policy 
proved to be a partial success at best. The exclusively Romanian initiative of 
the Black Sea Forum was also a failure. The overall achievements of the 
Băsescu administration’s Eastern focus were rather disappointing. In the 
words of Armand Goşu, ‘neither at a theoretical level has a coherent vision for 
Romania’s Eastern policy been formulated, nor at a practical level can one 
notice a consistent endeavour in this respect’.837 Even if the foreign policy 
embodiment of Romania’s two externally accepted self-images – ‘liberal 
democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – was unsuccessful in 2005-2006, a great 
accomplishment awaited state elites and public opinion on 1 January 2007. 
 
Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration had been a long-standing foreign 
policy goal and national aspiration during the post-communist years. Its 
symbolic importance for the state was constitutionally enshrined and 
included among the revisions to the Romanian Constitution in 2003.838 
Minutes before the official EU accession (1 January 2007), in his New Year’s 
Eve address to the domestic population, President Băsescu emphasised the 
collective will and sacrifice of all Romanians that led to the much desired 
achievement of NATO and EU membership.839 The prevalent message invoked 
the state’s long awaited ‘return to Europe’: 
‘[w]e have not entered but returned [to Europe] after 60 years, during which no one 
asked us if we wanted to be absent. We have come back home, to our Europe!’840 
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Romania finally obtained full and incontestable international recognition for 
its Euro-Atlantic national identity and all three related self-images: ‘liberal 
democratic’, ‘security provider’ and ‘European’. This was the eagerly 
anticipated last stop in Romania’s journey of national identity re-definitions 
that had shaped its foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, the years 2004-2007 consolidated and intensified the 
Atlantic dimension of Romania’s national identity and foreign policy. 
Domestic politics was dominated by the new ‘president-player’ Băsescu, who 
became the main de facto decision-maker concerning the state’s international 
affairs. This was problematic in the Romanian semi-presidential system, 
which featured two heads of the executive branch – the President and Prime 
Minister. President Băsescu and Premier Tăriceanu entered an uneasy 
political cohabitation, although they had initially been co-leaders of the same 
coalition. The presidential administration shaped to a great extent the post-
2005 foreign policy imaginary. The Presidency’s discourses, reflected in the 
2006 National Security Strategy, re-articulated Romania as a ‘pro-active 
liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’ with an intensified Atlantic 
vocation. This intensified Atlanticism subordinated or rendered secondary the 
other key facet of national identity – the ‘European’ self-image. Early in his 
mandate, President Băsescu showed an overt Atlantic preference and argued 
for a special relationship between the US, UK and Romania. Unlike previous 
documents, the 2006 National Security Strategy conveyed that the Atlantic 
dimension of national identity prevailed over the European one. ‘European’ 
identity had been a constant theme of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary 
throughout the first post-communist decade. Following an episode of internal 
contestation in 1991, ‘Europe’ emerged as Romania’s unquestioned 
international course. Having chosen ‘Europe’, the ‘European’ self-image of 
national identity was intensely promoted between 1990 and 1996, affecting 
Romanian relations with Hungary. The ‘European’ self-image also influenced 
Romania’s evolving international reactions to the Kosovo crisis in 1998-1999. 
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And during the Iraq invasion of 2003, Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-
image was fundamentally re-defined as pro-active and Atlantic-oriented, 
without explicitly neglecting its ‘European’ identity.  
 
However, since Romania had gained NATO membership in 2004, the 
Presidency as a key foreign policy agent viewed the state like a bridge to the 
outside or to the ‘East’. After 2005, the Romanian international purpose was 
to act as a ‘border state’ and ‘gate keeper’ that connected the Euro-Atlantic 
community (NATO and EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic others. The ‘European’ 
self-image of Romanian identity represented its inextricable link to Western 
Europe. Having obtained international recognition for two main themes of 
national identity – ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – via NATO 
integration, Romania started to look from the West to the East. An externally 
validated pro-active liberal democracy with a security provider role needed to 
spread democratic values and stabilise the neighbouring non-Euro-Atlantic 
states. It also had to keep participating in nearer or more distant military 
missions as a component of the global war on terrorism. Yet such foreign 
policy understandings were not accepted by all Romanian elites, especially 
the Prime Minister as chief of the Government. June 2006 configured an 
episode of domestic contestation regarding the withdrawal of Romanian 
armed forces from Iraq. These debates were part of a wider attempt to re-
balance the state’s Atlantic vocation and ‘European’ self-image, which would 
in turn impact on Romanian identity and international stances. The 
governmental programme adopted in December 2004 outlined that the foreign 
policy priority of the Tăriceanu cabinet would be achieving EU accession, 
followed by other obligations stemming from NATO membership. The 
Government saw the fight against international terrorism and the involvement 
in the EU Foreign and Security Policy as equally important. The Presidency’s 
intensified Atlanticism for Romanian identity and foreign policy was absent. 
For Premier Tăriceanu’s cabinet, the EU and ‘European’ self-image were very 
significant and not secondary to the Atlantic vocation of Romanian national 
identity. In June 2006, the Prime Minister tried to contest the President’s sole 
de facto right to decide the maintaining of soldiers in Iraq, as well as re-
balance the ‘European’ and ‘Atlantic’ dimension of Romanian identity and 
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foreign policy. Tăriceanu’s challenge to Băsescu’s Atlanticist vision failed 
because it was not well planned and the ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and 
‘security provider’ self-images were more influential on national elites. 
 
Post-2005 the Presidency’s intensified Atlanticism also configured 
Romania’s Eastern foreign policy. The state was less involved in the internal 
‘European’ deliberations and much more preoccupied with the EU 
mechanisms that were relevant to the dominant Romanian self-images 
(‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’). Those EU policies pertained to 
the Eastern neighbourhood and the organisation’s possible future expansion. 
As a ‘border state’, Romania was looking to the East and connected the Euro-
Atlantic community with its non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity. The state’s Eastern 
projects were meant to democratise and stabilise the Black Sea region, but 
yielded mixed results. Romania promoted its own idea of a Black Sea 
initiative among multilateral cooperation arrangements directed by major 
actors like Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Romania’s ‘Black Sea Forum for 
Dialogue and Partnership’ was ignored by Russia and organised only one 
meeting in June 2006. The potential success of the ‘Black Sea Forum’ in 
particular and Romania’s Eastern foreign policy in general depended on a 
good working relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, President Băsescu 
consistently antagonised Russia via a somewhat aggressive and hostile 
rhetoric throughout late 2005 and 2006. It was not a rational attitude and 
rather one influenced by the negative representations of the ‘non-Euro-
Atlantic’ others circulated by the presidential discourses. As the logic of 
exclusion moved on to confrontation, the intensified Atlantic vocation of 
Romanian national identity shaped an antagonistic conduct towards the 
‘undemocratic’ Russian other. Another component of Romania’s Eastern 
foreign policy referred to relations with the Republic of Moldova and the 
latter’s EU prospects. Romanian-Moldovan dialogue had a promising 
beginning that eventually ended in a diplomatic crisis. Moldova had not 
internalised a ‘European’ international course and did not want to be ‘pushed’ 
by Romania in the EU. The Romanian state had also aimed to be included in 
the format of negotiations to solve the ‘frozen conflict’ of Transnistria, yet was 
refused by most participant states – the Republic of Moldova, Russia and 
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Ukraine. Overall, Romania’s Eastern foreign policy in 2005-2006 was marked 
by tentative progress which in the end proved to be a failure. This 
disappointment was assuaged by the state becoming an official EU member 
on 1 January 2007, which internationally validated all the three main themes 
of Romania’s post-communist national identity and foreign policy: ‘European’, 
‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’. 
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Conclusions regarding Romania’s National Identity and  
Foreign Policy (1990-2007) 
 
 
 
This thesis has explored the significance of national identity in shaping 
the trajectory of Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. To 
accomplish its aims, the project has employed a multi-dimensional 
framework of national identity, which draws from four literatures related to 
constructivism, nationalism scholarship, collective memory and self-esteem 
and international recognition. The framework has applied the following 
general constructivist ideas: the changing nature and ideational foundation of 
national identity; how it influences state action without imposing causality; 
the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation; the way 
identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible 
representations on the self-other nexus; inter-subjectivity as a feature of 
identity creation. The thesis has used nationalism and memory studies to 
identify the internal sources of national identity. A fairly obvious first 
domestic factor is the nation. The debates in the field of nationalism shed 
light on the imagined essence of the nation, which does not imply that 
nations are fictitious. They have a stable ethno-cultural core based on ethnic 
ancestry, language, territory and collective memories like internalised 
historical narratives and symbols. The second internal source of national 
identity refers to collective memory-myths, which are subjective 
interpretations of the nation’s remembered past that give meaning to the self-
images feeding into national identity and convey future aspirations. Apart 
from the two domestic factors of national identity, there is the external 
dimension of self-esteem and international recognition. Self-images and 
national identity require validation by others from the international realm. 
Identity verification is intertwined with self-esteem, which illustrates an 
important motivator in a state’s social survival and foreign policy. Self-images 
and national identity are negotiated between the self (the state) and its salient 
others. If self-images are not internationally recognised, the state appeals to 
different strategies such as identity re-definitions to convince external 
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audiences of their validity. The multi-dimensional view of national identity 
has provided some very interesting and unique insights in the case of 
Romanian post-communist foreign policy. 
 
Thus, the years 1990-1996 featured a rich palette of re-emerging 
meanings and three key ‘formative moments’ for Romania’s national identity 
and foreign policy. The first ‘formative moment’ configured the state’s 
international orientation towards ‘Europe’. Political leaders had to answer an 
existential question for the newly democratic Romania – to be or not to be 
‘European’? The 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ was a crucial 
episode of domestic contestation about the state’s future identity and 
international course. The President’s endorsement of the Soviet ‘Friendship 
Treaty’, which created a controversial security relationship with the USSR, 
was not shared by the majority of elites who wanted a Euro-Atlantic course 
for Romania. Although signed by the President, the treaty was not ratified by 
the Romanian Parliament and never became legally binding. Having chosen 
the European direction, a second ‘formative moment’ of 1990-1996 
underlined how Romania’s ‘European’ self-image was contested by and 
negotiated with external audiences. Despite internally constructing the state’s 
European identity, the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty showed the 
problematic aspects of gaining only partial recognition from the authoritative 
European self. Romania and Hungary had opposing conceptions of what 
European identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights. For Romania, 
European identity entailed a democratic Constitution, individual rights and 
native language provisions as appropriate protection for minorities. By 
contrast, Hungary and the UDMR considered collective rights and a form of 
ethnic autonomy to be the adequate standards for European identity. As 
these issues were still in flux at the ‘European’ level, Romania and Hungary 
were active participants in defining what European identity meant with 
respect to minority rights. Once the international community clarified its 
perspective, the two states reached a mutually acceptable compromise for the 
treaty text in 1996.  
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The period 1990-1996 also contained a third ‘formative moment’ that 
brought forward the main self-images of Romanian national identity: 
‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. The ‘European’ self-image 
was more intensely circulated at this time, yet the others were articulated as 
well. All three self-images formed an ideational foundation that shaped 
Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. The state’s relationship 
with the Balkans has been marked by rejection and acceptance. Romanian 
officials persistently tried to convince external audiences that their state was 
‘non-Balkan’. Even so, the ‘Balkan other’ was not constructed as a threat. The 
area was often represented as ‘our friends to the South’, with Yugoslavia 
described as ‘traditional partner’ and ‘best neighbour’. These articulations 
configured a ‘non-Balkan’ Romania that retained an affinity and friendly 
rapport with the Balkans. The ‘security provider’ self-image of Romanian 
identity presented a range of meanings like ‘reliable partner’ and ‘source of 
stability’. It had a discursive connection with NATO membership because 
Romania had to prove that it could contribute to allied military capabilities. 
But the self-image of ‘security provider’ was not simply a response to NATO 
discourses and accession criteria, since it was rooted in a long-standing 
collective memory-myth about Romania being a defender of Europe and the 
West. The ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’ self-images were particularly 
relevant in influencing Romanian positions on the Kosovo intervention and 
Iraq war.  
 
After Romania opted for a European orientation and discursively 
negotiated what European identity meant for its international affairs, the 
state’s journey of national identity and foreign policy in 1996-1999 
emphasised the inherent dilemmas of a European liberal democracy and 
security provider that has Balkan ties. Confronted with an escalating inter-
ethnic conflict in Kosovo, Romanian leaders needed to decide what would be 
the suitable stance for an aspiring liberal democracy with a security provider 
role, which had a traditional friendship and affinity with the Balkans too. The 
post-1996 discourses had consolidated the key themes of Romania’s foreign 
policy imaginary - ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’, while 
articulating an ideational shift towards the role of democracy in the state’s 
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evolution. Elites mentioned the ‘liberal democratic’ self-image of Romanian 
identity more often than the ‘European’ one, yet they were facets of the same 
representation. The Kosovo crisis was a ‘formative moment’ for national 
identity and international reactions. Romania had an evolving position on 
Kosovo which started with partial support for NATO in October 1998 and 
later changed to unconditional assistance for the Alliance’s air campaign in 
March-April 1999. The initial response of October 1998 was a middle ground 
with a dual objective. Partial support for NATO actions (airspace access in 
emergencies) did not explicitly oppose the Alliance or contradict Romania’s 
self-proclaimed Euro-Atlantic identity. It also accommodated the dilemmas 
within national identity - whether to act as a ‘European’ liberal democracy 
and ‘security provider’ or choose the traditional Balkan ties.  
 
This foreign policy decision was re-defined under the impact of three 
factors: national identity, rationalism and shifting international context. 
Rational interests were a component of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic goal and 
contributed to its Kosovo stance, but they cannot explain why the state did 
not fully endorse and assist NATO operations from the beginning. Here 
national identity shows the tensions between the two Romanian self-images - 
‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – and Balkan affinity, 
which shaped Romanian foreign policy. Critical events like the Kosovo conflict 
facilitate the re-articulation of international ideational contexts. In early 1999, 
the international discourses conveyed the urgency of a humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo and NATO states were ready to use force without a 
mandate from the UN Security Council. Prominent Euro-Atlantic voices talked 
about the negative implications of appeasing dictators and advocated a 
certain interpretation of Kosovo as a fight between the civilised values of 
liberal democracy and barbaric authoritarianism. This shifting ideational 
context enabled a hierarchy within Romanian identity, as the 
‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images became 
more relevant than traditional relations and affinity with the Balkans. 
Romania’s presidential and parliamentary discourses resonated with the idea 
of the state acting like an established liberal democracy. Once the tensions 
and dilemmas of national identity were solved in March-April 1999, Romania 
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supported NATO’s Operation ‘Allied Force’ in Kosovo by granting unrestricted 
airspace access without military troops. 
 
Having decided to behave like a credible ‘European’ liberal democratic 
state and security provider, the journey of Romania’s national identity and 
foreign policy in 2000-2004 moved on to another existential question – to be 
or not to be an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy? The years 2000-2004 featured the 
culmination of several ‘formative moments’ for Romanian identity and 
international politics. During the first post-communist decade, the state’s 
Euro-Atlantic national identity included three main self-images: 
‘European’/‘liberal democratic’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. The 
‘European’ self-image meant that Romania was an aspiring liberal democracy 
that required international recognition from the authoritative Euro-Atlantic 
community - NATO and EU states. At the crucial point of the 1999 Kosovo 
intervention, national identity underwent two fundamental re-definitions. 
Firstly, the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image started to gradually disappear from the 
foreign policy imaginary, which made the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and 
‘security provider’ ones to be dominant. Secondly, the ‘European’/‘liberal 
democratic’ self-image was re-articulated to a substantial extent. From 1990 
to 1999, the ‘European’ and ‘liberal democratic’ self-images constituted the 
same representation. The Kosovo ‘formative moment’ encouraged Romania’s 
‘liberal democratic’ self-image to be separated from its ‘European’ identity. As 
the international narratives of 1999 promoted the notions of humanitarian 
and democratic intervention, Romanian identity was re-defined as a pro-
active liberal democracy that helped to spread democratic principles; being a 
liberal democracy was not necessarily associated with ‘Europe’. This re-
articulation of national identity was central in clarifying Romania’s foreign 
policy on Iraq, whether it should opt for a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ orientation.  
 
During 2002-2003, France and Germany persisted in disarming Iraq 
via peaceful methods, while the US wanted to invade the country and remove 
its totalitarian regime through military force. NATO states were also divided 
on how to approach the Iraq situation. Romania initially attempted to remain 
neutral but decided to support the US and take part in the coalition against 
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Iraq in February 2003. Rationalism would say that Romania was merely 
currying favour with the US to finalise the NATO integration process. The 
state had been invited to join the Alliance in 2002 and its accession had to be 
ratified by each member. Yet the context was not straightforward, considering 
that France had a NATO veto at its disposal and both Germany and France 
were highly influential EU decision-makers. France had been very displeased 
by Romanian solidarity with the US on Iraq and threatened the state’s EU 
candidacy. According to a rational calculation, Romania was halfway in NATO 
and could lose much more by antagonising France and Germany. Romania 
could have formulated a limited backing for the US that did not entail sending 
armed forces. Instead, Romanian elites across the political spectrum agreed 
on a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq and full military participation. National 
identity can explain the state’s choice of foreign policy actions. The 
contradictory European (French-German) and Atlantic views on Iraq 
prompted an identity crisis within Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image. 
After intervening in Kosovo for humanitarian and democratic reasons, 
Romania as a pro-active liberal democracy seeking international validation 
could not entertain double standards and distinguish between dictatorships. 
Romania opted to become fully involved in the coalition against Iraq since this 
course of action was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined national 
identity - ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ - and the emerging Atlantic vocation of 
its foreign policy. At the time, specific Cold War memory-myths were 
particularly meaningful for Romanian leaders as they reinforced the state’s 
identity re-articulations and its Atlantic perspective. Romania and Central-
Eastern European states felt an emotional solidarity with American causes, 
because the US was collectively perceived and remembered as not having 
completely abandoned the region during communism. That is why many post-
communist states like Romania interpreted their support for the American 
democratic ideal as a moral duty, even at the expense of traditional relations 
with France and potential material costs. 
 
After re-defining national identity as a pro-active liberal democracy with 
an Atlantic vocation, Romania’s foreign policy story entered its final post-
communist formative period. The years 2004-2007 consolidated and 
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intensified the Atlanticism of Romanian identity and international politics. 
The post-2005 foreign policy imaginary was significantly shaped by the 
Băsescu presidential administration. President Băsescu promoted an overt 
Atlantic orientation and aimed to build a special relationship between the US, 
UK and Romania. For the first time, the Presidency’s intensified Atlanticism 
depicted as secondary the other key facet of Romanian national identity – the 
‘European’ self-image. Throughout the initial post-1990 decade, ‘European’ 
identity was a constant theme of the state’s foreign policy imaginary. In 1991, 
following the contested Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, ‘Europe’ became the clear 
international direction of Romania. After choosing ‘Europe’, the ‘European’ 
self-image of national identity was intensely re-articulated between 1990 and 
1996, impacting on Romania’s relations with Hungary. It influenced the 
state’s evolving stances on the Kosovo intervention during 1998-1999 as well. 
And the Iraq war of 2003 facilitated the fundamental re-definition of 
Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image as pro-active and Atlantic, without 
explicitly marginalising its ‘European’ identity. Nevertheless, as Romania had 
obtained NATO membership in 2004 and was close to EU accession, the 
presidential administration as a main foreign policy decision-maker had a 
specific view of the state’s international purpose. Romania intended to act like 
a ‘border state’ or bridge that linked the Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and 
EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic others. Since Romania had received 
international recognition for two self-images of its national identity – ‘liberal 
democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – through NATO integration, the state 
focused more on the ‘East’. Romania as an externally accepted pro-active 
liberal democracy with a security provider role wanted to democratise and 
stabilise the non-Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood. It also needed to maintain the 
contributions to military operations abroad as part of the international war on 
terrorism. These foreign policy meanings were not endorsed by all Romanian 
elites and especially the Prime Minister. He attempted to re-balance the 
‘European’ self-image and Atlantic dimension of national identity, which 
would affect Romanian international affairs. The Premier’s discursive efforts 
culminated in the June 2006 episode of internal contestation about 
withdrawing Romanian soldiers from Iraq. The Prime Minister’s challenge to 
the President’s Atlantic option was unsuccessful, because it was not well 
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planned and the ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’ self-
images had a greater impact on state officials. 
 
Post-2005 Romania’s intensified Atlanticism and ‘border state’ 
representation configured its Eastern foreign policy. Romania’s Eastern 
projects were supposed to spread democratic values and stabilise the non-
Euro-Atlantic vicinity, particularly the Black Sea area, yet produced mixed 
results. The state’s version of a Black Sea initiative had a very short activity 
as it was mostly ignored by Russia. The possible success of Romania’s 
Eastern policies depended on a reasonably good working relationship with 
Russia. However, in 2005-2006, the Romanian Presidency consistently 
antagonised Russia via a quite aggressive and hostile rhetoric. This was not a 
rational behaviour, but rather one shaped by the negative articulations of the 
non-Euro-Atlantic others advocated by the presidential discourses. The 
intensified Atlantic vocation of Romanian identity influenced the antagonistic 
attitude towards the ‘undemocratic’ Russian other. Romania’s Eastern foreign 
policy also included improving relations with the Republic of Moldova and the 
latter’s EU prospects. The inter-state communication showed a promising 
potential that unfortunately deteriorated into a diplomatic crisis. Moldova 
decided that it did not wish to be ‘pushed’ by Romania in acceding to the EU. 
Consequently, Romania’s Eastern foreign policy was characterised by 
tentative progress and ultimately failure in 2005-2006. Such a disappointing 
outcome was sweetened by Romania becoming an official EU member on 1 
January 2007, which granted international validation to all the three main 
themes of Romania’s post-communist national identity and foreign policy: 
‘European’, ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’. 
 
The trajectory of Romania’s national identity and foreign policy has 
been difficult at times, yet the discursive dialogue with the authoritative 
Euro-Atlantic self has re-defined the state into a credible European and 
Atlantic liberal democracy that plays a security provider role in the 
neighbouring regions. 
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